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why there should be a difference, why he should be moved to purpose so and so, in reference to them that perish, (which purpose we are not to consider abstractly as it lies in God alone, for so it is not a distinct thing from his own essence, of which there can be no cause; but we are to consider it with a reference to the effects and to the objects, and of that relation there is really a cause, and so there is a just cause, for the condemnation of them that perish, even from the creature; but there can be no cause from the creature, of them that are saved,) I say, if you will have the reasons assigned of the difference, they are obvious and plain, especially these two.

tion hath never been vouchsafed or any thing of it, how | between him and them, and with himself. If any require, God hath determined to deal with them, and the infants of such, he hath not yet declared further his pleasure to us expressly, than it was needful for us to know and understand. And therefore, it would be either vain or over-bold curiosity to determine positively in their case, and it is very unreasonable and foolish, over-solicitously to inquire about it. It is enough for us to understand and know upon what terms God will deal with us, according to those circumstances wherein he hath placed and set us; he hath placed us under the dispensation of his Gospel, wherein all things are made plain and evident to us, that concern us in reference to our present and eternal state, and will deal with us according to those known and published terms, which stand in so clear a light before our eyes; and with all others according to those measures they have had. It is enough for us to understand and know what we may, as our case is stated, expect from God, and what God doth expect from us. And it would be very unreasonable, and uncharitable, for us to trouble ourselves with further inquiries, and it would be very bold to venture on rash determinations, in those more obscure things, and wherein | we are so little concerned. These are to pass among the arcana, that secret things belong to God, when revealed things belong to us, and our children after us, as they shall come to be revealed to them, Deut. xxix. 29. A passage placed, as it were, on purpose to caution and warn too busy and bold inquirers, and that, even in matters of unspeakably less concerninent than the eternal salvation of souls. As suppose, that the people, for that is the case there supposed and referred to, who had been so peculiar to God, taken nigh to him, above, and from, all other people and nations under heaven, should apostatize and revolt from him, and draw down vindictive judgments, and destructive ones, upon themselves, and inquiry be made how it comes to pass, that such a people, so near to God, should be so treated and dealt withal, their land laid waste and made a wilderness, and nothing to be found but marks of divine vengeance, where such a people, so favoured by heaven, did dwell, what is the meaning of all this? Why, they forsook the Lord their God! But that might have been prevented. Why did he not hold them to him? "Secret things belong unto God, but revealed things to us and our children." So is that sad and dismal state concluded and shut up at last, with that seal upon it! That, therefore, I would leave with you, as all I think needful to say, with reference to their case who lie without the compass of superadded divine revelation. Again I further add,

(1.) That there is no natural connexion between the imperfect faith and holiness of the saints, and their eternal felicity; no natural connexion, I say, at all between them. But there is a most natural connexion between the infidelity, enmity against God, and reigning wickedness, and eternal ruin and everlasting misery. No man can say that these two are naturally connected, an imperfect faith in God, through Christ, and imperfect holiness, and final felicity and blessedness. These are not so naturally connected that the one must arrive to the other. But there is a most plain, natural connexion between infidelity and disbelief of divine truth, enmity against divine goodness, repudiation and refusal of the offers and tenders thereof, and eternal misery; so as that the one of them cannot but be the other. Wickedness must be misery, sin persisted in to the last must be destruction, it cannot be otherwise; sin when it is finished can be nothing but death. “To be carnally minded is death :" it is indeed said, "to be spiritually minded is life and peace;" but that is by an intervening divine constitution. And though there be a constitution in the other case too, yet there is a most natural connexion between total prevailing wickedness, reigning iniquity, and misery; to which the supervening constitution is added to an indication of the righteous judgment of God, that he doth but let the thing be with such as it is. They love death; and he only lets them have what they love, and what they choose: he doth only not interpose in their case to break the connexion. And,

