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been merely a delusion. See to what a shocking conclusion Benevolus's proposition necessarily leads us!

Phil. I must own, I had no idea that it involved such consequences; and yet, from what you say, I see no means of defending it from them. For my own part, I am thoroughly convinced of its dreadful tendency; nor should I insist more upon the subject; but, as I may have occasion to converse with others, I should wish to know what can be said to the arguments by which they may pretend to support it.

Orth. Let us us hear, then, what these arguments are. I may venture to say beforehand that they are not to the purpose; nay, that you yourself can be at no loss, after what has been said, to see their weakness and inconclusiveness.

Phil. I shall not say what intrinsic weight they may really have; but I cannot help thinking that they have a considerable degree of plausibility. I shall propose them in Benevolus's own words: "Though you should work a miracle, even raise a person from the dead in attestation of transubstantiation, I should not be convinced by it, but would believe that Almighty God had permitted it as a trial of my faith and steadfastness in the truth, and not as a proof of the doctrine; and I have good reason to say so―ist, because it is plain, both from the Old and New Testament, from the magicians of Egypt, the false prophets mentioned Deut. xiii., and from Antichrist, that miracles may be wrought seemingly in attestation of false doctrine, though really they are only permitted to try people's faith; and, 2dly, because transubstantiation is incapable of being proved by miracle." In these words you see that two reasons are included in defence of the proposition, "That God may permit wicked spirits to work miracles for their own ends, though

His design in permitting them is only to try our faith; and that transubstantiation is incapable of being proved by any miracle.”

Orth. The first of these has already been answered; but that you may still more clearly see its weakness, I shall make another observation. There are, you know, two kinds of miracles, that may be wrought in confirmation of doctrine; some that do not exceed the natural power of spiritual beings, whether good or bad, and are termed relative miracles; others which are above the reach of all created power, that can be performed only by God Himself, and are therefore called absolute miracles.* A relative miracle, known as such, can never of itself give thorough conviction of the truth of any doctrine, unless it be otherwise proved to be the work of God, or of good angels commissioned by Him; but a miracle of the second kind must produce absolute conviction that the person, at whose desire it is performed, is sent by God, and that "the word of the Lord in his mouth is true," 1 Kings, xvii.t

Now the examples cited by Benevolus from the Scriptures are all of the first kind, merely relative; they show, indeed, that God may, and sometimes does, permit the devil, by his agents, to do extraordinary things within the compass of his own natural strength, seemingly in proof of falsehood, though permitted by God only to try people's faith, or for some other good end; but what is that to the point? The raising of a dead man to life is above the utmost power of Satan, a miracle proper to God alone, and therefore the most unanswerable proof of any doctrine in confirmation of which it is performed. Allowing,

* See above, Chap. I. cn the different kinds of miracles.
+ See above, Chap. IX. on the authority of miracles.

then, that the devil is sometimes permitted to do signs and wonders within the reach of his own power, in support of false doctrine, will this ever excuse Benevolus for refusing to believe a doctrine, which he supposes confirmed by a miracle proper to God himself, and which none but His almighty power can perform?

For my part, I see nothing to which such incredulity can better be compared than to that of Pharaoh; for though Moses wrought before that prince such miracles as compelled even his own magicians to confess, "That the finger of God was there, yet Pharaoh's heart was hardened, and he hearkened not unto them," Exod. viii. 19. It is also extremely unfortunate for Benevolus that our blessed Saviour Himself brings this very case of “refusing to believe though one should rise from the dead," as an instance of the most obstinate and consummate infidelity, Luke, xvi. 31. Nor do I see how Benevolus's proposition can escape the same condemnation; at least I think it manifest that this first argument, which you have brought, cannot justify it.

Phil. I must indeed acknowledge that I do not see how it can; and its fallacy is evident from the distinction between relative and absolute miracles, to which I did. not at first advert. But what do you say to the second reason alleged, that "transubstantiation is incapable of being proved by any miracle?"

Orth. If this be really true, and can be clearly proved, then the dispute is at an end, and victory must be with Benevolus. I suppose he has summed up all that can be said in proof of this assertion, as I know it is a favourite topic of his; let us hear, then, what he says for this purpose.

Phil. I assure you he says a great deal, and perhaps more to the point than you imagine. I will state his

arguments in his own words: "I say transubstantiation is incapable of being proved by a miracle, and that for two reasons: First, because there is the same evidence against that doctrine that there can be for the truth of any miracle—I mean the testimony of the human senses; for, if I believe my senses, I cannot believe transubstantiation; and if I disbelieve my senses, I could not believe the truth of your miracle. Secondly, Transubstantiation is incapable of being proved by a miracle, because it involves many contradictions." He proceeds then to show some of the many contradictions which flow from this tenet, and which make it absolutely impossible that any miracle can prove it to be true; for what is in itself founded on contradiction, and therefore an impossibility, can never be proved a truth, by any evidence whatever.

Orth. I imagined that he would take his stand there. These are the common arguments used against transubstantiation, and have been again and again fully answered by those who hold that doctrine. I should not wish,

however, to occupy your time by repeating here what others have said; but as all the arguments against transubstantiation are founded on either a real or pretended ignorance of what its defenders believe and teach, I shall lay before you a clear explanation of the doctrine itself, from which you will immediately see how little to the point are all the objections brought against it.

Phil. You will afford me particular pleasure; for, to say the truth, I have not a clear idea of it myself; and in many discussions I have thought that the disputants did not seem to understand each other, or even to have a distinct idea of what they themselves would argue for. Orth. That is too frequently the case in controversies on religion. Each one thinks himself master of the subject, though in reality his knowledge of it be ex

VOL. II.

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tremely superficial; generally he forms false and unjust ideas of the tenets of his adversaries, and, in combating them, he only combats the phantoms of his own imagination. Hence there is no end to disputes, and to improper, nay, impious expressions, among which, I fear, Benevolus's proposition will find a distinguished place. This, in a great measure, I have shown already, but it will be more evident as we proceed in our examination.

Phil. I believe your observation is just, and I am persuaded that many religious discussions would soon terminate, if the parties, before they begin to argue, would fix the precise point in question, and lay down a clear explanation of their respective tenets. This I long to hear done with regard to transubstantiation.

Orth. All the arguments of reason urged against this doctrine are drawn from philosophy; and you see that the two arguments used by Benevolus are entirely of this kind. The supporters of transubstantiation, then, are only called upon to reconcile it with sound philosophy, and if they do all objections vanish.

In philosophy we must distinguish what is founded on evident facts and experience from what is merely theoretical, and invented to explain the phenomena of nature. The former is steady and uniform, and must be the same, in all times, to every attentive inquirer; the other is fluctuating and uncertain, and has changed in almost every age. Objections have been made against transubstantiation, from the principles adopted by the different systems of philosophy, and have, with equal ease, been solved from the same assumed principles. It is needless, however, to repeat here what has been urged from systems now exploded. I shall confine myself, therefore, to what is now regarded as the most certain and rational system, and, from its principles, I shall

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