ness, and discretion, so essential to the consideration of a question of such vital importance.

The first night that Mr. Holyoake lectured, the proposition was, "Jesus Christ an example for modern reformers." In his opening remarks he said, he did not deny the existence of a God, what he had to say was, he could not see evidence sufficient to convince him of his existence. Albeit in a discussion which subsequently took place between him and Mr. Townley in London, he admitted, that the design argument proved the existence of a Being distinct from nature.*

In the course of his lecture he said, he must be allowed to view Christ as the Unitarian viewed him, (bye the bye, he appears somewhat partial to the Unitarians,) if he looked at him as a man he must confess that he was very far superior to any who lived in his day. He then proceeded to take exception to many of his sayings, and with a perversion, which seems quite natural to atheistic controversialists, declared the language of Christ to his disciples (Matt. v. 11, 12,) was very dangerous in its tendency, in that it led men to court persecution here, in the hope of a reward hereafter; nevertheless, I apprehend that if any of Mr. Holyoake's disciples encounter opposition in the advocacy of their principles, he is not slow to offer them some kind of consolation and encouragement, as a reward for their patient endurance; but whether he can with consistency give them the appellation of blessed, must be left to his own far seeing gacity.

"Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth" They did not inherit the earth, the lecturer said, yet neither he nor any other man would safely inherit much if it were not for the recognition and inculcation of peaceable principles; far more of real temporal good is to be enjoyed by peaceably pursuing a right course than by any other. Mr. Holyoake's motto is, utility, the present world; then surely he ought not to find fault with a passage inculcating that virtue which he knows bears so much on the present life, and which materially affects the progress of his cause.

"The death of Christ was a bad example to man." But why so? Does not Mr. Holyoake profess to be labouring for the benefit of men, and what he considers the progress of truth? Is he not sometimes sub jecting himself to much inconvenience and self-sacrifice for the benefit of others, and would he, in the professed integrity of his heart, abandon his principles, although in the end suffering and death should follow? Suppose this were the case, would he allow it was a bad example? And if Christ, the innocent and just, layed down his life voluntarily for the benefit of the guilty and unjust, ought it not rather to be said, it was a good example, a convincing proof of the high, the noble, and sublime principles by which he was actuated. If a man by his vices incur disgrace and death, and this is very frequently the case, it is in truth a bad example; but if a man under the influence of noble and generous sentiments pur sues à course which exposes him to suffering and even to death, we may feel for and deeply sympathise with him, but we cannot say his example was bad; and if the individual submit to these things as did Christ for the benefit of his enemies, then our admiration is raised to the highest

"Atheistic Controversy." Pages 21 and 43.

pitch, and we feel the most profound reverence for excellence, so disinterested and God-like.

In his concluding remarks, the lecturer said, he accepted nature as selfexistent and eternal; and, therefore, he assumes, that nature is equal to all that is, and to all that may yet be; "and if the world could wait long enough, if time, as he says, were given sufficient for the purpose, we should find, that this matter would change without help on our part, and would become we know not what, because it has already become what it is from what we are unable to explain." Now this language is mere assumption, there is no proof that matter is eternal, that it has by its own inherent power produced all that is; and, therefore, until this can be shewn, all reasoning with respect to what it may yet do, can avail nothing. If an instance could be given of the creative energy of nature, if it were possessed of an intelligence equal to the production of what is, then we need not wait, it would be palpable, and there would be no doubt at all as to its capability in time to come. The testimony of the past and the experience of the present are, that nature is unintelligent, that the great mass of matter is unorganised, and hence it would be an absurdity to suppose it could give, what our senses testify it does not possess.

Intelligence, we are told, is the result of organisation, because we know of no intelligence independent of it; then nature being unorganised as before stated, has necessarily no intelligence, it could not, therefore, be the parent of all beings possessing it: we are driven then from nature to a Being above and distinct from it, who in all ages has been equal to the creation of what has existed; and if equal to the formation of such wonarous production which we everywhere behold, then we think, that we are justified in concluding that he must be equal likewise to the creation of the material itself, out of which they have been formed. Nature, then, is not that independent self-existent being which infidel philosophers would have us believe; on the contrary, it gives proof of its dependency, and its subjection to the will of an intelligent ruler.