(2.) There is this manifest difference too; that as there is a natural connexion between wickedness and misery, whereas there is none between imperfect faith and holiness and eternal felicity, otherwise than what God hath graciously made; so there is in final, reigning, persevering wickedness, the highest desert of eternal misery; whereas, there is in imperfect faith and holiness no desert of eternal life and blessedness. And none that consider, will think 11. That whereas faith and its concomitants are ever to this strange, that when a man can never deserve (much be found in that, which appears to be at length the subject less by what is merely gratuitously wrought in him) life of God's purpose of saving souls; and final infidelity, and blessedness; yet, by continuing, persevering wickedwith its concomitants, are the characters of the subjects of ness, he may deserve to perish. That imperfect good that the contrary purpose, a purpose to condemn with everlast- is wrought in him, and which he owes not to himself, can ing destruction; these must very differently be understood never deserve life and blessedness, for him. But total to be so. Faith, for instance, and so of the rest of its con- wickedness, yea, or any wickedness, can deserve death, can comitants, are never looked upon by God as any causes, deserve for a man's being left to be finally miserable, and or conditions, or inducements, any way, of his purpose to his falling under divine vindicta, vengeance: this is a disave any. These are by his grace to be found in the sub-vine nemesis, what is fit and righteous, what is fit the jects, in those that he will save; but they are no induce- righteous Judge of all the earth should do; even animadments to pass any such determination concerning them. vert upon the wickedness, and testify his own just abhorIt is honourable to him to save such: and, even in the na- rence and detestation of it, so that there is a vast differture of the thing, they only are capable of final salvation ence between these two: that though faith and holiness be and blessedness, in whom such characters are to be found in those that shall be saved, and so are ever to be found for they can never be happy in union with the eternal truth in the subject of God's purpose to save, as characterand goodness, who are habitually averse in their temper, istical of the subject, but are not inducements, or causes of and opposite to the one and the other. If happiness result motives thereof unto God; yet, wheresoever God hath from such a union, then they, in whom there is a prevailing purposed to condemn, their wickedness is a just motive of final aversion to eternal truth and goodness, are incapable that purpose, so terminated, so related to the creature, that of any such felicity, as is to result from a union with these. is, to suffer, and to the suffering that he is to undergo. But it is no motive or inducement to God, to intend to There is something justly causative in this; and there is save such a one, because he will be a believer, or he will nothing more strange in all this, than what God hath himbe a penitent person. That he is a believer, that he is a self, in his word, so plainly told us, that men's destruction penitent person, that he is a lover of him, and that he is is of themselves, but their help in order to salvation should obedient to his Son, these are the effects of his grace, and be found in him alone, Hos. xiii. 9. It is no unsuitable of his good pleasure, and so he is moved in this case by or strange thing, that God should be eyed as the Author nothing without himself. But the case must be understood of all life, and all grace, and all blessedness, and of life to be otherwise, as to those that he intends finally to punish, and of felicity for ever. And, that sinners should be and to punish with everlasting destruction. That is, he looked upon as the fountains of all evil, and all darkness, doth resolve to deal with them suitably to the state of things | and all impurity, and all misery to themselves only. God

must determine men only to that good by which they are to be led on gradually to a blessed, safe, and happy state. But to that evil that tends to ruin and final destruction, men have it in themselves to determine themselves. More is yet to be added to illustrate this.

LECTURE III.*

BUT before I proceed further, I think fit to premonish thus much, and declare to you, that I would not, as to these matters, be understood to deny every thing that I do not assert about them, nor to assert whatsoever I do not deny; for my design is only to propose to you what is plain, and what is useable and may be improved unto the common purposes of Christianity. There are a great many things besides, that many have concerned themselves to dispute to and fro, which I think it not at all needful or useful to be brought into such discourse.

