Had he succeeded in passing the Aar, he might have turned to his left, marched up the river, destroyed the bridges of Brugg, Aarau, and Olten, on which the French right depended for communication with the left ; - thus applying Principle 2. The French army would have been cut in two; and the Archduke would have applied Principle 1. by marching with his whole force against the successive fractions of the French left which were distributed along the Rhine.

The general neighbourhood of the point of attack, then, having been determined by the above considerations, the point itself was determined by the local peculiarities which have been described, which could hardly have been more favourable except in the one particular of anchorage.

It may be thought that the Archduke was wanting in enterprise in not persisting in his attempt, considering the immense preponderance of artillery-fire at his command, and the safety in which his troops might have formed on the opposite bank under its protection.

He had 40,000 men. After working fifteen hours his bridges were not half finished. Ney had arrived with 12,000 men and occupied a commanding position. Fifteen hours more would probably have seen 30,000 men in that position which the Archduke must carry

before he could advance; and here the advantage of artillery would be entirely in favour of the French.

Thus although the French could not have prevented the passage, it had become dangerous for the Archduke to effect it, as he would probably have been beaten afterwards with the river in his rear.

231

CHAP. VII.

MANŒUVRES.

WITHOUT a perfect knowledge of the art of handling troops, no man can be a great general; and drill is the basis of the perfection of the soldier as a military machine. Its object is to ensure that, through the habit acquired by constant exercise, a certain action of the soldier shall instantly and almost mechanically follow on a certain word of command spoken by the officer. It is an undoubted fact that many men who in their natural state would with difficulty be induced to face any danger, after they have been subjected to drill and discipline will, by reason of the force of the habit of obedience, follow their officer to almost certain death. Association and the fear of shame often confer a boldness which would not be found to exist in the same individual if solely dependent on himself. It may therefore be regarded as an axiom that drill and discipline of men in masses will increase their courage: if not courage of the highest order, it is still that which serves our turn, viz. readiness to attack, and obstinacy to withstand, an enemy.

In all armies, ancient and modern, the line of battle

has been divided into units, whose magnitude has been determined by the average range of the human voice. The unit should be as large as is consistent with the possibility of the men composing it, when formed in line, being directed by the voice of their commander.

The battalion is taken as the unit of the infantry line. The squadron and the battery as that of the cavalry and artillery respectively.

In our army 500 men in two ranks form a line of about 150 yards, as many as are usually found in the field, supernumeraries and non-effectives being taken into account; a greater extent of line might be inconvenient, although it is certain that in an attack the larger the mass to which unity of impulse can be communicated without confusion, the greater will be the chances of success.

The art of directing troops in battle consists in the just employment of the three arms in such a manner that they shall mutually support and defend each other to as great an extent as possible. No fixed rule can be laid down as to their relative proportion in the composition of an army. That must depend very much on the nature of the country in which an army operates.

But where such country is favourable to the march and action of those arms, a good proportion

is

Cavalry, one fourth of the infantry;

Artillery, four guns for every thousand men of infantry and cavalry united.

A few remarks on the combined employment of the three arms are necessary as an introduction to the subject of manoeuvring.

1st. Infantry alone should never be exposed to the attacks of cavalry and infantry.

In such a case, the infantry is obliged to show a front to the hostile infantry, while the cavalry charge it in flank, if in motion. Or if it form Or if it form squares when threatened by cavalry, the small fronts of the squares may be overwhelmed by the superior fire of the lines of opposing infantry, and charged by them during the confusion caused by that fire, while the cavalry is ready to take advantage of any wavering to complete the rout and to cut up the fugitives.

2nd. Infantry alone should not be exposed to attack from artillery and infantry.

The fire of the artillery will throw it into confusion, and the hostile infantry will complete the defeat. Nothing can be more opposed to the rules of war than for infantry alone to attack an enemy's infantry in position which is defended by artillery. The fire of the latter will throw the attacking force into confusion, and will expose it to an easy overthrow if it should succeed in reaching the position to be assaulted.