carrying them down to the end of the fourth, others admitting those of the fifth age, and others allowing many true and real miracles to be incontestably proved, even to the end of the sixth century.

From this dissension among themselves upon one of the two great points in debate, we must naturally infer that the arguments for the cessation of miracles at these respective periods cannot be conclusive; for, were the reasons at any one of these periods stronger than at another, there could be no dissension; but all would agree on that period which was proved by the most conclusive arguments. Seeing, therefore, that they do not agree, but that each one thinks his own arguments the best, this is an undeniable proof that they are all equally worthless and inconclusive.

But, however these writers differ in their conclusions, we find that they all proceed upon the same principle, their aversion to Popery, and only differ in their ideas of Popish doctrines, and about the date when those doctrines began. "No true miracles must be allowed after the corruptions of Popery were introduced into the Church!" This is the grand principle on which they all agree among themselves, and even with Doctor Middleton! But what are the corruptions of Popery? and when did they begin? In this they differ widely. To Dr Middleton nothing is more plain than that "the sign of the cross; praying for the dead; mixing the cup with water; sending the consecrated elements to the absent; keeping the consecrated bread at home in private houses and for private use; looking upon it as a defence against devils; styling the Eucharist the sacrifice of the body of Christ; offering it up in memory of the martyrs; calling it most tremendous mystery, dreadful solemnity, and the like." To the

Doctor nothing is more plain than that all this is rank Popery: "What is all this (says he) but a description of that sacrifice of the Mass which the Romanists offer at this day both for the living and the dead?" Introd., p. liii.

But the Doctor found these things manifestly taught and practised by the fathers and Christians of the second and third ages, by Justin Martyr, by Cyprian, by Tertullian, whose plain testimonies he cites for that purpose. Consequently, according to his idea of Popish corruptions, and in conformity with the above principle, which he lays down in common with his adversaries, he is forced to reject all miracles even in those early ages, and to maintain that the cessation took place just after the days of the apostles.

Others do not look upon the above articles as Popish corruptions, but think that "the sign of the cross," which the Church of England uses in baptism, may be practised without idolatry, and that mixing water in the cup, and even offering up the elements as an oblation or sacrifice, are consonant to primitive purity. They even believe that praying for the dead may be lawfully used, and with those Protestant bishops whom the Duchess of York, King James II. of England's first wife, consulted upon that head, they wish that this and some other points had not been done away by their reforming

ancestors.

Persons of this turn of mind have generally an esteem for antiquity, and wish it to be thought that their religious principles were authorised and followed by the Christian world in the most primitive ages. They contend, that as Popery (that is, what they consider Popery) did not commence for some ages after the apostles, there is no reason for denying the existence and continuation of

miracles during those pure ages; and therefore they uphold them against Dr Middleton, by the force of human testimony, by the authority of the Christian writers, of the holy fathers and church historians, who flourished during the period which they assign for their continuation.

Of these gentlemen it may be remarked that, although they have no other way of proving this continuation down to their respective assigned periods than this testimony, and declare it to be, in their opinion, a full and satisfactory proof, yet, the moment after these their respective eras, they deny it all weight, and treat it as utterly incapable of proving the existence of one single miracle. Why so? In the judgment even of their Protestant brethren the testimony is the same afterwards as before, nor can any rational cause be assigned why it should not be of equal value in both cases. But if it were allowed to proceed, it would favour Popery, and therefore, be the consequences what they may, it must be rejected. Is it not evident that this is mere trifling, and that all that they advance upon this subject is nothing but opinion and prejudice in favour of a preconceived hypothesis, which each one assumes as best suits his own fancy?

XXIII. It appears, then, that Dr Middleton and his Protestant opponents are in reality in the same predicament, all building upon the same foundation, "a mere begging of the question," and assuming as truth what they can never prove; nay, what is not only called in question, but absolutely denied, and looked upon as impiety and heresy by the great majority of Christendom. Whatever weight, therefore, this may have against Dr Middleton's system in the mouth of his opponents, it must militate with equal force against themselves. He and they must stand or fall together.

XXIV. This, however, will be more evident when we take a more minute view of their way of managing their cause. Between them and the Doctor there is the most perfect conformity. The same arguments by which they show the falsehood of the Doctor's system, and prove that the power of miracles continued in the Church after the apostolic age, show equally the falsehood of their own various systems, and prove that these powers most certainly continued in the Church after the different periods which they respectively assign. And the reasons by which they as Christians pretend to show that the miracles said to have been wrought after their supposed periods of cessation are falsehood and forgery, have the self-same force in the mouths of heathens and deists to prove that the miracles which they admit, and even the Scripture miracles themselves, are exactly of the same kind.

XXV. As it would be tedious, and indeed an endless repetition, to examine each of their systems apart, I shall confine myself to the one most commonly received by Protestants: That the power of miracles continued in the Church till about the end of the third, or the beginning of the fourth century, and was then totally withdrawn. This opinion is adopted, and strenuously defended by Mr Brook, in his "Examination of the Free Inquiry;" a work in which he has displayed, in a masterly manner, all that can be said in defence of this system, or indeed of any of the others; for in all the arguments are the same, and only arbitrarily applied to the different periods, without any reason for appropriating them to one more than to another. amining, therefore, what Mr Brook advances upon this system, we, in fact, examine all the others at the same time.

In ex

XXVI. I have stated that Protestants who write against the Doctor's system have chiefly two points in view, and that their whole aim is to establish them: "That the power of working miracles continued in the Christian Church for some ages after the apostles; and that it was totally withdrawn from her at those particular periods which they respectively assign." The first of these propositions they maintain against Dr Middleton, the other against the Catholic Church. For the sake of perspicuity we shall treat them separately.

XXVII. In proving that miracles continued in the Church for some time after the apostles, two kinds of arguments are used; the first is drawn from presumptive evidence, the second from positive testimony. The first shows that it was reasonable to expect miracles after the apostolic age, removes such prejudices as might arise against them, and, of course, prepares the mind to believe them. The other shows that they actually were performed; and the two produce complete conviction. "The miracles of the earlier ages of the Christian Church (says Mr Brook) are probable in themselves; there is a strong presumptive evidence of their truth and reality. There is no sufficient reason to suspect that evidence; of consequence, when well attested, they are equally to be believed with any other common historical facts. They are not therefore to be set aside, where there is the unanimous testimony of credible witnesses, without destroying the faith of all history, without introducing an universal scepticism." Brook's Examin., p. 51.

A little after he adds: "If facts probable in themselves, the truth of which we have no reason to suspect from the nature of the thing, but, on the contrary, there appear manifest reasons why we should believe them, are nevertheless to be set aside as doubtful and incredible, though