But now, that the matter last insisted on may yet be clearer and more plain. If we speak of this natural bodily life, you can very easily understand that that is in any man's power, it is within the compass of human power that ordinarily men have, for a man to give himself a mortal wound, but, having done so, it is not within the compass of human power to heal him again; and that, in reference to the natural connexion between the one of those forementioned things and the other, and in reference to the moral and legal connexion that is asserted between them; we may again illustrate it by resemblance of it to the concernments of this natural bodily life. It is in the power of any one that dares venture to be so far criminal, to deserve death at the hands of the prince and the law, whereas, it may be no way in his power, when he hath done so, to deserve the prince's pardon, and to have his forfeited life, given him again. These are things, in themselves, plain to any understanding. And now, whereas the text hath plainly told us, that God works all things after the counsel of his own will, this doth manifestly imply, that the determinations must be correspondent to the aptitudes of things, and most especially to the apt agreement which they shall hold with the universal perfection of his own nature. Now it is no blemish to the perfection of the Divine nature, when things are so and so connected in themselves, naturally and morally, to let things in many instances stand just as in themselves they are. This is no reflection on the divine perfection; that is, where there is a real connexion between wickedness and misery, both natural and moral or legal, it is no reflection upon the perfection of the Divine nature, in many instances to let that connexion be as it is. And whereas, there is no connexion between imperfect faith and holiness, and perfect felicity and blessedness, (there is, in reality, no connexion between these,) it is no blemish to the divine perfection (if there be really, and if there be in nature, and as yet any other way between these two, no connexion) to make one by grace, in what instances he pleaseth; that being done (as the Gospel tells us) upon the Redeemer's account, who it was predetermined should so order the course of his management, even to dying itself, and in dying, that no divine perfection should reluctate or reclaim against such a connexion as this; a connexion to be made by grace when before it was not, when really it was not, between that imperfect faith and holiness that some should be enabled to in this world, and their future felicity and blessedness in the other world. All comes to this sum, that is, that we can both effect and deserve our own death and misery; but we can neither effect nor deserve life and blessedness: that must be owing to divine favour and grace. And the case (as hath been often said) is vastly different in dispensing of punishments and free favours. It being no reflection upon the best government that can be supposed, either to inflict deserved punishments, or to dispense undeserved favours. Neither of these can reflect on the best and most perfect government that can be thought. I now go on, and add further,

* Preached January 15th, 1692.

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12. That the assertion of a decree of reprobation, antecedent to a decree of condemnation for infidelity and wickedness persisted in to the last, is that which may seem agreeable to the imperfect mind of man; but we cannot be so sure that it will be any way agreeable unto the most perfect mind of God, in which there can be no such thing as first and second, and unto which all things lie open at once, even unto one entire and eternal view. We are very plainly told in Scripture, of some men's being ordained of old unto condemnation, in that 4th verse of the epistle of Jude; and in the same place we have the characters given us of them that are so: ungodly men, turning the grace of God into lasciviousness, denying the only Lord God and our Saviour Jesus Christ." We are sure of such a decree as doth doom such, continuing such unto the last, unto condemnation and eternal perdition: but that there should be any decree concerning such, prior to this, that must suppose priority and posteriority in eternum. But eternum non patitur novum, there can be no such thing as novity, newness, in eternity. And therefore, being sure there is such a decree as this, and that this decree is eternal, we may be equally sure there can be no decree pre-existent to it; because every thing in God is co-eternal to him, and so this decree must be co-eternal unto God himself; and there can be nothing before God. And though it be very true, indeed, that many have taken much pains and given great exercise to their thoughts to assign and fix some certain order of former and latter, to the divine decrees, yet that doth only proceed from the imperfection of their minds; but we are sure it is impossible there can be any such thing as priority and posteriority in the Divine Mind; all things lying open to him at one eternal and entire view at once so that whensoever he beholds and looks upon the subjects of final misery, he sees their character at the same time, and it cannot be otherwise. And again, I add,

13. That will, or decree, or purpose of God, by which he doth determine the salvation of any, it is, in the proper time and season, effective of whatsoever is pre-requisite thereunto: that is, if he have decreed he will save such and such, that same will of his is, in the proper season, effective of that faith, of that repentance, of that holiness, and of that perseverance which is requisite to their final salvation. But, on the other hand, God's will to punish any with future misery is not effective of what concurs to that, neither as naturally causing or deserving it. That is sin that doth both as you have heard; it doth both naturally cause it and deserve it too. And, if you ask here, "what is the reason of the difference; or is there not a parity of reason in both cases, that if his will doth effect what is necessary to the salvation of the one, his will should also effect what is necessary or doth any ways previously concur to the destruction of the other? The reason of the difference is most manifest upon these two accounts.

