ilies in case of death or accident, within a reasonable period, by the practice of decent economy. We would remove them as far as possible from temptations of all kinds. In other words, we would see them independent of trade, speculation, or politics, and would wish to see the whole country frown upon their intermeddling with either.

The precise amount of salary to be paid to judges would of course depend much upon the nature and extent of their duties and responsibilities; but the adequacy or inadequacy of any given sum would depend much more upon the system introduced into our new state government. If a government shall be formed that will prohibit all monopolies, discourage all splendid schemes of either state or individual aggrandizement, and introduce among the whole people that proper economy, true independence, and scorn of outward show that ought invariably to mark the whole people of America, a small sum will be a competence. If, on the contrary, a spirit of speculation is engendered by governmental action, a large sum will only afford a glittering show and a splendid poverty.

We are glad, very glad, to see the Telegraph taking up this subject, and trust it will continue to differ or agree with us on those points that ought to be at this moment discussed daily by every inhabitant of the territory, until a state government shall be formed as nearly as possible in accordance with the wishes of the whole people. We should be rejoiced to see every press in Wisconsin devoting a portion of its columns, and a large portion, too, to discussions of this kind, and exerting all the energies of its conductors to lay before the public the various improvements it would wish adopted.

We know, as a matter of course, that no constitution will be formed that will suit us, or any one man; and while we shall feel satisfied as long as the people are, we hold it the duty of everyone connected with the press to throw aside minor disputes and devote great space to matters that must soon be settled for a long term of years.

We learn that we have made some suggestions that have been made heretofore by the Telegraph, and we are happy to learn that such is the fact. Our ambition is not to say that we have started a particular measure but to have it said that we have been able and industrious in the support of a good

one.

We look upon the present situation of the country as one that demands the energies of all to excite the people to constant and temperate discussion of measures, and we feel that there is a difficulty in this that is not to be found at the eve of an exciting presidential election, while the importance of the movement is infinitely greater.

Let us, then, all do our duty, and we may rest assured that we shall be well repaid by a prosperous future for our exertions. We have now but little else to do, and that little is of no great importance. We shall welcome all into the field, and shall be happy to follow every lead we may think better than our own, or to add such suggestions to the projects of wiser men than ourselves as shall in our opinion render their projects still more useful to the community.

PREVENTION BETTER THAN CURE

[May 19, 1846]

It would be well at this period for the people of our territory to look around them at the many constitutional reforms that are proposed in other states, and see that by their own state constitution such measures shall be adoped as will fully guard against those mistakes and faults that have crept into other communities. It has been too truly remarked that power is constantly stealing from the many to the few, and it is against this abuse especially that we ought to guard.

In the state of New York we find most papers of both parties anxious to throw more power into the hands of the people by making more officers elective and less dependent upon the pleasure either of the governor or the senate; but it seems to us that even there they do not go far enough. We

think one important provision in a constitution ought to be the denial of a power in the legislature to create at pleasure new offices. Many are occasionally introduced that are at first thought to be of little moment but turn out in the end to be not only offices of great profit but offices that tend greatly to corruption. Indeed, throughout the whole state of New York office-seeking has been for a few years past a mania among the whole people; and few citizens of the state have not felt inclined to blush at the eagerness with which men labored to obtain the pettiest offices as well as the greatest.

In addition to the army of justices of the peace, police justices, constables, and deputy sheriffs, the state has of late years formed a whole army of inspectors, and cities, following the example of the state, have added to them, so that in many places it was impossible to buy even a load of wood without employing a man in authority to decide how much you were buying. It is useless to say that these offices are all necessary, and it is equally useless to say that even where necessary the numbers have not been too great. And these offices, for whatever purpose they have been nominally created, have in fact been made to give or to keep in the hands of the few that power that the whole people of the state have long been wishing to see placed in the hands of the many. A convention in New York now proposes, among other salutary reforms, to place all this power in the hands of the people; and this so far is well: but would it not be still better were offices to be reduced to the lowest possible number that could carry on the business of the state, and to fix that number beyond the possibility of increase, unless by the determination of the people, made known by a direct vote, without any reference to the man who should be called to fill the office proposed to be made.

We have pointed out the state of New York the more especially on account of its peculiar present position, and because that state has suffered so much from the continual accumulation of offices that the people have found it necessary to resist the power thus thrown into the hands of the few.

We are now on the eve of becoming a state, and to us it seems a matter of the highest importance so to reduce the number of offices that we may avoid the one rock upon which so many communities have split. If, in the coming convention, the proper provisions are introduced, we may not only avoid hosts of useless officers throughout the state, but we may render an increase of offices absolutely impossible, unless actually desired by the whole people. Every state office, or almost every one, may be made elective, and the number may be reduced much below that of any state in the Union. We want no boards of internal improvement, no inspectors of necessaries or luxuries, and if we can determine to do away with the collection of small debts, making them what they really should be, debts of honor, we should want no small courts, small court judges, or small court officers. The justices of the peace would then be, what they ought to be, only conservators of public peace, and the office of constable would be one held by good citizens to restrain or punish crime in those evilly disposed.

There will always be in a state sufficient offices to satisfy all honorable ambition, to spur men on to the exercise of all their abilities to promote the public weal, and that is all that is wanted. Every unnecessary office opens a door for intrigue, corruption, bickerings, heartburnings, and all the curses that follow, both to the successful and to the disappointed. The people are never dissatisfied because men of talent are elevated on account of talent and purity; but when they see intriguers elevated to office they become at once distrustful of the institutions they have fostered, and often hopeless of even the most rational improvements that can be proposed. When they make all the selections this cannot happen; and, moreover, their representatives, being cut off from the power of assisting men to office, will attend more faithfully and steadily to the wants of their constituents.

A simple form of government, few officers to execute the laws, and those few paid well but not extravagantly, will prevent any great desire to seek office, or to tinker with the

laws. We want, in a country like this, but few legislative enactments; and we want to remove from among legislators the constant endeavor to make a trade of politics and secure a support out of the state for themselves and their friends, either by procuring offices of profit or by enacting laws that will benefit a few persons, among whom they will of course be found.

"Purity of elections" is another cry among the older states. That purity will be best effected by making offices so few and so immediately derived from the people that no ulterior object will be sought by parties. It is not the great measures before the public that lead to frauds. It is the hopes that voters entertain of gaining by the election of particular candidates. Men who would commit frauds at elections would never care much about carrying out measures for the good of the country. Men do not, as a general thing, seek to bribe people into voting for or against a great measure; it is only for or against a certain set of candidates. It is only for a certain distribution of offices that corruption is used. No one heard a charge made of any corruption in the state of New York upon the question of convention or no convention; and yet that question was one of the most important that could have been placed before the public. But it involved no distribution of offices, and therefore there was cool consideration but no excitement.

Let us, then, look to other states, not with a view of copying them but to prevent the possibility of our falling into the errors from which they are trying to extricate themselves. Let us not only avoid their errors, but let us so fortify the people in power that they will not only be called upon at stated periods to review their own work, but that, if an emergency should arise, means would be ready to place directly within their control the whole subject, after that due deliberation that should always be given to so grave a project as that of amending the constitution of a state.