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can produce, and is to be imputed only to downright frenzy ? Since the world began, there hath not appeared a more general propensity to the wildest fanaticism than appeared in this island about the middle of the last century. 'Tis astonishing that when the minds of men were intoxicated with enthusiasm, none are to be found who advanced a claim to the power of working miracles—a claim which, in the author's opinion (Mr Hume's), though false, is easily supported and wonderfully successful, especially among enthusiasts.

"It is true, one or two frantic people among the Quakers did actually pretend to such a power; but this had no other consequence than to bring the pretenders into general contempt. In the beginning of this century, also, the French prophets revived this plea; but by no part of their conduct did they so effectually open the eyes of mankind, bring discredit on their inspirations, and ruin their cause, as by this no less foolish than presumptuous pretence; and though they were so deluded as to imagine that they could restore a dead man to life-nay, though they proceeded so far as to determine and announce beforehand the day and hour of his resurrection, yet none of them were so insane as to imagine they had seen him rise, and not one of them afterwards pretended that their prediction had been fulfilled. Thus even a frenzy which had disordered their intellects could not in this instance overpower their senses.”—Part II. § 2.

From these judicious remarks it plainly follows that the evidence of the senses, with regard to the objects proper to them, is not to be overpowered even by enthusiasm itself; and therefore, that those who are eyewitnesses of any miracle have, from the testimony of their senses, the most absolute and convincing proof of its existence.

VI. This first question being thus disposed of, the answer to the second naturally follows. For if eyewitnesses of a miracle, from the evidence of their senses, can have a full and absolute conviction, they doubtless can give testimony of this to others who were not present, and thus impart to them also as full a conviction as the nature of the case can possibly admit.

A miracle is a fact which depends solely upon the good pleasure and free choice of God; and the proof of its existence must be taken either from the evidence of our senses, if we ourselves see it, or from the testimony of others who have been eyewitnesses. There is no other way by which such facts as depend upon the will of free agents can possibly be proved; nor can any rational objection be made against their existence, when properly supported by either of these proofs, without directly striking at the proofs themselves, by supposing in them some defect or flaw. If, therefore, they possess all those conditions which, by the very constitution of our nature, command our assent, no objection, solely drawn from arguments extrinsic to these proofs, can have any weight against the evidence of the fact so proved by them. Now, as all the usual arguments brought against the existence of miracles vanish when opposed to the evidence of the senses in eyewitnesses, it follows that if such eyewitnesses are persons of veracity and probity, and possess those other qualities which preclude all suspicion of deceit, their testimony regarding what they saw must afford the most satisfactory conviction that what they assert is true, notwithstanding every metaphysical sophism to the contrary.

We can acquire the knowledge of facts past or distant only by the testimony of others; and the certainty which it affords us is in many cases as full and absolute as we

obtain from any other source of knowledge. Nay, when the testimony possesses the necessary conditions, it never fails to produce the most complete conviction.

These conditions are, first, certainty that the witnesses were not themselves deceived; secondly, certainty that they speak exactly according to their knowledge. When these two conditions concur, or when we believe that they exist, it is impossible to withhold our credit from the testimony. We may doubt if the witnesses were not themselves deceived-we may call in question their veracity; but if we have no doubt upon these points, it is no longer in our power to question the truth of what they say; we are forced to believe it, and to believe it with the utmost assurance, by the very constitution of our nature; and hence Dr Beattie, after some judicious observations, justly concludes, that "to believe testimony is agreeable to nature, to reason, and to sound philosophy," Essay on Truth, chap. ii. § 8.

VII. Now there are rules to ascertain when testimony is attended with the two conditions above mentioned— rules founded on principles born with us, and which are the foundation of human society, and of the whole intercourse between man and man,-namely, "That men are not fools and devoid of sense. That there are certain rules from which they seldom or never depart in their conduct. That there cannot be a joint combination among them to deceive. That if they sometimes deceive, it is not without some motive, particularly interest. That the whole world never conspires to deceive any man. That no man can deceive the whole world." These principles are ascertained by the concurrent belief of mankind, whose general practice is directed by them in the most important affairs of life-in proving genealogy, in settling property, in administering justice, and the

like; and from them this general maxim is deduced relative to our faith in testimony, "That we must believe the testimony of men when, the facts testified by them being possible, we cannot believe they are deceived, or intend to deceive, without supposing that they have lost their reason."

VIII. "Our faith in testimony," says Mr Beattie, "doth often, but not always, amount to absolute certainty. That there is such a city as Constantinople, such a country as Lapland, and such a mountain as the peak of Teneriff; that there were such men as Hannibal and Julius Cæsar ; that England was conquered by William the Norman ; and that Charles I. was beheaded,—of these and suchlike truths, every person acquainted with history and geography accounts himself absolutely certain. When a number of persons, not acting in concert, having no interest to disguise the truth, and who are sufficient judges of that to which they bear testimony, concur in making the same report, it would be accounted madness not to believe them. Nay, when a number of witnesses, separately examined, and having had no opportunity to concert a plan beforehand, do all agree in their declarations, we make no scruple of yielding full faith to their testimony, even though we have no evidence of their honesty and skill— nay, though they be notorious both for knavery and folly; because the fictions of the human mind being infinite, it is impossible that each of these witnesses should, by mere accident, devise the very same circumstances. If, therefore, their declarations concur, this is a certain proof that there is no fiction in the case, and that they all speak from real experience and knowledge."Essay on Truth, Part I. chap. ii. § 8.

IX. To the same purpose Mr Douglas speaks in his 'Criterion, or Miracles Examined,' on the force of

proper testimony: "Two qualifications," says he, "must concur to establish the credibility of witnesses; a sufficient knowledge of the matters of fact they attest, and a disposition not to falsify what they know and when these two qualifications do concur, we think ourselves obliged to admit what is attested as true."-P. 199. Dr Church, also, in his Vindication, p. 62, says: "It must be granted that present facts, which are appeals to the senses, are more striking and satisfactory than any long intricate reasonings. And hence miracles may be pronounced to be the shortest and clearest means of conviction of the divine authority of any mission, and consequently of any doctrine to those who see them. And further, as we may have sufficient certainty of their having been worked in times past, they must, if well attested, be full proofs, even to us who do not see them."

But it is needless to multiply testimonies on this point, as every one's experience must teach him that when we are persuaded that a person is not deceived himself, and that he truly speaks according to his knowledge, it is no longer in our power to withhold our assent from what he says. Consequently, if any miracle be attested by those who were eyewitnesses of it, and in such circumstances that we cannot suspect their veracity, we have from their testimony a full and convincing proof of the existence of the miracle,-a proof which, as Dr Beattie observes, "it would be accounted madness not to yield to;" and which, according to Mr Douglas, would oblige us to receive what was so attested as true. X. We may consider this subject in another point of view, which will illustrate it still further. It is doubtless a just and convincing inference which is made from the effect to the cause. We see an effect produced; we know the cause which naturally and constantly produces

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