(1.) That sin is properly, as such, no effect, but a defect, and therefore, it doth not need an effective cause, but a defective only. But we will impute nothing of defectiveness to God; that can be found no where but in the creature. And,

(2.) That we can (sure any one may) apprehend it a great deal more congruous and suitable to the nature and honour of God, to make men believing and holy than to make them unbelieving and wicked. We can easily apprehend how well it agrees to the nature of God, and how subservient it is to the glory of God, to make men believing and holy; but no man can ever apprehend it agreeable to his nature, or subservient to his honour, to make men disbelieving and wicked. And therefore, as we make the difference, I cannot but apprehend you see reason enough why we should. And then further, take this,

14. That for these distinct states of blessedness and misery, unto which the will of God doth determine some, and leave others, they are the only states of men hereafter, and there is not a middle state between these two, though there be great intermediate degrees between the highest pitch of felicity and the lowest of misery. There are, I say, very great intermediate degrees, but not a middle state. This proposition hath two parts:-that there is no middle state, and yet-that there are great intermediate degrees, both of blessedness and misery.

(1.) As to the former part, that there is no intermediate | to, as it is impossible that there can be a will against a will or middle state between these two: it cannot, without very in God, or that he can be divided from himself, or against great absurdity, be so much as conceived there should be; himself, or that he should reveal any thing to us as his besides that it is against the most express tenor of Scrip- will that is not his will, (it being a thing inconsistent with ture. I need not go about to quote texts to you. Look to his nature, and impossible to him to lie,) that being, I say, the judgment of the great day, Matt. xxv. Men are judged firmly laid, (as nothing can be firmer or surer than that,) but to two distinct states; all go one of these two ways. then measure all your conceptions of the secret will of And it is unconceivable in itself that there should be a God, by his revealed will, about which you may be sure. distinct intermediate state: for it would be to suppose that But never measure your conceptions of his revealed will there can be such a thing as an intelligent, reasonable crea- by his secret will; that is, by what you may imagine conture, having the use of his faculties, (which death, we cerning that. For you can but imagine while it is secret, have a great deal more reason to apprehend, doth promote and so far as it is unrevealed. rather than hinder,) and neither happy nor miserable. This is an unconceivable thing, equally unconceivable as it would be that there should be such a creature under a law, under government, (as reasonable creatures even as such, either possitive or natural at least,) that should be neither good nor bad, that should neither be obedient nor disobedient, holy nor wicked, and this you know to be an impossible thing. And that is enough as to the former part of the proposition. But then,

4. Take heed of exalting any one divine perfection to the depressing of another, which men are too prone to do in their more fervent disputes about these matters. Great heat and zeal appear to vindicate such a particular divine perfection, without attending, that at the same time they intrench upon some other. It were very easy to give instances. Some on the one hand are so much for the magnifying of the goodness of God, his love and his justice, (as they think,) that they quite overlook his sovereignty, make nothing of that, but guide their, thoughts by such measures, as if they thought that God was obliged by his goodness, or even by his justice, to do so with his own creatures, whom he hath so freely produced and brought forth into being out of nothing, as they may do with their fellow-creatures. As if God were bound to observe the same measures as they do, and had no more power and dominion over the works of his own hands, than they have over one another, who cannot give one another so much as a moment's breath. And on the other hand, some are so over-apt to exalt and magnify the divine sovereignty, that they quite forget to consider him as a wise, and righteous, and holy, and good God; in all these, the best and most perfect of beings. This is quite forgot, and scarce any other notion doth actually obtain; though otherwise these are not denied, are only not denied ; but in the mean time they are overlooked; and so hardly any other notion is brought in view, or upon the stage, concerning God, than as of an almighty will; quite against the manifest scope and current of the Scripture every where, which makes all excellencies to be in him, and magnifies his wisdom, and his righteousness, and his love and goodness, at so high a rate, as you know. But to suppose the Divine nature to consist but in an omnipotent will, not guided by wisdom and counsel, as the text speaks, "He doth all things according to the counsel of his own will," is the strangest and most unshapen notion of God; and, in the tendency of it, most destructive to religion that can be conceived. It tends, indeed, to ingenerate in the minds of men a certain dread and horror: but is that the affection that is to influence religion, and to animate our worship? There can be no worship that doth not proceed from a dutiful reverential love; and agreeable hereunto must be still our notions of God. Heathens themselves, that speak at so high a rate (some of them) of the divine excellencies, and particularly of his goodness, exalting that far above his power, and above his knowledge, and above his wisdom; yet they, at the same time, say of him, "He is an impartial law;" and they comprehend in that, both goodness and righteousness, according to the strict measures whereof he manageth the whole course of his dispensation towards his creatures, and cannot but do so. He is a law that equally inclines every way, an impartial law he is to himself in all his dispensations. And indeed, such love and goodness in a ruler, as should include in it an insensible1. That we should take heed of being too positive about ness of injuries, and indignities, and affronts, it were stuany of these things, beyond the measure of divine revela-pidity; it were inconsistent with the proper governing tion, or too curious in inquiring, or too contentious in dis- qualifications which are requisite in any ruler whatsoever. puting about such matters. Let us labour to lay a restraint And again, upon our spirits as to these things. The matter requires it, and the divine word requires it.

