sixth volume of this collection. It was a well-meant, but unauthorized step, and was promptly disavowed by the administration of Mr. Van Buren. Its operation, while it lasted, was but to increase the existing difficulty. Reports of the interruptions experienced by our commerce in the African waters began greatly to multiply; and there was a strong interest on the part of those surreptitiously engaged in the traffic to give them currency. A deep feeling began to be manifested in the country; and the correspondence between the American Minister in London and Lord Palmerston, in the last days of the Melbourne ministry, was such as to show that the controversy had reached a critical point. Such was the state of the question when Mr. Webster entered the Department of State.

The controversy was transmitted, as we have seen, to the new administrations on both sides of the water, but soon assumed a somewhat modified character. The quintuple treaty, as it was called, was concluded at London, on the 20th of December, 1841, by England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia; and information of that fact, as we have seen above, was given by Lord Aberdeen to Mr. Everett the same day. A strong desire was intimated that the United States would join this association of the great powers, but no formal invitation for that purpose was addressed to them. But the recent occurrences on the coast of Africa, and the tone of the correspondence above alluded to, had increased the standing repugnance of the United States to the recognition of a right of search in time of peace.

In the mean time, the same complaints, sometimes just, sometimes exaggerated, sometimes groundless, had reached France from the coast of Africa, and a strong feeling against the right of search was produced in that country. The incidents connected with the adjustment of the Syrian question, in 1840, had greatly irritated the French ministry and people, and the present was deemed a favorable moment for retaliation. On the assembling of the Chambers, an amendment was moved by M. Lefebvre to the address in reply to the king's speech in the following terms: "We have also the confidence, that, in granting its concurrence to the suppression of a criminal traffic, your government will know how to preserve from every attack the interest of our commerce and the independence of our flag."

This amendment was adopted by the unanimous vote of the Chambers.

This was well understood to be a blow aimed at the quintuple treaty. It was the most formidable parliamentary check ever encountered by M. Guizot's administration. It excited profound sensation throughout Europe. It compelled the French ministry to make the painful sacrifice of a convention negotiated agreeably to instructions, and not differing in principle from those of 1831 and 1833, which were consequently liable to be involved in its fate. The ratification of the quintuple treaty was felt to be out of the question. Although it soon appeared that the king was determined to sustain M. Guizot, it was by no means apparent in what manner his administration was to be rescued from the present embarrassment.

The public feeling in France was considerably heightened by various documents which appeared at this juncture, in connection with the controversy between the United States and Great Britain. The President's message and its accompanying papers reached Europe about the period of the opening of the session. A very few days after the adoption of M. Lefebvre's amendment, a pamphlet, written by General Cass, was published in Paris, and, being soon after translated into French and widely circulated, contributed to strengthen the current of public feeling. A more elaborate essay was, in the course of the season, published by Mr. Wheaton, the Minister of the United States at Berlin, in which the theory of a right of search in time of peace was vigorously assailed.

The preceding sketch of the history of the question will show the difficulty of the position in reference to this most important interest, at the time Lord Ashburton's mission was instituted. With what practical good sense and high statesmanship the controversy was terminated is well known to the country. It is unnecessary here to retrace the steps of the correspondence, to comment on the eighth article of the treaty of Washington, or to analyze the parliamentary and diplomatic discussions to which in the following year it gave rise. It is enough to say, that, under circumstances of some embarrassment to the Department of State, a course of procedure was happily devised by Mr. Webster, and incorporated into the treaty, which, leaving untouched the metaphysics of the question, furnished a satis

factory practical solution of the difficulty. Circumstances having made a restatement expedient of the principles maintained by the United States on this most important subject, a letter was addressed by Mr. Webster to Mr. Everett, on the 28th of March, 1843, to be read to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in which the law of nations applicable to the subject was expounded by the American Secretary with a clearness and power which will render any further discussion of the subject, under its present aspects, entirely superfluous. Nor will it be thought out of place to acknowledge the fairness, good temper, and ability with which the doctrine and practice of the English government were sustained by the Earl of Aberdeen.

The wisdom with which the eighth article of the treaty was drawn up was soon seen in its consequences. Its effect was decisive. It put a stop to all discontent at home in reference to the interruption of our lawful commerce on the coast of Africa. Abroad, it raised the jealousy already existing in France on this subject to the point of uncontrollable repugnance. The ratification of the quintuple treaty had long been abandoned. It was soon evident that the conventions of 1831 and 1833 must be given up. In the course of the year 1844, the Duc de Broglie, the honorable and accomplished minister by whom they had been negotiated, accepted a special mission to London, for the purpose of coming to some satisfactory arrangement by way of substitute, and a convention was soon concluded with the British government on precisely the same principles with those of the treaty of Washington.

