peculiar mind of the Turk, the two nations would be so intimately connected, that he would with difficulty separate them, but would generally associate them in his policy towards either. In all the little intercourse I have had with this Government and people, I have universally found that the nearer I could approach themselves, the fewer the persons interposed between me and them, the more simple, easy, and successful were my transactions. Direct negotiation is particularly suited to the character of the Turks. It implies a degree of confidence which is gratifying to their pride, and which they endeavor by their conduct to justify. I have in my own case made this experiment with them, and have seen this trait of their character clearly evinced. Although this case relates to myself individually, I will take the liberty of mentioning its particulars.

It is usual for all citizens or subjects of powers not having amicable relations established by treaty with the Porte, upon their arrival within the Turkish dominions, to place themselves under the protection of some power having such relations. In my first interview with the Government here, under the supposition that I had, of course, done in this respect what is usual in such cases, I was asked under the protection of what power I had placed myself? I answered, that of the Sublime Porte; that I was here a stranger, and reposed myself upon the hospitality of the country; that it would neither consist with my own feelings, and I took it

upon myself to add, nor would it be agreeable to those of my Government, for me, while within the dominion of the Ottoman Porte, to recognise or accept the protection of any other power than that of the Sublime Porte itself. Upon that alone I relied for my security, and felt assured that here I should need no other.' This answer was received with evident surprise and gratification. They have since seemed to endeavor fully to justify the confidence it implied. They have in consequence voluntarily offered me many indulgencies and facilities, (some of them unusual,) which, I am persuaded, would otherwise have been obtained with difficulty or altogether withheld. I mention this case merely as illustrative of what I consider a prominent trait in the character of the Turks, and one that may be turned to much advantage in all intercourse with them. They are indeed a very singular people. Their character seems an extraordinary union of opposite qualities.

Although in many respects extremely uncivilized, they are capable of the most elevated and refined sentiments. An appeal to their generosity and magnanimity, is generally successful, and confidence reposed in them is rarely violated. In any intercourse, therefore, which the United States may have with this Government and people, I am fully satisfied, from all I have observed of both, that, to approach them at all times directly, and not intermediately through any third power, will ever be found, not only most easy and successful in the first

is most influenced by this narrow policy. I know the opinion is generally entertained in our country, that the nations of Europe, heretofore hostile to commercial relations between the United States and the Sublime Porte, would now no longer oppose their establishment; but that, yielding to the influence of liberal principles, and adopting a more enlarged and sounder policy, would be willing to exchange their former monopoly for a fair and more honorable competition. This opinion is incorrect. I speak with confidence upon this subject; I am not left to mere conjecture, or to derive my opinion upon this point from appearances. It is founded upon positive information, derived from the highest source. I am explicitly informed, in confidence, by the Porte itself, that ******** under the idea that the United States contemplate negotiation with the Porte, has, within a few days passed, presented to the latter a formal and solemn protest against such negotiation, in which she has even threat ened, in case the Porte should conclude a treaty with the United States, to break off her present relations, and declare war against the Porte. The other nations most influenced by the narrow policy which has induced this very singular measure on the part of **

are

**********

****Although these have been less explicit than *******, and have even avowed contrary sentiments, I have reason to believe, that, in this respect, they are, in truth, not more friendly than the latter, but would all be

hostile to the views of the United States in this quarter, and would oppose any advances we might make towards the establishment of commercial relations with the Sublime Porte. This hostility, however, whatever form it may assume, will not, I am well assured, deter the Porte from following its present dispositions upon this subject, provided it be met by the United States. But it would render the Porte desirous, in the existing posture of its relations with the European Powers, and the present state of its own internal affairs generally, and especially with its two revolted provinces, that negotiations should be direct; that the knowledge not only of the fact of negotiation, but the conclusion of a treaty, might thereby be confined to the parties immediately interested therein, until the exchange of ratifications, and the treaty should actually go into effect. This has induced the Porte itself to suggest that the person authorized on the part of the United States to treat, should not appear here as minister, but merely as a private individual, until the treaty should be about to go into effect. It would then be expected that an avowed and accredited minister of the United States should appear and receive the usual formal audience of the Sultan, &c, when the customary presents would, of course, be expected. These latter, indeed, by the usages of the Porte, could not, in any case, be received, nor could the minister have a formal audience until that time. The anxious desire of the Porte for this course,

originating in the posture of its foreign relations, and the existing situation of its own internal affairs, is much strengthened by the character of the persons at present composing its Government. The affairs of its two revolted Pachalics of Albania and Servia, put in requisition the resources of the Government, and render the Porte generally, and particularly the timid, more cautious in adopting any measures that might put at hazard its present relations with the great European powers, or increase the present disaffection among its own subjects. This Government, although nominally composed of many persons, is, in fact, at present, in the hands of a single individual. This individual is Halet Effendi, a man of extraordinary talents and considerable acquirements. He was in the years 1803, '4 and '5, ambassador from the Sublime Porte to the court of France. Since his return here, he has declined all the great offices of the Government, and has only the nominal and irresponsible one of minister of conference, or privy counsellor. In this however, he notoriously possesses the will of the sultan, but wields the entire government of the empire. Heis, at present, decidedly in favor of a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States; but he is considered a man in the market; and the other persons of the government favorable to such a treaty, are apprehensive that, if negotiations were opened and avowed, means would be used by the powers opposed to the treaty, to change the present opinion of this minister in regard to it; and

that he, operating upon the weakness of some, and the timidity of others, would thus be able to prevent its conclusion, and thereby defeat what are really the present wishes of the whole Government upon this subject. This, of course, renders the Porte anxious that the negotiations should be direct, and as secret as possible. But, so strongly desirous are the Porte of the conclusion of a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, that I feel perfectly confident, that, if a person duly authorized by the latter to conclude such treaty, were now here, it might be accomplished in the course of a few days. The present moment, so far as regards the character and dispositions of the Porte generally, is particularly auspicious for this purpose.

Upon the subject of the expense here of such a treaty, I have made every possible inquiry, and have obtained what I believe to be pretty correct information. I believe this whole expense would not exceed 350,000 piastres, (Turkish.) This includes the public presents to be made upon the minister's receiving his formal audience of the Sultan, &c, &c, but does not, of course, include the salary of the minister, &c, &c, employed by the United States in negotiating the treaty.