(2.) As to the latter part, that there are great intermediate degrees both of happiness and misery, that is plain from most express Scriptures. It is less needful to insist upon the degrees of blessedness in the other state, about which the Scripture is plain enough. There will be such a difference as there appears to be of one star differing from another star in glory, 1 Cor. xv. 41. But chiefly as to the differing degrees of misery; nothing is plainer from such passages in Scripture:-"They that know their master's will, and do it not, shall be beaten with many stripes; they that do it not, not knowing it, with fewer," Luke xii. 47, 48. "It will be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah, for Tyre and Sidon, in the day of judgment, than for Capernaum and Bethsaida, where so much Gospel light shone, and where so glorious works were done, to evidence and demonstrate the truth of the Gospel," Matt. xi. 22. And there is a sort among them that do perish, which do perish more dreadfully. Such and such, it is said, shall have their portion with hypocrites, (Matt. xxiv. 51.) which must be supposed the most fiery, in the worst and hottest hell. God will not lay upon men more than is right, that any should enter into judgment with him, as the expression in Job is. And therefore, we must suppose the case to be vastly different between them that live under the Gospel and them that do not. "They that sin without law, shall perish without law;" (Rom. ii. 12.) but with a gentler kind of perdition. But they that sin under the law, that is, under the divine revelation, for that is the meaning of the law there, supernatural, divine revelation, they shall be judged by it: not by that light which they have not, or those means of light which they never had, but by those which they have. But whereas, there will be very great degrees of difference in the states of the miserable hereafter, how great that difference will be, that we know not. It is enough that we know it will be very great; and therefore, among them that are miserable, none will be punished unsuitably to the demerit of their own sins. And this ought to have its weight with us, in order to the repressing of undue and hard thoughts concerning the divine proceedings with men in the final judgment: and so, concerning his purposes and determinations before, and from, eternity.

But I think it not necessary to say more to you by way of position; yet, there are sundry things that I shall add by way of caution. As,

2. Never depart from, nor doubt of, what God hath expressly revealed: in reference to what he hath expressly revealed, let us neither deviate nor doubt; but take heed lest we do. And,

3. Take heed that we do not oppose the secret and revealed will of God to one another, or allow ourselves so much as to imagine an opposition, or contrariety between them. And that ground being once firmly laid and stuck |

5. Take this further by way of caution: Let us take very great heed that we do not, in reference to these things, so magnify human perfection as to depress divine; for that, in this affair, too many are apt to do; that is, to as cribe so much to the reason and will of man, as to detract most injuriously from the counsel of the will of God. Some think they know not how to solve the difficulties in these affairs, without ascribing greatly and highly to the reason and will of man. And all ought to be ascribed thereunto that is due; that is, so much as doth render a

man a governable creature, capable of being bound by a law, and of being dealt with in the way of moral government. So much must be ascribed and ought to be so. It would be otherwise as fit and congruous to have given laws, and assigned rewards and punishments, to beasts and trees, as men, if we do not preserve the apprehension of man's capacity to be the subject of government, by reason and will, wherewith God hath endowed his nature. But to think that the reason and will of man are, of themselves, enough to enable him to all that is requisite to his future felicity, is to make a god of him, instead of a man, and to put him into his Maker's throne, to give him a selfsufficiency, as if he had enough in himself to do all things. And this, indeed, is so to magnify the reason and will of man, as upon the matter to nullify the council of the divine will in reference unto him; by which we find the methods are described and set, in which he is to expect continual aids and assistances, as being of himself, without them, able to do nothing. And,

