that after the injury the wife was taken to her mother's. On cross-examination she says: "Q. After the injury you stayed and lived with your mother. How long was he away from you after the injury, -after this accident? "A. I don't know, I am sure. I guess he came to see me when I was sick. I can't say. "Q. Are you living together now? "A. If he could support me; but he is sick, and not able to support me. "Q. So you are not living in the same house? "A. No, sir; he was away trying to get work. There is no work in Detroit for him, and he cannot get it to do. "Q. This was in 1891. Have you lived with him at all since that time in the same house? "A. He came up to my house-my mother's housewhen I was sick, so they tell me. "Q. But as a matter of fact you have not lived together in the same house since 1891? "A. I believe not; not since they took me from him to their home. He came there. That was his home as well as mine. We boarded there." If because of the injury the plaintiff was not able to support his wife in her then condition, the fact would not defeat recovery for loss of her services. If he was sick and unable to support her, and she had been well and assisted in his care and support, that fact certainly would not take away the right to recover. Their separation, so far as this record shows, was not the result of domestic troubles, nor was it an abandonment. The court gave the following instruction: "If the jury believe that the hook was in the proper place when the car left the city hall, and that it was displaced either by Mrs. Bowdle or by some other passenger, and by hanging caught Mrs. Bowdle's dress, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict must be for the defendant; that is, if this was done without any negligence on the part of the street-railway company, or any contributory negligence on the part of Mrs. Bowdle." This instruction, and other portions of the charge, practically took from the jury the question of the negligent starting of the car before the injured party had alighted, and the error is not cured by other portions of the charge. The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial ordered. THOMAS B. GOODWILLIE ET AL. V. THE CITY OF DETROIT. Municipal corporations-Public improvements--Assessments-Preliminary estimate-Paving-Power of council-Estoppel. 103 283 103 293 103 283 106 338 103 283 109 11 109 583 103 283 110 239 103 283 d118 251 103 283 124 437 103 283 606 283 103 103 283 146 713 103 283 147 4700 103 283 1 34 150 1. The charter of the city of Detroit requires the common council, 2. The charter provides that the board of public works shall constructed; that no street shall be paved until the sewer to be constructed through it shall be completed so far as the pavement is to extend: "Provided, that all sewers, waterpipes, gas pipes, and all connections be made and completed at least one year before such paving is ordered to be done." As respects water and gas pipes and connections, neither the board of public works nor the council has authority to lay either. The water board has exclusive management and control of laying water pipes and connections, and the same are laid in its discretion, and gas is supplied by private corporations owning and managing the entire plant. The water board is empowered to lay pipes in the streets, and the consent of neither the council nor the board of public works is required, nor is there any provision in the charter enabling the council or the board of public works to direct or compel the laying of water pipes by the water board. And it is held that the proviso, so far as it relates to water and gas pipes and their connections, is inconsistent with the proper exercise of the general powers respecting street improvements conferred upon the common council, and void. 3. Section 188 of the charter (compilation of 1893) provides that "the proceeds of each special assessment levied for the grading or paving of any street or alley shall become part of the street-paving fund, and be credited therein to the account of the specific improvement for which the assessment was made: Provided, that the common council shall not, in any one year, enter into contracts for the grading and paving of streets, alleys, and public places, the cost of which will exceed in the aggregate $200,000, except upon the petition of the holders of the larger portion of the real estate directly abutting upon the portions of the street or alley proposed to be improved." And it is held that said section relates to such paving as might be done upon the petition of abutting owners; that' the charter contains no provision for repaving upon petition of abutting owners or others; that, in view of the language used, and of the limitations contained in other sections upon the power of the council to raise money by general taxation for other paving, the limitation in section 188 must be held to be for the benefit of persons liable to special assessment, and to refer to contracts for paving, the cost of which is to be made by such special assessment. 4. In a suit to restrain the collection of a paving assessment, it appeared that a portion, at least, of the complainants, before the letting of the paving contract, filed with the common council a remonstrance against the paving of the street, placing their objection solely upon the ground of the "depression in business," and asking that the paving be deferred until the next season; and that all of the objections made in the bill were available when the remonstrance was filed. And it is held that the relief asked for ought to be denied upon the ground that said complainants, notwithstanding their knowledge of the fact that the council was proceeding in the matter, stood by until the pavement was completed, the bonds probably issued, and then joined in a bill to set aside the assessment; citing Byram v. City of Detroit, 50 Mich. 56; Lundbom v. City of Manistee, 93 Id. 170. Appeal from Wayne. (Donovan, J.) Argued October 23, 1894. Decided December 22, 1894. Bill to enjoin the collection of a paving assessment. Defendant appeals. Decree reversed, and bill dismissed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Brooke & Spalding, for complainants. MCGRATH, C. J. The bill in this case is filed to enjoin. the collection of a paving assessment. The case was heard on bill and answer. It is alleged that the proceedings are invalid "1. Because the board of public works never furnished the common council with the detailed estimate of cost of pavement required by the charter. "2. Because the laying of water and gas pipes in the portion of the street paved was not completed a full year before the pavement was ordered, as the charter requires, but, on the contrary, the city laid the water main in the street immediately before the laying of the pavement. "3. Because, by entering into this paving contract, the council exceeded the charter limitation upon the aggregate cost of paving contracts entered into in one year without the petition of the owners of abutting property.' Compiler's section 320 of the charter of the city provides. that, when any public improvement is proposed, the common council, before proceeding with the same, shall refer the matter to the board of public works, which shall forthwith examine it, and report thereon to the council, giving detailed estimates of the costs of the improvement, and making such recommendation as it may deem expedient. An estimate of the cost in gross was reported to the common council. The bill does not allege that a detailed estimate was not actually made by the board. It does, however, allege that no other estimate was reported to the council. In this respect only does the present case differ from the case of Cuming v. City of Grand Rapids, 46 Mich. 157, 158. The charter of Grand Rapids provided that, when the council should decide that any public work was a necessary improvement, the board of public works should determine as to the particular kind and quantity of materials to be used therefor, and estimate the probable cost and expense of such work, and of the material to be used, in detail, and cause to be prepared, so far as necessary, plans and specifications for such work, and report its estimate to the common council. Mr. Justice COOLEY, speaking for the Court in that case, says: "The board of public works must undoubtedly make a detailed estimate, but there is much reason for contending that if only the sum total is reported to the council, and that body sees fit to act upon it, the objection cannot be taken afterwards. The estimate is for the information of the council, to enable that body to determine how much money shall be raised; and if they have the sum total, and act upon it without calling for further particulars, it may well be urged that the question is precluded." Under the charter provision in that case, plans and specifications were prepared by the board of public works for each particular street, as its improvement was contemplated, while, under defendant's charter, plans and specifications for the various kinds of pavement are prepared in advance by the board of public works, and approved by the common council. The question of the |