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Mr. Madison, whose adverse opinion in the Federalist had been relied upon by those who denied the exclusive power, now participated in the debate. He declared that he had reviewed his former opinions, and he summed up the whole case as follows:
"The Constitution affirms that the executive power is
vested in the President. Are there exceptions to this propappointing to office the Senate shall be associated with the osition? Yes, there are. The Constitution says that in President, unless in the case of inferior officers, when the law shall otherwise direct. Have we (that is, Congress) a stitution has invested all executive power in the President, right to extend this exception? I believe not. If the ConI venture to assert that the legislature has no right to di minish or modify his executive authority. The question now resolves itself into this: Is the power of displacing an executive power? I conceive that if any power whatsoever is in the Executive it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws. If the Consti tution had not qualified the power of the President in appointing to office by associating the Senate with him in that business, would it not be clear that he would have the right, by virtue of his executive power, to make such appointment? Should we be authorized, in defiance of that clause in the ConstitutionThe executive power shall be vested in the President'-to unite the Senate with the President in that we should not be authorized to do this, I think it may the appointment to office? I conceive not. If it is admitted be disputed whether we have a right to associate them in removing persons from office, the one power being as much of an executive nature as the other; and the first one is lished by the Constitution in these words: The executive authorized by being excepted out of the general rule estabpower shall be vested in the President.""
The question thus ably and exhaustively argued was decided by the House of Representatives, by a vote of thirty-four to twenty, in favor of the principle that the executive power of removal is vested by the Constitution in the Executive, and in the Senate by the casting vote of the Vice President.
abuse of the power; from the supposed tendency of an exposure of public officers to capricious removal to impair the efficiency of the civil service; from the alleged injustice and hardship of displacing incumbents dependent upon their official stations, without sufficient consideration; from a supposed want of responsibility on the part of the President; and from an imagined defect of guaranties against a vicious President who might incline to abuse the power. On the other hand, an exclusive power of removal by the President was defended as a true exposition of the text of the Constitution. It was maintained that there are certain causes for which persons ought to be removed from office without being guilty of treason, bribery, or malfeasance, and that the nature of things demands that it should be so. Suppose," it was said, "a man becomes insane by the visitation of God, and is likely to ruin our affairs, are the hands of the Government to be confined from warding off the evil? Suppose a person in office, not possessing the talents he was judged to have at the time of the appointment, is the error not to be corrected? Suppose he acquires vicious habits and incurable indolence, or total neglect of the duties of his office, which shall work mischief to the public welfare, is there no way to arrest the threatened danger? Suppose he becomes odious and unpopular, by reason of the measures he pursues and this he may do without committing any positive offense against the law-must he preserve his office in despite of the popular will? Suppose him grasping for his own aggrandizement and the elevation of his connections by every means short of the treason defined by the Constitution, hurrying your affairs to the precipice of destruction, endangering your domestic tranquillity, plundering you of the means of defense, alien ating the affection of your allies, and promoting the spirit of discord; must the tardy, tedious, desultory road by way of impeachment be travelled to overtake the man who, barely confining himself within the letter of the law, is employed in drawing off the vital principle of the Government? The nature of things, the great objects of society, the express objects of the Constitution itself, require that this thing should be otherwise. To unite the Senate with the President The question came before the Supreme Court in the exercise of the power," it was said, "would of the United States in January, 1839, ex parte involve us in the most serious difficulty. Sup- Hennen. It was declared by the Court on that pose a discovery of any of those events should occasion, that the power of removal from office take place when the Senate is not in session, how was a subject much disputed, and upon which a is the remedy to be applied? The evil could be great diversity of opinion was entertained in the avoided in no other way than by the Senate sit-early history of the Government. This related, ting always." In regard to the danger of the however, to the power of the President to remove power being abused if exercised by one man, it officers appointed with the concurrence of the was said that the danger is as great with Senate; and the great question was whether the respect to the Senate, who are assembled from removal was to be by the President alone, or various parts of the continent, with different with the concurrence of the Senate, both conimpressions and opinions;" "that such a body stituting the appointing power. No one denied is more likely to misuse the power of removal the power of the President and Senate jointly than the man whom the united voice of America to remove where the tenure of the office was not calls to the presidential chair. As the nature fixed by the Constitution, which was a full recog. of government requires the power of removal," nition of the principle that the power of removal it was maintained' that it should be exercised was incident to the power of appointment; but in this way by the hand capable of exerting it- it was very early adopted as a practical conself with effect; and the power must be construction of the Constitution, that this power ferred on the President by the Constitution, as was vested in the President alore; and such the executive officer of the Government." would appear to have been the legislative con
The question has often been raised in subsequent times of high excitement, and the practice of the Government has nevertheless conformed in all cases to the decision thus early made.