6. Take heed, hereupon, of being tempted to take up with a spiritless religion, that shall be only a human product, the effect only of a man's own power. Take heed of taking up such a repentance, and such a faith, and such an obedience as the power of man is sufficient for: that will certainly lurch men at last. That repentance, and that faith, and that holiness, (if any other were to have the names,) which is not produced by the Divine Spirit, but is short of that, must needs leave men short of heaven and eternal glory; unless you would suppose it possible to a man to be his own Saviour out of such a gulf of sin and misery as men are sunk into.

7. Take heed of admitting any distrustful thoughts, that God will not be always ready to afford his communicated, superadded light and influence to those that see and acknowledge their own impotency and nothingness. Such as see themselves lost, and unable to help themselves, and that, from a sense of indigency and want, cry for his Spirit (even as for bread) to enlighten them and empower them, and enable them to do his will, to comply with his call, and come up to his terms of life and blessedness: take heed of ever admitting a distrustful thought concerning his readiness to impart and communicate to such. He will give his Spirit to them that ask him; when he is considerately asked and sought to; not formally, not slightly, not in words of course; but as feeling our own blindness, and darkness, and deadness, and impotency: or where there is not, as yet, the light of a saint, there is that of a man, and that is to be improved and made use of, in order to our higher light, and if there be that self-reflection to which God hath given to every man, a natural ability, much more may be known than usually is. It belongs to the nature of man to turn his eyes inwards. The mind of a man, (like the sun, can only project its beams and cast them about this way and that, and every way,) the mind of a man, I say, as an intellectual sun, can turn its beams inward upon itself, and take cognizance of what is done within him, and what dispositions and indispositions are within. Men can reflect and consider this with themselves: "Have not I an aversion towards God? have not worldly concernments and affairs, by the natural irclination of my own mind, a greater room and place there inan heaven and the things of heaven? are not other thoughts more grateful? and have they not a more pleasant relish with me than the thoughts of God?" Men, I say, are capable of using such reflections as these. And thereupon, of considering, "This can never be well with me: if there remain with me an habitual aversion to God, who must be my best and eternal good, I cannot but be eternally miserable: if I cannot think of him and converse with him with inclination and pleasure, I am lost. If my blessedness lie above, in another world, and my mind is carried continually downward towards this world, I must have a heart attempered to heaven, or I can never come there. Well then, let me try if I can change the habit of my own mind, make the attempt, make the trial." The more you attempt and try, the more you will find that of yourselves you cannot; you can do nothing of yourselves, you do but lift at a heavy log, you attempt to move a mountain upwards, when you would lift at your own terrene hearts. Then is

*Preached January 22nd, 1692.

this consideration obvious, “I must have help from heaven, or I shall never come there." Therefore falla seeking, fall a supplicating, as one that apprehends himself in danger to perish and be lost, if he have not another heart, a believing heart, a holy heart, a heavenly heart. God will in this case give his Spirit; and of that, you are not to despair by any means. Take heed therefore of setting the imagination of a secret will of God not to give his Spirit, against his plain and most expressly revealed will, that he will give his Spirit to them that ask it, that is, that do considerately ask it, as apprehending the state of their case; not ask it slightly and in mockery, so as that the manner of their asking to have the Divine Spirit given should imply a contempt of the gift at the same time.

LECTURE IV.*

AND I will add, further, to this caution, that we take very great heed that we do not remit either our diligence, or our hope, in reference to the affairs of our salvation, upon the supposition of any divine council or purpose lying against us; and to enforce this, (than which nothing is more necessary to be enforced,) I might reason two ways, partly ad hominem, partly ad rem.

