This step on the part of the British government was as bold as it was wise. It met the difficulty in the face. It justly assumed the existence of a corresponding spirit of conciliation on the part of the United States, and of a desire to bring matters to a practical result. It was bold, because it was the last expedient for an amicable adjustment, and because its failure must necessarily lead to very serious and immediate conse

quences.

In his choice of a minister, Lord Aberdeen was not less fortunate than he had been wise in proposing the measure. Lord Ashburton was above the reach of the motives which influence politicians of an ordinary stamp, and unencumbered by the habits of routine which belong to men regularly trained in a career. He possessed a weight of character at home which made him independent of the vulgar resorts of popularity. He was animated by a kindly feeling, and bound by kindly associations to this country. There was certainly no public man in England who united in an equal degree the confidence of his own government and country with those claims to the good-will of the opposite party, which were scarcely less essential to success. The relations of personal friendship contracted by Mr. Webster with Lord Ashburton in 1839 have already been alluded to, as influencing the selection. They decided Lord Ashburton in accepting the appointment. The writer was informed by Lord Ashburton himself, that he should have despaired of bringing matters to a settlement advantageous to both countries, but for his reliance on the upright and honorable character of the American Secretary.

With the appointment of Lord Ashburton, the discussion of the main questions in controversy between the two countries, as far as it had been carried on in London, was transferred to Washington. But as an earnest of the conciliatory spirit which bore sway in the British counsels, Lord Aberdeen had announced to Mr. Everett, in the interval which elapsed between Lord Ashburton's appointment and his arrival at his place of destination, that the Queen's government admitted the wrong done by the detention of the "Tigris" and "Seamew" in the African waters, and was prepared to indemnify their owners for the losses sustained.

Notwithstanding the favorable circumstances under which

the mission of Lord Ashburton was instituted, the great difficulties to be overcome soon disclosed themselves. The points in dispute in reference to the boundary had for years been the subject of discussion, more or less, throughout the country, but especially in Massachusetts and Maine (the States having an immediate territorial interest in its decision), and, above all, in the last-named State. Parties differing on all other great questions emulated each other in the zeal with which they asserted the American side of this dispute. So strong and unanimous was the feeling, that, when the award of the King of the Netherlands arrived, the firm purpose of General Jackson to accept it was subdued. The writer of these pages was informed by the late Mr. Forsyth, while Secretary of State, that, when the award reached this country, General Jackson regarded it as definitive, and was disposed, without consulting the Senate, to issue his proclamation announcing it as such; and that he was driven from this course by the representations of his friends in Maine, that it would change the politics of the State. He was accustomed to add, in reference to the inconveniences caused by the rejection of the award, and the still more serious evils to be anticipated, that "it was somewhat singular that the only occa sion of importance in his life in which he had allowed himself to be overruled by his friends, was one of all others in which he ought to have adhered to his own opinions."

From the diplomatic papers contained in the sixth volume of the present edition of Mr. Webster's works it appears that the first step taken by Mr. Webster, after receiving the directions of the President in reference to the negotiation, was to invite the coöperation of Massachusetts and Maine, the territory in dispute being the property of the two States, and under the jurisdiction of the latter. The extent of the treaty-making power of the United States, in a matter of such delicacy as the cession of territory claimed by a State to be within its limits, belongs to the more difficult class of constitutional doctrines. We have just seen both the theory and practice of General Jackson on this point. The administration of Mr. Tyler took for granted that the full consent of Massachusetts and Maine was necessary to any adjustment of this great dispute on the principle of mutual cession and equivalents, or any other principle than that of the ascertainment of the true, original line of boundary by

k*

agreement, mutual commission, or arbitration. Communications were accordingly addressed to the governors of the two States. Massachusetts had anticipated the necessity of the measure, and made provision for the appointment of commissioners. The legislature of Maine was promptly convened for the same purpose by the late Governor Fairfield. Four par ties were thus in presence at Washington for the management of the negotiation: the United States and Great Britain, Massachusetts and Maine. Recollecting that the question to be settled was one which had defied all the arts of diplomacy for half a century, it seemed to a distant, and especially a European observer, as if the last experiment, exceeding every former step in its necessary complication, was destined to a failure proportionably signal and ignominious. The course pursued by the American Secretary, in making the result of the negotiation relative to the boundary contingent upon the approval of the State commissioners, was regarded in Europe as decidedly ominous of its failure.