The question was revived during the adminis tration of President Jackson, who made, as is well recollected, a very large number of removals, which were made an occasion of close and rigorous scrutiny and remonstrance. The subject was long and earnestly debated in the Senate, and the early construction of the Constitution was nevertheless freely accepted as binding and conclusive upon Congress.
uction of the Constitution, for in the organi-ernment appointed by the President, whose term of duration is not specially declared. It is supported by the weighty tion of the three great Departments of State, reason that the subordinate officers in the executive depart War, and Treasury, in the year 1789, provision ment ought to hold at the pleasure of the head of the de was made for the appointment of a subordinate partment, because he is invested generally with the execnthe Senate was an exception to a general principle and officer by the head of the Department, who should tive authority, and the participation in that authority by have charge of the records, books, and papers ought to be taken strictly. The President is the great appertaining to the office when the head of the responsible officer for the faithful execution of the law, and the power of removal was incidental to that duty, and might Department should be removed from office by the often be requisite to fulfill it." President of the United States. When the Navy Thus has the important question presented by Department was established, in the year 1798, this bill been settled, in the language of the late provision was made for the charge and custody Daniel Webster, (who, while dissenting from it, of the books, records, and documents of the De- admitted that it was settled,) by construction, partment in case of vacancy in the office of Sec- settled by precedent, settled by the practice of retary by removal or otherwise. It is not here the Government, and settled by statute. The said by removal of the President," as is done events of the last war furnished a practical conwith respect to the heads of the other Depart-firmation of the wisdom of the Constitution as ments, yet there can be no doubt that he holds it has hitherto been maintained, in many of its
his office with the same tenure as the other Sec
retaries, and is removable by the President. The change of phraseology arose, probably, from its having become the settled and well-understood construction of the Constitution that the power of removal was vested in the President alone in such cases, although the appointment of the of ficer is by the President and Senate. (13 Peters, page 139.)
of consideration. When the war broke out, rebel parts, including that which is now the subject enemies, traitors, abettors, and sympathizers, were found in every Department of the Government, as well in the civil service as in the land and naval military service. They were found in Congress and among the keepers of the Capitol; in foreign missions; in each and all of the executive Departments; in the judicial service; Our most distinguished and accepted commen- in the post office, and among the agents for contators upon the Constitution concur in the con- ducting Indian affairs. Upon probable suspicion struction thus early given by Congress, and thus sanctioned by the Supreme Court. After a full they were promptly displaced by my predecesanalysis of the congressional debate to which I sor, so far as they held their offices under execNo complaints have referred, Mr. Justice Story comes to this utive authority, and their duties were confided to new and loyal successors. power or doubts of its wisdom were conclusion: "After a most animated discussion, against that the vote finally taken in the House of Repre-entertained in any quarter. I sincerely trust sentatives was affirmative of the power of re- and believe that no such civil war is likely to moval in the President, without any co-operation occur again. I cannot doubt, however, that in of the Senate, by the vote of thirty-four mem- whatever form, and on whatever occasion, sedibers against twenty. In the Senate, the clause tion can raise an effort to hinder, or embarrass, in the bill affirming the power was carried by the casting vote of the Vice President. That or defeat, the legitimate action of this Governthe final decision of this question so made was ment, whether by preventing the collection of greatly influenced by the exalted character of revenue, or disturbing the public peace, or septhe President then in office, was asserted at the arating the States, or betraying the country to a time, and has always been believed, yet the doc-foreign enemy, the power of removal from office trine was opposed as well as supported by the highest talents and patriotism of the country. The public have acquiesced in this decision, and it constitutes, perhaps, the most extraordinary case in the history of the Government of a power conferred by implication on the Executive by the assent of a bare majority of Congress, which has not been questioned on many other occasions." The commentator adds: "Nor is this general acquiescence and silence without a satisfactory explanation."