(1.) Ad hominem. That is, from the common apprehension and practice of men in reference to other cases. It is very plain that all the other concernments of men are as much determined by divine counsel and decree, as the affairs and concerns of their souls and future estate. But it is as plain that men are not wont to suspend their actions, in common cases, upon mere supposition of such purposes and councils of God, that may, for aught they know, lie against them in such cases. It would make very strange work in the world if they should; if men should suspend their actions in rcference to common affairs of human life, merely upon the supposition that a decree may be against them. What a condition would it reduce things to among men on earth! The whole world would be at a stand, or would be sitting still, and would sit still in very uneasy postures too. The husbandman must never plough nor sow, for he might say, "I do not know but there is a decree against me, that all will come to nothing, I shall have no crop, I shall lose all my labour and expense." The merchant should never send or go to sea; no man should ever make a meal, because he doth not know but that it may be determined that it shall poison and not nourish him, choke him and not refresh him. Men should not walk the streets, for they do not know but that there may be some decree or other that a tile shall fall and strike them dead, or they may meet with a stab in their walk: nor should they sit still in the house neither, for they do not know but that there may be such a decree that the house may fall and bury them in the ruins. Plain it is, men do not in common cases suspend their actions upon such suppositions; but then it argues very great insincerity, and a very ill temper of mind, that men should only pick out their weightiest and most important concerns, and do nothing in reference to them, merely upon such an imagination that there may be some purpose, or something in the divine council, lying against them. It argues, I say, a very ill mind; that there is some peculiar disaffection to God, and to the way of holiness and to religion as such, that men should only lay themselves under restraint in reference to those great concernments of religion, when they have as much cause, and the same pretence, in reference to all things as they have in reference to this. And again,'

(2.) We may argue ad rem, or from the true, real state of the case itself; that is, that there is no supposable divine purpose but what is guided by counsel, and that no one hath any reason to fear that the divine counsel can be any way prejudicial to him, even to an honest affair or undertaking, that belongs to the human life itself. For they are always to be considered as the counsels of an absolutely, infinitely perfect Being, whose nature is incapable of any thing of malignity towards his creatures; (for it is the most

perfect benignity and goodness itself, "God is love;") and | show the same diligence unto the full assurance of hope therefore, that any supposable counsel of the divine will, unto the end: that ye be not slothful, but followers of them in reference to our common affairs themselves, are a great who through faith and patience have inherited the promideal more encouraging than they can be discouraging; ses." And in the nature of the thing, there can be no diliyea, unspeakably more, in reference to these affairs, sup-gence where there is no hope; where there is much of posing we will but take up due thoughts of God, about hope, there will be much of diligence. There is no reathem, and hove correspondent, due dispositions of heart son that either should languish; there is the greatest reaand spirit towards him: for we are pre-assured by his own son why both should be lively and vigorous, and make express word, that all things shall work together for good each other so, even upon the supposition of what lies in to those that love God; which love will be the evidence of the mind and purpose of God, in reference to the affairs of a man's being called according to his purpose, as these souls. And then, I further add, by way of caution, things lie connected in that Rom. viii. 28. There is no 8. That we do not overlook the advantages that may be son or servant of common understanding and ingenuity, made of agreements among them that do controvert this but it will be a very great encouragement and satisfaction same thing. That is, the purposes and counsels of God to him to act in all things under the conduct and direction touching the salvation of men, or touching the punishment of a parent or master, that he knows to be a man of coun- of them who shall be found the fit subjects of his punitive sel, as well as of the greatest goodness; it will certainly be justice in another state. Let us not overlook the advanmost satisfying and encouraging to any such one. And tage that may be made of what is in this matter agreed on how unspeakably more will it be to any, to think, that all hands; that is, it is on all hands agreed, that no good whatsoever affairs that lie within the compass of human man shall ever perish. This is a thing wherein all do conlife, I have to manage, I am to manage and order them all sent and agree. And truly, what there is of difference, it under the conduct and direction of the wise counsel of a is so very notional and little, in comparison of this, that good, and gracious, and holy God; whence I may be sure here we have what should quiet our minds, yea, and it is he will never hinder me in any such enterprise and under- further agreed, that for them that are wicked, they have taking of mine, unless it appear to his infinite wisdom, that always still means for making them better, more than ever it will be to my hurt, that it will turn to my prejudice. If they improve or make use of; and that God doth afford no it shall be for the best for me, it shall succeed, if it shall such means to any unwillingly; therefore, always accordnot succeed, it would be to my disadvantage if it should. ing to his will, and the counsel of his will; and conseThe tendency of all this is to compose men's spirits to the quently, that this must be found the case at last, that none greatest quietude and tranquillity imaginable, in reference do finally perish but such as have refused and rejected the even to the common affairs of human life. This word is overtures, or misimproved, or not improved, the means firmer and more stable than the foundations of heaven and that they had in order to their being saved. Though they earth, that all things shall work together for good to them have not all at once what was necessary to the saving of that love God: nothing can come amiss to a lover of God, them, they had always reason to apprehend, that if they to one, who by the Divine Spirit working in him, is con- had used what they had, they should have had still more. tempered in the habitual frame of his spirit to the divine And such agreements as these are by no means to be overpleasure. And the disposition of all things cannot but looked. We should labour to make the greatest advanwork together for good to such a one. tage of them that the matter admits of. Yea, and it is further agreed, that this world is very wicked; and it cannot but be agreed, that God could make it generally better if he would, and therefore, it ought to be as generally agreed, that he hath something in his wise counsel whence it doth appear to him less fit to exert his almightiness to this purpose. Or, if any should expect he should do so, or wonder he doth not so, they have as much reason to wonder why he did not, by almightiness, shut sin out of the world at first, and why he did not, by his almighty power, (as he might ) prevent the apostacy or fall, either of the angels that fell, or of the universality of men that fell all at once, and are all in a fallen state ever since.