It may be hoped that the important suggestion of Mr. Webster will be borne in mind, in any future discussions of this and other maritime questions, that the policy of the United States is not that of a feeble naval power interested in exaggerating the doctrine of neutral inviolability. A respect for every independent flag is a common interest of all civilized states, powerful or weak; but the rank of the United States among naval powers, and their position as the great maritime power on the western coasts of the Atlantic and the eastern coasts of the Pacific, may lead them to doubt the expediency of pressing too far the views they have hitherto held, and moderate their anxiety to construe with extreme strictness the rights which the law of nations concedes to public vessels.

The three subjects on which we have dwelt, namely, the northeastern boundary, the extradition of fugitives, and the suppression of the slave-trade, were the only ones which required to be provided for by treaty stipulation. Other subjects, scarcely less important and fully as difficult were happily disposed of in the correspondence of the plenipotentiaries. These were the affair of the "Caroline," that of the "Creole," and the question of impressment. Our limits do not permit us to dwell at length on these topics; but we shall be pardoned for one or two reflections.

So urgent is the pressure on the public mind of the successive events which demand attention each as it presents itself, that the formidable difficulties growing out of the destruction of the "Caroline" and the arrest of McLeod are already fading from recollection. They formed, in reality, a crisis of a most serious and delicate character. A glance at the correspondence of the two governments at Washington and London sufficiently shows this to be the case. The violation of the territory of the United States in the destruction of the "Caroline," however unwarrantable the conduct of the "sympathizers" which provoked it, became, from the moment the British government assumed the responsibility of the act, an incident of the gravest character. On the other hand, the inability of the government of the United States to extricate McLeod from the risks of a capital trial in a State court, although the government of England demanded his liberation on the ground that he was acting under the legal orders of his superior, presented a difficulty in the working of our system equally novel and important. Other cases had arisen in which important constitutional principles had failed to take effect, for want of the requisite legislative provisions. It is believed that this was the first time in which a difficulty of this kind had presented itself in our foreign relations. A more threatening one can scarcely be imagined. In addition to the embarrassment occasioned by the refusal of the executive and judiciary of New York to yield to the representations of the general government, the violent interference of the mob presented new difficulties of the most deplorable character. If McLeod had been executed, it is not too much to say, that war would at once have ensued. His acquittal averted this impending danger. The conciliatory

spirit cannot be too warmly commended with which, on the one hand, the proper reparation was made by Lord Ashburton for the violation of the American territory, and, on the other hand, Congress, by the passage of an appropriate law, provided an effectual legislative remedy for any future similar case. They show with what simplicity and ease the greatest evils may be averted, and the most desirable ends achieved, by statesmen and governments animated by a sincere desire to promote the welfare of those who have placed power in their hands, not for selfish, party purposes, but for the public good.

There is, perhaps, no one of the papers written by Mr. Webster as Secretary of State, in which so much force of statement and power of argument are displayed as in the letter on "impressment.” To incorporate a stipulation on this subject into a treaty was, regarding the antecedents of the question, impracticable. But the reply of Lord Ashburton to Mr. Webster's announcement of the American principle must be considered as acquiescence on the part of his government. It may be doubted whether this odious and essentially illegal practice will ever again be systematically resorted to, even in England.* Considering the advance made by public sentiment an all questions connected with personal liberty, "a hot-press on the Thames" would hardly stand the ordeal of an investigation in Parliament at the present day. It is certain that the right of impressing seamen from American vessels could never be practically asserted in a future war with any other effect than that of adding the United States to the parties in the contest. No refinements in the doctrine of natural allegiance, although

*The following passage from a letter of Robert Walsh, Esq., to the editors of the National Intelligencer, dated Paris, 28th October, 1842, furnishes confirmation of the remark in the text:

"The former journal [The Times], of the 18th instant, acknowledges that Mr. Webster has not exaggerated the hardships and evils which the practice of impressment occasioned in the last war.' It ratifies his ideas of the probable aggravation of them, if the practice should be ever renewed; it would even dispense with press-warrants at home, as adverse to the general principles of British liberty and law; it advises some general measure for the entire abolition of arbitrary impressment both at home and abroad, and it expresses its belief of a very strong probability, that, in the event of a war, no instructions for the impressment of British seamen found in American merchant-vessels will be issued to her Majesty's cruisers. The Standard chimes with the great oracle, and concludes in this strain: We may infer that, whatever may be the plan hereafter for managing our navy, impressment will never again be resorted to; this is beyond a doubt; the practice complained of by Mr. Webster will be abandoned.'