It undoubtedly required a high degree of political courage thus to put the absolute control of the subject, to a certain extent, out of the hands of the national government; but it was a courage fully warranted by the event. It is now evident that this mode of procedure was the only one which could have been adopted with any hope of success. Though complicated in appearance, it was in reality the simplest mode in which the coöperation of the States could have been secured. The commissions were, upon the whole, happily constituted; they were framed in each State without reference to party views. By their presence in Washington, it was in the power of the Secretary of State to avail himself, at every difficult conjuncture, of their counsel. Limited in number, they yet represented the public opinion of the two States, as fully as it could have been done by the entire body of their legislatures; while it is quite evident that any attempt to refer to large deliberative bodies at home the discussion of the separate points which arose in the negotiation, would have been physically impossible and politically absurd. The commissioners were, on the part of Maine, Messrs. Edward Kavanagh, Edward Kent, William P. Preble, and John Otis; and on the part of Massachusetts, Messrs. Abbott Lawrence, John Mills, and Charles Allen.

While we name with honor the gentlemen forming the commissions, a tribute of respect is also due to the patriotism of the States immediately concerned, and especially of Maine. To devolve on any individuals, however high in the public regard, a power of transferring, without ratification or appeal, a portion of the territory of the State, for such consideration as those individuals might judge to be adequate, was a measure to be expected only in a case of clear necessity and high confidence. Mr. Webster is known to have regarded this with the utmost concern and anxiety, as the turning-point of the whole attempt. His letter to Governor Fairfield states the case with equal strength and fairness, and puts the course there recommended in striking contrast with that of proceeding to agree to another arbitration, as had been offered by the preceding administration, and assented to by England. The fate of the negotiation might be considered as involved in the success of this appeal to the chief magistrate of Maine, and through him to his constituents. It is said that, when Mr. Webster heard that the legislature of Maine had adopted the resolutions for the commission, he went to President. Tyler and said, with evident satisfaction and some animation, "The crisis is past!"

A considerable portion, though not the whole, of the official correspondence between the Secretary of State and the other parties to the negotiation is contained in the sixth volume of this collection. The documents published exhibit full proof of the ability with which the argument was conducted. They probably furnish but an inadequate specimen of the judgment, tact, and moral power required to conduct such a negotiation to a successful result. National, State, and individual susceptibilities were to be respected and soothed; adverse interests, real or imaginary, to be consulted; the ordeal of the Senate to be passed through, after every other difficulty had been overcome; and all this in an atmosphere as little favorable to such an operation as can well be imagined. What neither Mr. Monroe in the "era of good feelings," nor the ability and experience of Messrs. Adams, Clay, and Gallatin, nor General Jackson's overwhelming popularity, had been able to bring about, was effected under the administration of Mr. Tyler, though that administration seemed already crumbling for want of harmony between some of the members and the head, and between that

head and the party which had brought him into power. No higher tribute can be paid to the ability and temper which were brought to the work.

It was, however, in truth, an adjustment equally honorable and advantageous to all parties. There is not an individual of common sense or common conscience in Maine or Massachusetts, in the United States or Great Britain, who would now wish it disturbed. It took from Maine a tract of land northwest of the St. John, which the people of Maine believed to belong to them under the treaty of 1783. But it is not enough that we think ourselves right; the other party thinks the same; and when there is no common tribunal which both acknowledge, there must be compromise. The tract of land in question, for any purpose of cultivation or settlement, was without value; and had it been otherwise, it would not have been worth the cost of a naval armament or one military expedition, to say nothing of the abomination of shedding blood on such an issue. But the disputed title to the worthless tract of morass, heath, and rock, covered with snow or fog throughout a great part of the year, was not ceded gratuitously. We obtained the navigation of the St. John, the natural outlet of the whole country, without which the territory watered by it would have been of comparatively little value; we obtained a good natural boundary as far as the course of the river was followed; and we established the line which we claimed at the head of the Connecticut, on Lake Champlain, and on the upper lakes; territorial objects of considerable interest. Great Britain had equal reason to be satisfied with the result. For her the territory northwest of the St. John, worthless to us, had a geographical and political value; it gave her a convenient connection between her provinces, which was all she desired. Both sides gained the only object which really was of importance to either, a settlement by creditable means of a wearisome national controversy; an honorable escape from the scourge and curse of

war.

Both governments appear to have been fortunate in the constitution of the joint commission to survey, run, and mark the long line of boundary. Mr. Albert Smith, of Maine, was appointed commissioner on the part of the United States, with Major James D. Graham, of the United States Topo