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deavour to delude us by any false doctrine contrary to the Gospel.

XX. If we suppose that Almighty God should be pleased to reveal His will to man, and perform miracles to attest that the revelation was from Him, and should wish the knowledge of this revelation, and of the miracles attesting it, to be transmitted to future ages, how is it possible for this to be done but by human testimony? Can a Middleton or a Hume devise any other way? Will they pretend that a succession of miracles must be kept up in every generation, and in presence of every individual, in order to prove the original revelation? Will they blasphemously say that the omnipotent Being has it not in His power to transmit with certainty the knowledge of these things to future ages? How ridiculous, then, is it to assert that miracles cannot be proved by human testimony, since it is absolutely the only natural means by which such facts can be proved to those who are not themselves eyewitnesses of them.

XXI. The result of all this is, that no rational objection can be made against the existence of any miracle which does not strike at the testimony by which it is supported. But if this stand the test, no metaphysical argument a priori, and extrinsic to the testimony, can ever influence the mind, or weaken the conviction which the force of that testimony gives. And yet, upon examination we find that all the arguments brought by the above gentlemen and their party are entirely of this kind.

XXII. Here I shall say nothing of Mr Hume's vaunted argument against proving the existence of miracles by human testimony, the futility of which has been already demonstrated by several masterly hands. I shall only observe, with Dr Campbell, that one positive

credible testimony for the existence of a fact, possible in itself, is of more weight to convince a man of commonsense of the existence of such a fact, than ten hundred thousand millions of negative experiences against it; and this single observation, which is founded upon positive experience, and the feelings of our own heart, at once saps the foundation of all that Mr Hume has advanced upon the subject.

XXIII. The other arguments brought by the adversaries of revelation against our thesis may be reduced to these following: Miracles are unnecessary; they are inexpedient; they are incredible; they are trifling, and unworthy of the Deity; there are no ends to be gained by them worthy of such extraordinary divine interposition; the doctrine pretended to be attested by them is absurd, from which they conclude that no human testimony can render them credible in any circum

stance.

I know not if these gentlemen have ever seriously examined the force of these reasons, or applied them to any particular case, or even put them into proper form, that they might see wherein their strength or weakness lay. I can scarcely think that if they had ever done so they would have exposed themselves to the contempt which such objections must necessarily evoke; nor do I find, in their writings or conversation, any serious reasoning, but a witticism or a sneer, with the words "incredible, unnecessary, inexpedient," and the like, interspersed in order to give an appearance of reason to their declamation.

But let us reduce their objection to form, that common-sense may estimate its value. Let us suppose, then, a miracle-that, for example, of a blind man restored to sight to be attested upon oath by three or four men

of known probity, who declare that they were eyewitnesses of it. Every man of ordinary judgment would be satisfied of the fact by such testimony. It could not be imagined that the witnesses were mistaken, as it is supposed they knew the man to be blind, and saw him perfectly restored to sight; much less could it be thought that men of known probity would attest a thing upon oath as eyewitnesses, if they had no had as full a conviction as the testimony of their senses could possibly give them. And if they be not mistaken in what they saw, and attest the fact precisely as they beheld it, the existence of the miracle is an undoubted consequence.

Let us now see the force of the objection when put in its proper form. In the mouth of a deist, it runs thus: "Several men of probity have attested upon oath that they saw a man, whom they knew before to be blind, miraculously restored to sight; but this appears inexpedient, unnecessary, without any good end, intrinsically incredible-therefore it is a mistake; no such miracle was performed." The major proposition is the state of the case as attested, the minor is the very argument of the deists; for surely none of them will dare to affirm that miracles are "inexpedient, unnecessary," or the like, in themselves. All they can say is, that so they appear to them; and from this they conclude, as from an answerable argument, that the best-attested miracles are falsehoods and fiction! How ridiculous the conclusion!

In order that a well-attested miracle be regarded falsehood or fiction, one of two things must be clearly proved, either that the witnesses are deceived in the testimony of their senses, or that they knowingly perjure themselves in order to deceive others. Now what connection is there between the apparent non-necessity or inexpe

diency of the miracle in the eyes of a deist and either of these two points? Because the miracle seems unnecessary or inexpedient to a deist, does it follow that the witnesses were deceived in what they saw with their eyes, or that they voluntarily perjured themselves by swearing contrary to their conscience? How unworthy of a philosopher to argue in such a strain !

XXIV. Their arguments from the unworthiness of the ends of miracles, and from the pretended absurdity of the doctrine attested by them, I have considered more particularly above, and have pointed out whence all their sophistry arises. I shall conclude this subject, therefore, by a few observations on the incredibility of the miraculous facts attested.

One can scarcely think men serious when they object to the existence of miracles on this account; or at least it were to be wished they would explain their meaning of the intrinsic incredibility of a miracle. If they mean that every miraculous fact involves an absolute contradiction-or, in other words, that a miracle is in itself impossible-let them rest upon that in plain terms, and prove it if they can; but if they allow that miracles are possible, how ridiculous is it to object that any possible fact is intrinsically incredible, when omnipotence itself is supposed to be the agent! Is any possible thing too difficult for God to perform? is any possible change in His creatures above His strength? Even Dr Middleton, with reason, dismisses such an objection : "To say that where the facts themselves are incredible," says he, "such miracles are to be rejected, is to beg the question, and not to prove it; a too precarious way of reasoning, because what is incredible to me may seem credible to another."-Remarks on the Observator, p. 26

et seq.

Mr Locke, whose justness of thought and strength of genius will not readily be called in question, is so far from regarding the extraordinary character of the fact as an argument against its existence, that in certain circumstances he draws the very opposite conclusion: "Though the common experience," says he, "and the ordinary course of things, have justly a mighty influence on the minds of men, to make them give or refuse credit to anything proposed to their belief, yet there is one case wherein the strangeness of the fact lessens not the assent to a fair testimony given of it. For where such supernatural events are suitable to ends aimed at by Him Who has the power to change the course of nature, there, under such circumstances, they may be the fitter to procure belief, by how much the more they are beyond or contrary to ordinary observation."-Ess. on the Hum. Und., iv. 16, § 13. This is a just remark, with which we shall here conclude the subject; because afterwards, when treating on the continuation of miracles in the Church of Christ, this objection from the incredibility of the fact must be resumed, and more fully refuted.

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