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arguments in his own words: I say transubstantiation is incapable of being proved by a miracle, and that for two reasons: First, because there is the same evidence against that doctrine that there can be for the truth of any miracle—I mean the testimony of the human senses; for, if I believe my senses, I cannot believe transubstantiation; and if I disbelieve my senses, I could not believe the truth of your miracle. Secondly, Transubstantiation is incapable of being proved by a miracle, because it involves many contradictions." He proceeds then to show some of the many contradictions which flow from this tenet, and which make it absolutely impossible that any miracle can prove it to be true; for what is in itself founded on contradiction, and therefore an impossibility, can never be proved a truth, by any evidence whatever.

Orth. I imagined that he would take his stand there. These are the common arguments used against transubstantiation, and have been again and again fully answered by those who hold that doctrine. I should not wish, however, to occupy your time by repeating here what others have said; but as all the arguments against transubstantiation are founded on either a real or pretended ignorance of what its defenders believe and teach, I shall lay before you a clear explanation of the doctrine itself, from which you will immediately see how little to the point are all the objections brought against it.

Phil. You will afford me particular pleasure; for, to say the truth, I have not a clear idea of it myself; and in many discussions I have thought that the disputants did not seem to understand each other, or even to have a distinct idea of what they themselves would argue for. Orth. That is too frequently the case in controversies on religion. Each one thinks himself master of the subject, though in reality his knowledge of it be ex

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tremely superficial; generally he forms false and unjust ideas of the tenets of his adversaries, and, in combating them, he only combats the phantoms of his own imagination. Hence there is no end to disputes, and to improper, nay, impious expressions, among which, I fear, Benevolus's proposition will find a distinguished place. This, in a great measure, I have shown already, but it will be more evident as we proceed in our examination.

Phil. I believe your observation is just, and I am persuaded that many religious discussions would soon terminate, if the parties, before they begin to argue, would fix the precise point in question, and lay down a clear explanation of their respective tenets. This I long to hear done with regard to transubstantiation.

Orth. All the arguments of reason urged against this doctrine are drawn from philosophy; and you see that the two arguments used by Benevolus are entirely of this kind. The supporters of transubstantiation, then, are only called upon to reconcile it with sound philosophy, and if they do all objections vanish.

In philosophy we must distinguish what is founded on evident facts and experience from what is merely theoretical, and invented to explain the phenomena of nature. The former is steady and uniform, and must be the same, in all times, to every attentive inquirer; the other is fluctuating and uncertain, and has changed in almost every age. Objections have been made against transubstantiation, from the principles adopted by the different systems of philosophy, and have, with equal ease, been solved from the same assumed principles. It is needless, however, to repeat here what has been urged. from systems now exploded. I shall confine myself, therefore, to what is now regarded as the most certain and rational system, and, from its principles, I shall

explain to you the Catholic teaching concerning transubstantiation.

Phil. I suppose you mean the philosophy of the mind and of common-sense, which Dr Reid, in his Inquiry, and Dr Beattie, in his Essay on Truth, have so clearly explained, and so solidly established.

Orth. I do; and from the language of nature, explained by these learned gentlemen, I lay down the following observations, which will serve as so many principles in our present inquiry.

First, The different qualities which we observe in bodies, by means of our senses-their colour, smell, taste, and the like-are not in these bodies themselves what they are in our mind. In us they are sensations, feelings, or perceptions excited in our mind, by the mediate or immediate action of external objects upon the organs of our senses. Thus, the feeling which we have of colour, is not in the coloured body, but is excited by the rays of light reflected in a certain manner from that body, which, striking on our eyes, excite in the mind that sensation which we call colour; and, according to the different proportions in which the rays of light are reflected to our eyes, the sensations of different colours are excited. In like manner, when we taste sugar, the sweetness is not in the sugar, but is a perception or feeling excited in our mind by the particles of sugar acting upon our organ of taste when applied to it. The same observation holds true in all the sensible qualities which we perceive in bodies; and may be explained by a familiar example. When the point of a needle is pressed upon any part of our body, we experience that uneasy sensation which we call pain; now it is evident this pain is not in the needle, but is a feeling of our mind caused by the needle. So when we smell

a rose, the agreeable odour which we experience is not in the rose, but is a sensation excited in our mind by the perfume of the rose applied to our organ of smell.

Secondly, In examining objects we must carefully distinguish three things; first, the feelings or sensations excited in our minds by the actions of those objects upon our organs of sense; secondly, the particular qualities. or dispositions of the objects themselves, by which they excite such feelings; and thirdly, the material part or substance of the objects, in which the particular qualities or dispositions reside.

Thirdly, A little attention to what passes in our minds will convince us that we are totally ignorant of the material part or substance of all surrounding objects; that we are no less ignorant of the nature of the particular qualities or dispositions of bodies, by which they act upon our organs, and excite certain feelings and sensations in our mind; and that all our natural knowledge of bodies is confined to their sensible qualities alone, as perceived by us. From these we argue that there are bodily objects really existing without us, and independent of us; that they have in themselves certain qualities or arrangements of their component parts, calculated to excite various sensations in us, when applied to the organs of our senses; that these qualities are different in different objects, which excite various sensations, according to their respective qualities; that these qualities may be changed in the same object, so that it shall cease to excite the sensations in us which it formerly did, and excite others which it did not raise before, &c.

Fourthly, As it is experience alone that shows us the connection between the several bodies around us, and the corresponding sensations which they excite in our minds; and as this connection is constant, we naturally

conclude that these bodies are the causes of the sensations which we feel, and being ignorant of the manner in which they produce these effects, "without inquiring farther," as Dr Reid justly observes, "we attribute to the cause some vague and indistinct notion of power or virtue to produce the effect. In many cases the purposes of life do not make it necessary to give distinct names to the cause and the effect; and hence it happens, that being closely connected in the imagination, though very unlike to each other, one name serves for both, which occasions an ambiguity in many terms in all languages. Thus magnetism signifies both the power or virtue in the loadstone to attract the iron as a cause, and the motion in the iron towards the loadstone as an effect. Heat signifies both a sensation of our mind, and a quality or state of bodies apt to excite that sensation in u's. The names of all smells, tastes, sounds, as well as heat and cold, have a like ambiguity in all languages, though, in common language, they are rarely used to signify the sensations, but generally the external qualities indicated by the sensations."

Fifthly, In like manner, this general term, the sensible qualities of bodies, is ambiguous: it signifies both that particular aptitude, power, or virtue in bodies to excite. certain sensations in our mind, when applied to our organs of sense; and also these very sensations themselves. In the former sense it signifies a thing of which we have no idea, and are totally ignorant in what it conin the latter, it signifies a thing with which we are thoroughly acquainted.

sists;

Sixthly, As we are totally ignorant of the nature of sensible qualities residing in the objects around us, so we are equally ignorant of the reason why they excite their corresponding sensations in our mind. We can see