Chancellor Kent's remarks on the subject are as follows:
"On the first organization of the Government it was made a question whether the power of removal in case of officers appointed to hold at pleasure resided nowhere but in the body which appointed, and, of course, whether the consent of the Senate was not requisite to remove. This was the construction given to the Constitution while it was pending for ratification before the State conventions, by the author of the Federalist. But the construction which was given to the Constitution by Congress, after great consideration and discussion, was different. The words of the act (establishing the Treasury Department) are: And whenever the same shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy in the office, the assistant shall act. This amounted to a legislative construction of the Constitution, and it has ever since been acquiesced in and acted upon as a decisive authority in the case. It applies equally to every other officer of the Gor
and been practiced, will be found indispensable. by the Executive, as it has heretofore existed
Under these circumstances, as a depository of the executive authority of the nation, I do not feel at liberty to unite with Congress in reversing it by giving my approval to the bill. At the early day when this question was settled, and, indeed, at the several periods when it has subsequently been agitated, the success of the Constitution of the United States, as a new and peculiar system of free representative government, was held doubtful in other countries, and was even a subject of patriotic apprehension among the American people themselves. A trial of nearly eighty years, through the vicissitudes of foreign conflicts and of civil war, is confidently regarded as having extinguished all such doubts and apprehensions for the future. During that eighty years the people of the United States have enjoyed a measure of security, peace, prosperity, and happiness never surpassed by any nation. It cannot be doubted that the triumphant suc cess of the Constitution is due to the wonderfu Wisdom with which the functions of government were distributed between the three principal Departments-the legislative, the executive, and the judicial-and to the fidelity with which each
has confined itself or been confined by the general voice of the nation within its peculiar and proper sphere. While a just, proper, and watch ful jealousy of executive power constantly prevails as it ought ever to prevail, yet it is equally true that an efficient Executive, capable, in the language of the oath prescribed to the President, of executing the laws, and, within the sphere of executive action, of preserving, protecting, and defending the Constitution of the United States, is an indispensable security for tranquility at home, and peace, honor, and safety abroad Governments have been erected in many countries upon our model. If one or many of them have thus far failed in fully securing to their people the benefits which we have derived from our system, it may be confidently asserted that their misfortune has resulted from their unfortunate failure to maintain the integrity of each of the three great departments while preserving harmony among them all.
Having at an early period accepted the Constitution in regard to the executive office in the sense in which it was interpreted with the concurrence of its founders, I have found no sufficient grounds in the arguments now opposed to that construction or in any assumed necessity of the times for changing those opinions. For these reasons I return the bill to the Senate, in which house it originated, for the further consideration of Congress which the Constitution prescribes Insomuch as the several parts of the bill which I have not considered are matters chiefly of detail, and are based altogether upon the theory of the Constitution from which I am obliged to dissent, I have not thought it necessary to examine them with a view to make them an occa sion of distinct and special objections.
pointed to any such office, and shall become duly qualified to act therein, is, and shall be, entitled to hold such office until a successor shall have been in like manner appointed and duly quali fied, except as herein otherwise provided: Provided, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
SEC. 2. That when any officer appointed as aforesaid, excepting judges of the United States courts, shall, during the recess of the Senate, be shown, by evidence satisfactory to the President, to be guilty of misconduct in office, or crime, or for any reason shall become incapable or legally disqualified to perform its duties, in such case, and in no other, the President may suspend such officer, and designate some suitable person to perform temporarily the duties of such office until the next meeting of the Senate, and until the case shall be acted upon by the Senate; and such person, so designated, shall take the oaths and give the bonds required by law to be taken and given by the person duly appointed to fill such office; and in such case it shall be the duty of the President, within twenty days after the first day of such next meeting of the Senate, to report to the Senate such suspension, with the evidence and reasons for his action in the case and the name of the person so designated to perform the duties of such office. And if the Senate shall concur in such suspension, and advise and consent to the removal of such officer, they shall so certify to the President, who may thereupon Experience, I think, has shown that it is the remove such officer, and, by and with the advice easiest, as it is also the most attractive of studies and consent of the Senate, appoint another perto frame constitutions for the self-government son to such office. But if the Senate shall refuse of free States and nations. But I think experi- to concur in such suspension, such officer so susence has equally shown that it is the most diffi-pended shall forthwith resume the functions of cult of all political labors to preserve and maintain such free constitutions of self-government when once happily established. I know no other way in which they can be preserved and maintained, except by a constant adherence to them through the various vicissitudes of national existence, with such adaptations as may become necessary, always to be effected, however, through the agencies and in the forms prescribed in the original constitutions themselves.
Whenever administration fails, or seems to fail, in securing any of the great ends for which republican government is established, the proper course seems to be to renew the original spirit and forms of the Constitution itself.