But whereas it may be said, "What if I do not love God? what if I find not that disposition in my heart and soul to him, what shall I do then?" Why,

[1.] I would appeal to such a one, How perverse a notion must you needs have of God, if you think him to be such a one that he should equally take care, that all things should work together for good to men, whether they love him or love him not! that he should as much gratify them that hate him, as them that love him! You must suppose, in this case, somewhat in its own nature impossible: for it is simply impossible that any thing can succeed well with a man that loves not God. He must be the son of peace, or good cannot come to him; it can take no place in him. But what I have further to say is this, which in the second place I designed to say in arguing this matter ad rem. That is,

[2] That supposing a man be not a lover of God, an habitual lover of him, so he can discern this to be the predominant governing principle in him; yet he hath greater encouragement in reference to the affairs of his soul, (supposing them to lie in this state,) that he can have in reference to his external estate in this world. For do we ever find any such promises in the word of God, that whosoever labours to be rich shall be rich; or that he that takes care of his health shall be always healthy; as we have, that he that labours to be saved shall have help from heaven in order thereunto? "Work out you own salvation with fear and trembling, for God worketh in you to will and to do of his own good pleasure," Phil. ii. 12, 13. He is working: (for so the word signifies:) what he doth herein, he doth according to good pleasure, and he is still doing and working in you. Therefore, there can be no purpose or counsel in the divine will, lying against this plain word of his. So that none can have any pretence to be less laborious, less diligent in reference to the affairs of their souls, than they have in reference to their common affairs. Yea, there is a great deal of reason why they should be much more, and that they should conjoin hope with their diligence in reference thereunto; which I mention in this conjunction, because we find them so conjoined in Scripture; and they are conjoined in the nature of the thing. We find them conjoined, Heb. vi. 11. "That ye

I shall not further insist as to matter of useful caution which in these several particulars hath been given you, But I shall add to these, some alleviating considerations, that may help to make things sit more easily on our minds, relating to this great and important subject. As,

1. Consider this, that all the purposes or determinations of the divine will, they are the products of counsel. That the text assures us, that whatsoever he doth, he doth according to the counsel of his own will, whereupon, as to the secret purposes and determinations of the divine will, which therefore we know not, because they are secret, we have all the reason imaginable to think, that they must be most unexceptionable, from that we do know, that they are all purposes guided by most unerring counsel, and which, whilst we know not in particular what they are, we have nothing to do but reverentially to adore, as the apostle doth in Rom. xi. 33. "O! the depth both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out." That part remains, to adore, with a dutiful adoration, what we do not distinctly and particularly understand, and, indeed, cannot understand. There is no government but hath its arcana; and it would be very inept and foolish for us to imagine, that there should be no secrets belonging to the divine government. But admit that there be, inasmuch as they do belong to the divine government, the government of God; that name is a name that comprehends all perfection, and excludes all imperfection; contains nothing in it but what is most excellent and perfect in all respects; and therefore, of this, in the general, we may rest most assured, that there

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