1880.] LORD LYTTON'S POLICY. 299 forward, he might be charged, and was charged, with inconsistency. On August 15, after questions as to the proposed Mission to Cabul had been asked by Sir Charles Dilke and others, Sir Stafford explained that the Ameer did not invite the Mission, but that a communication 'about it would be made to him by the Indian Government. He added that we did not ask for what we had never possessed, a European agent at Cabul. Parliament broke up; negotiations and delays occurred on the Indian frontier; Sir Neville Chamberlain, with a numerous armed Mission, set out from Peshawur on September 21, and Major Cavagnari was refused leave to pass the fort of Ali Musjid. The Mission returned to Peshawur. The rebuff of the barbarians excited many observers in India and at home. There were explanations, demands for apology, and talk about a new scientific frontier. Afghanistan was invaded, and Parliament met on December 5. From a letter of September 30, to an official colleague, it is clear that Sir Stafford, at that moment, had grave doubts as to the policy of Lord Lytton in India. The Ameer's conduct, he thought, "if not a breach of engagement" (in receiving the Russian embassy), "may be a virtual repudiation of the old state of our relations, and may justify and require a new departure on our part, and this I think it does. Only I think we should be well informed at the outset what the new policy is to be." In a later letter (October 2) he says: "The old policy used to be, to keep Afghanistan strong and independent, not to interfere with its internal affairs, not to annex or occupy any of its territories, but to cultivate friendly relations with its ex officio ruler, . . . and to obviate the danger of internal conflicts." As to the new policy, he says, "It may be right, or it may be inevitable, but we ought to know how far it is to be carried." To a lay looker-on, it seems as if Russia had out-manœuvred us. If Cabul accepted a Mission from her, not from us, where was our prestige? The word is unlucky, but it does express that kind of influence of belief in her by which England has governed India. Object as we may to the word, or to what it implies, the fact is undeniable. If, on the other hand, we bullied the Ameer, or put him in such a position that he, too, must lose his prestige among his own people, we were at once involved in all that our enemies could desire for us. There may have been a middle course; it may have been possible to turn on our own side, and to our own profit, the oriental system of delays. Experts may discuss this. As things fell out, we took the second course, by affronting the Ameer, of which we soon felt all the disadvantages and discredits. The Liberal party, when Parliament met, maintained that the Ameer had been misrepresented and ill treated, while our old policy as to Afghanistan had been reversed. The details are vast and complicated, and it is no part of our business to defend or arraign either the Government or Lord Lytton. Sir Stafford Northcote's own speech mainly concerns us where it offers a defence of his own conduct (December 13, 1878). He maintained that, after the incident of Ali Musjid, the Ameer had been given "ample opportunity of recalling and apologising for his conduct," and that, as he did not apologise, the Government had no alternative. "We could not have remained inactive." He defended himself against the charge of "having turned round," and after being known as an advocate of one policy, embracing another. He rested his case on letters of Lord Lawrence, written to himself when he was Sec retary for India. These letters gave Lord Lawrence's policy. He had agreed with it then, he agreed with it still, for Lord Lawrence had said it was one thing to leave the Afghans to fight their own battles, and quite another to stand by in the same attitude while others are interfering." And Sir Stafford had, even then, recorded his opinion that if Shere Ali tampered with the Persians about Herat, we might give aid to his rival. Others were now interfering, by the Russian Mission, in Afghanistan. Circumstances had altered, and his mind had changed with them. Again, Lord Lawrence thought we should await a Russian move on our own frontier. Yes; but in 1866 Russia had been far more remote from Afghanistan than she 1880.] MASSACRE OF CAVAGNARI. 301 was in 1878. When a Russian Mission went to Cabul, avowedly because Russia and England were unfriendly, and Cabul was a vulnerable point, then, "the circumstances on which Lord Lawrence based his policy of not advancing were completely revolutionised." Thus there was, in his own conduct, "no inconsistency whatever." We defeated the Ameer, he died, we appointed Yakoob as Ameer, we got a new frontier, we were to be masters of Afghan foreign policy, we were to support the Ameer against foreign foes, and we were to have a British resident at Cabul. All this policy, Sir Stafford said, “was forced on us (August 14, 1879). In three weeks the resident, Sir Louis Cavagnari, with the gallant Hamilton, had been massacred. Cabul was recaptured, the murderers were punished, but General Roberts was forced into the Sherpur cantonments, and Christmas came