WASHINGTON, March 2, 1867.
Copy of the Bill Vetoed. AN ACT regulating the tenure of certain civil offices.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That every person holding any civil office to which he has been appointed by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and every person who shall hereafter be ap
his office, and the powers of the person so performing its duties in his stead shall cease, and the official salary and emcluments of s ich officer shall, during such suspension, belong to the person so performing the duties thereof, and not to the officer so suspended: Provided, however, That the President, in case he shall become satisfied that such suspension was made on insufficient grounds, shall be authorized, at any time before reporting such suspension to the Senate as above provided, to revoke such suspension and reinstate such officer in the performance of the duties of his office.
SEO. 3. That the President shall have power to fill all vacancies which may happen during the recess of the Senate, by reason of death or resignation, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session thereafter. And if no appointment, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall be made to such office so vacant or temporarily filled as aforesaid during such next session of the Senate, such office shall remain in abeyance without any salary, fees, or emoluments attached thereto, until the same shall be filled by appointment thereto, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and during such time all the powers
and duties belonging to such office shall be exercised by such other officer as may by law exercise such powers and duties in case of a vacancy in such office
SEC. 4. That nothing in this act contained shall be construed to extend the term of any office the duration of which is limited by law.
SEC. 5. That if any person shall, contrary to the provisions of this act, accept any appoinment to or employment in any office, or shall hold or exercise, or attempt to hold or exercise, any such office or employment, he shall be deemed, and is hereby declared to be, guilty of a high misdemeanor, and, upon trial and conviction thereof, he shall be punished therefor by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
SEC. 6. That every removal, appointment, or employment made, had, or exercised, contrary to the provisions of this act, and the making, signing, sealing, countersigning, or issuing of any commission or letter of authority for or in re spect to any such appointment or employment, shall be deemed, and are hereby declared to be, high misdemeanors, and, upon trial and conviction thereof, every person guilty thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding five years, or both said punishments, in the discretion of the court: Provided, That the President shall have power to make out and deliver, after the adjournment of the Senate, commissions for all officers whose appointment shall have been adised and consented to by the Senate.
SEC. 7. That it shall be the duty of the Secrey of the Senate, at the close of each session creof, to deliver to the Secretary of the Treasury, and to each of his assistants, and to each of the Auditors, and to each of the Comptrollers in the Treasury, and to the Treasurer, and to the Register of the Treasury, a full and complete list, duly certified, of all persons who shall have been nominated to and rejected by the Senate during such session, and a like list of all the offices to which nominations shall have been made and not confirmed and filled at such session.
or performing the duties of any office or place
February 18-The SENATE passed it, as agreed upon by a committee of conference-yeas 22, nays 10, as follow:
YEAS-Messrs. Anthony, Brown, Chandler, Conness, Fogg,
Fowler, Henderson, Howard, Howe, Lane, Morgan, Morrill,
NAYS-Messrs. Buckalew, Davis, Diron, Doolittle, Hendricks, Johnson, McDougall, Patterson, Van Winkle, Willey
February 19-The HOUSE passed it-yeas 112, nays 41, as follow:
YEAS-Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Anderson, Arnell,
Delos R. Ashley, James M. Ashley, Baker, Baldwin, Banks,
Cooper, Dausim, Denison, Eldridge, Finck, Glosbrenner,
Ross, Rousseau, Shanklin, Sitgreaves, Stillwell, Taber, Na
March 2-The bill was vetoed.
Same day-The SENATE re-passed it—yeas 35, nays 11, as follow:
YEAS-Messrs. Anthony, Cattell, Chandler, Conness, Cra
gin, Elmonds, Fessenden, Fogg, Foster, Fowler, Freling huysen, Grimes, Harris, Henderson, Howard, Kirkwood, Lane, Morgon, Morrill, Nye, Poland, Pomeroy, Ramsey, Ross, Sherman, Sprague, Stewart, Sumner, Trumbull, Van Winkle, Wade, Willey, Williams, Wilson, Yates-35 Hendricks, Johnson, Nesmith, Norton, Fatterson, Saulsbury
SEC. 8. That whenever the President shall, without the advice and consent of the Senate, designate, authorize, or employ any person to perform the duties of any office, he shall forthwith notify the Secretary of the Treasury thereof, and it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury thereupon to communicate such notice to all the proper accounting and disbursing offi--11. cers of his Department.
NAYS-Messrs. Buckalew, Cowan, Davis. Dixon, Doolittle,
Same day-The HOUSE re-passed it-yeas 138, nays 40, as follow:
SEC. 9. That no money shall be paid or received from the Treasury, or paid or received YEAS-Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Anderson, Arnell, from or retained out of any public moneys or Delos R. Ashley, James M. Ashley, Baker, Baldwin, Banks, funds of the United States, whether in the Treas- Barker, Baxter, Beaman, Benjamin, Bidwell, Bingham, Blaine, Blow, Boutwell, Brandegee, Bromwell, Broomall, ury or not, to or by or for the benefit of any per- Buckland, Fundy, Reader W. Clarke, Sidney Clarke, Cobb, son appointed to or authorized to act in or hold-Conkling, Cook, Callom, Darling, Davis, Dawes, Defrees, ing or exercising the duties or functions of any office contrary to the provisions of this act; nor shall any claim, account, voucher, order, certificate, warrant, or other instrument providing for or relating to such payment, receipt, or retention, be presented, passed, allowed, approved, certified, or paid by any officer of the United States, or by any person exercising the functions
Delano, Deming, Dixon, Dodge, Donnelly, Driggs, Dumont, ekley, Eggleston, Eliot, Farnsworth, Farquhar, Ferry, Garfield, Grinnell, Griswold, Hale, Abner C. Harding, Hart, Hawkins, Hayes, Henderson, Higby, Hill, Holmes, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Asahel W. Hubbard, Chester D. Hubbard, John H. Hubbard,'ames R. Hubbell, Hulburd, Ingersoll, Jenckes, Julian, Kasson, Kelley, Kelso, Ketchim, Koontz, Laflin, George V Lawrence, William Lawrence, Loan, Longyear, Lynch, Marquette, Marston, Marvin. Maynard, McCurg, McIndoe, McKee, McRuer, Mercur, Miller, Moorhead, Morrill, Morris, Moulton, Myers, Newell, O'Neill, Orth, Paine,
Patterson, Perham, Pike, Plants, Pomeroy, Price, William | bama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, be forth-
NAYS-Messrs. Ancona, Bergen, Bouer, Campbell, Chanler, Cooper. Dawson, Eldridge, Finck, Glossbrenner, Goodyer, Aaron Harding, Hise, H gan, Edwin N. Hubbell, Humphrey, Hunter, Jones, Latham, Le Blend, Leftwich, Marshall, McCul lough, Niblack, Nicholson, Radford, Samuel J. Randall, Ritter, Rogers, Ross, Shanklin, Sitgreaves, Strouse, Tuber, Nelsom Tay Thornton, Trimble, Andrew II. Ward, Winfield, Wright-40.
Whereupon the SPEAKER of the House declared
the bill to be a law.
Message Accompanying the Approval of the
Pending this bill,
February 20-Mr. BINGHAM moved to strike out from the second section the words in the second sentence, prohibiting the removal, suspension, &c., of the General without the previous approval of the Senate; which was disagreed to yeas 62, nays 69, as follow:
YEAS-Messrs. Ancoma, Bergen, Bingham, Buckland, Campbell, Cooper, Darling, Davis, Dawes, Dawson, Denison, Eld ridge, Farquhar, Finck, Glossbrenner, Goodyear, Aaron Harding, Hawkins, He, Hogan, Edwin N. Hubbell, James R. Hubbell, Humphry. Hunter, Ketcham, Kuykendall. Laflin, George V Lawrence, Le Blond, Leftwich, Loan, Marshall, Marvin, McCullough McRuer, Moorhead, Niblock, Randall, Raymond, Ritter Rogers, Ros, Roussean, Schenck, Shanklin, Sitgreaves, Tuber, Nthniel G Taylor, Thayer, Thornton, Trimble, Andrew H. Ward, William B. Washburn, Whaley, Winfield, Wright-62.
The act entitled "An act making appropria-Nicholson, Noell, Phelps, Pike, Pomeroy, Radford, Simuel J. tions for the support of the Army for the year ending June 30, 1868, and for other purposes,' contains provisions to which I must call atten tion
NAYS-Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Arnell, James M. AshBaker, Baldwin, Barker, Beaman, Benjamin, Bidwell, Blaine, Blow. Butwell, Brandegee, Bromwell, Broomall, Bundy, Reader W Clarke. Sidney Clarke, Cullom, Dodge. Donnelly, Eggleston, Eliot, Abner C. Harding, Hart, Henderson, Higby, Hill, Holmes. Ho per, Hotchkiss, Demas Hubborð, Jr., John II. Hubbard, Hulburd, Ingersoll, Julian, Kelley, Koontz, William Lawrence, Longyear, Maynard, McClurg, Mercur, Miller, Moulton, Myers, O'Neill, Orth, Paine, Perham, Price, Rollins, Scofield, Shellalarger Spalding, Sar, Stevens, Stokes, Upson, Hamilton Ward, Warner. Heary D. Washburn, Welker, Wentworth, Williams, Stephen F. Wilson. Wind m-69.