before he was relieved. In all this affair the unhappy Ameer deserved our regrets, the Russians, our disinterested congratulations; and as for the Government, it is easy to blame them, or commiserate with them, but hard to say what they should have done. It does seem as if, in these three troubles the Bulgarian atrocities, the war with the Ameer, and the Zulu war-the Government was ill served abroad, and had its hand forced into directions not approved of by its judgment. They were not more fortunate in that grave of men and of reputations, South Africa. In 1877 we had annexed the Transvaal, which "was drifting into anarchy, was bankrupt, and was about to be destroyed by native tribes." According to Sir T. Shepstone, "most thinking men were in favour of the annexation, but Sir Theophilus did not say that most Boers were. The annexation appears at least to have prevented Cetywayo from washing his spears, or trying to wash them, in the blood of Boers. It was in other blood that he performed this part of Zulu coronation ritual. We annexed the Transvaal, its 40,000 white people, and its million of black people -unregarded dusky million-whom we took "for ever," 1 Cetywayo and his White Neighbours. H. Rider Haggard, p. 117. 2 Op. cit., 119, 120. and deserted in a few years. Cetywayo declared that he viewed the annexation with pleasure, though he regretted the neglect of that ceremony with the spears. Then came a difficulty about the Boer and Zulu marches. We took the side of the Boers. Sir Bartle Frere came on the scene, and bade Cetywayo disband his army. He refused. We invaded Zululand, and every one knows what followed. As to all these disasters, when Lord Hartington asked who is to be held responsible, Sir Stafford replied, “Her Majesty's Government" (March 31, 1879). "We do not cast the responsibility upon our agents." They stood between Sir Bartle Frere and the sentence of Parliament. The Government itself censured Sir Bartle Frere, but did not withdraw its confidence. He denied that Sir Bartle had throughout, in his negotiations, been deliberately working for a Zulu war. He gave a history of all that led to the Zulu war, and really this history seems a very strong condemnation of Sir Bartle's conduct, especially of his extraordinary ultimatum to the Zulus. The history is of most interest as expressing Sir Stafford's theory of the Transvaal annexation, as a measure taken in the cause of peace, and "to stop any future wars with the Zulus, and other native tribes." If the Government censured and dismissed Sir Bartle, what then? What was their next step to be? Where was a Liberal policy, except Mr Courtney's policy, "Abandon confederation, and withdraw from the Transvaal"? That, Sir Stafford thought, would, or might, involve our withdrawing from South Africa as an Imperial Power. The wish of the Government now was to break up the Zulu military system, while leaving them the power of protecting themselves against native tribes. But, one fancies, the Amaboona (the Boers) were the only "tribe" from whom they needed protection. In all this miserable business it is easy to criticise. Perhaps a really powerful nation would have simply enlisted the Zulus as its gladiators, and held South Africa with them. As it chances, we rescued the Boers from their assegais, only to "perish by the people we have made," only to ruin the finest natural soldiers in the 1877.] SIR STAFFORD AS A LEADER. 303 world, and to give the world a typical proof of our inability to discharge imperial tasks. The Zulus were hardly overthrown before the Boers, now safe on that side, began to show their teeth. But the Boers were left to be dealt with by Mr Gladstone's Government. CHAPTER XV. SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE AS A PARLIAMENTARY LEADER. THE two previous chapters, reviewing Sir Stafford's conduct as Chancellor of the Exchequer and in foreign affairs, do not deal with his other work as leader of his party in the House of Commons, both before and after the Liberal victory of 1880. To that topic we now address ourselves. Sir Stafford Northcote entered upon his duties as leader of the House of Commons on the 8th February 1877, when the Parliament of 1874 met for its fourth session. On the 6th July 1885, he took his seat in the House of Lords as Earl of Iddesleigh and Viscount St Cyres. For eight sessions and a half he led the Conservative party continuously in the Lower House. Sir Stafford's political career has now been traced to its culmination. We may pause for a moment to ask by what steps he attained this elevation. In the first place, he had made some mark in public and official life, and had displayed considerable administrative power and skill in dealing with men before he entered Parliament. In Parliament, his position, when he first entered it, was not a common one, as he was both a Conservative and a Free-trader. No other distinguished man of those opinions ultimately failed to join the Liberal ranks. With the Peelites he shared that aptitude for public business, which was then far more valuable in the parliamentary career than it is at present. It was his powers as a man of business that, in the first case, made the reputation of |