These provisions are contained in the secondley, section, which in certain cases virtually deprives the President of his constitutional functions as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and in the sixth section, which denies to ten States of the Union their constitutional right to protect themselves, in any emergency, by means of their own militia. These provisions are out of place in an appropriation act. I am compelled to defeat these necessary appropriations if I withhold my signature from the act. Pressed by these considerations I feel constrained to return the bill with my signature, but to accompany it with my protest against the sections which I have indicated. ANDREW JOHNSON.
WASHINGTON, March 2, 1867.
Same day-Mr. LEBLOND moved to strike out the second section; which was disagreed toyeas 41, nays 88, as follow:
YEAS-Messrs. Ancona, Bergen, Bingham, Campbell. Coop er. Davis, Dawson, Denison, Eldridge, Finck, Glossbrenner, Goodyear, Aaron Harding, Hise. Hogan, Humphrey Hun ter, Kuykendall, Le Blond, Leftwich, Loan. Marshall, Morvin, Niblick, Nicholson, N ell, Phelps, Radford, Samuel J. Ran dall, Raymond, Ritter, Rousseau, Sitgreaves, Nathaniel G Taylor, Nelson Taylor, Thornton, Trimble, Andrew H. Wara Whaley. Winfield, Wright.-41.
NAYS-Messrs. Alley, Allison, Ames, Arnell, Delos R. Ashley, James M. Ashley, Baker, Barker, Baxter, Beaman, Benjamin, Bidwell. Blaine, Boutwell, Beandegee, Bromwell, Broomall, Bundy, Reader W. Clarke, Siduey Clarke, Cook, William A. Darling, Dodge, Donnelly, Eggleston, Eliot, Farns worth, Farquhar. Abner C. Harding, Hart, Henderson, Higby, Hill, Holmes, Hooper, Hotchkiss, Denias Hubbard. jr., John 1. Hubbard, James R Hubbell, Ingersoll, Julian. Kelley, Kelso, Koontz, Laflin, George V. Lawrence, William Lawrence, Longyear, Lynch, Marston, Maynard, McClurg, McIndoe, Mekuer. Mercur, Miller, Moorhead, Moutton, Myers, Newell, O'Neill, Orth, Paine, Patterson, Perham, Pike, Plants, Pomerov, Price, John il. Rice, Rollins, Scofield, shellalarger, Sloan, Spuding, Starr, Stevens, Stokes, John L. Thomas, jr., Trowbridge, Upson, Burt Van Horn, Wilton Ward, Warner, Welker, Wentworth, Williams,
The sections complained of are these: SEC. 2. That the headquarters of the General of the Army of the United States shall be at the city of Washington; and all orders and instruc tions relating to military operations, issued by the President or Secretary of War, shall be issued through the General of the Army, and, in case of his inability, through the ext in rank. The General of the Army shall not be removed, suspended, or relieved from command, or assigned to duty elsewhere than at said headquarters, except at his own request, without the previous approval of the Senate; and any orders or in structions relating to military operations issued contrary to the requirements of this section shall be null and void; and any officer who shall issue orders or instructions contrary to the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor in office; and any officer of the Army who shall transmit, convey, or obey any orders or instructions so issued, contrary to the provisions of this section, knowing that such orders were so issued, shall be liable to impris-kle, onment for not less than two nor more than twenty years, upon conviction thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction.
SEC. 6. That all militia forces now organized or in service in either of the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Ala
February 26-In SENATE, a motion to strike out the second section was lost-yeas 8, nays 28, as follow:
YEAS-Messrs. Buckalew, Dizon, Doolittle, Henderson, Hendricks, Johnson, Norton, Patterson-8.
NAY-Messrs. Anthony, Chandler, Conness, Cragin, Cres
Veto of the Supplemental Reconstruction Bill,
To the House of Representatives:
I have considered the bill entitled "An act supplementary to an act entitled 'An act to pro