Mr. Holyoake frequently refers to science, as revealing such and such things; science, on one occasion he said, was our providence; now I go to science with respect to the world's history of nature, and I find, that the science of geology controverts the world's supposed eternity: it is true, it does not enable the theist to demonstrate the commencement of its existence, but it points him to epochs in its history when whole races of beings were swept away, and their places occupied by others adapted to an improved condition of its surface; it points him to a time when the whole mass was in a state of confusion, and, therefore, to a time when vegetable and animal organisms could not exist; their creation then must have been a subsequent operation, and if this did not require an infinite Being to accomplish it, as Dr. Hitchcock truly observes, no result in nature would demand his "Who does not see," he says, agency. "that to bestow organisation, and life, and instinct, to say nothing of intelligence upon brute matter, is the loftiest prerogative of Jehovah? especially to fill so vast a world as ours with teeming millions, exhibiting ten thousand diversities of size, form, and structure."*

• Professor Hitchcock's "Religion of Geology." Pages 142 and 143.

Geology shews then, in the first place, that the matter which composes our globe was once in a molten state, destitute of either animal or vege table life: secondly, that it afterwards became the abode of many distinct races of beings, which successively existed and passed away: and, thirdly, that about six thousand years ago, man, in his completeness stood forth, to gaze on this wonderful world, a modern inhabitant; unconscious of the cycles of ages that have passed away ere the mighty fabric over which he then presided became fitted for him. We see then, that the assumption of the world's eternity is met by the facts of geological science, and these are evidently such as lead us to conclude, that it must have had a creator, that it could not originate itself, but that the Being, who at different times interposed to furnish it with inhabitants, at some very distant period in the past brought into existence, by the fiat of his own power, the materials out of which the present beauteous world has arisen.

Thus science, when faithfully appealed to, though claimed by Mr. Holyoake as his providence, certainly does not in this respect afford him much protection; on the contrary, its revelations are against him, and in harmony with the opening statement of the sacred historian: “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.”

Mr. Holyoake's proposition the second night was, "The moral innocency of the rejection of Christianity if consistently disbelieved." After having occupied about an hour and half in descanting on the innocency of disbelief where it proceeded from conscientious or honest conviction, in reply to some statements made by a reverend gentleman, he said," he did not care whether religion were true or false," in connection with other remarks which I do not now distinctly remember.

:

If a man says, he cannot believe, that he is anxious to believe, that he is as anxious to know what is truth on a certain subject as any other man can be, if that man reiterate again and again his honesty and sincerity, if he be free from the dominion of vices calculated to blind his reason and pervert his judgment, if he search as diligently as other men into those sources which are best calculated to produce conviction, if after having done this, he still asserts his inability to believe as another man believes, then it appears to me, Sir, that we must give such a man credit for sincerity, and leave the issue with him who sees impartially and judges righteously but if a man, who apparently labours hard to make others understand, that he is sincere in his disbelief, that his motives are pure, and that he would believe if he could, if this man, some time after says, he does not care whether religion be true or not, it does not concern him, what he thinks is good in the Bible he will receive, what he thinks is not he will reject. I ask, Sir, what, in the name of common sense are we to think of such a man's innocency and conscientiousness? Where is the harmony between the proposition and the after statements? There is evidently none that I can see, it is in my estimation a palpable contradiction, and consequently, all that is built upon it falls to the ground. If a man says, I disbelieve Christianity because I do disbelieve it, certainly it is an easy way of settling the question, but it can be neither conscientious nor philosophic.

If the evidence for the truth of Christianity be equal to that adduced in support of other by-gone facts, and I presume this can be shewn, then

it follows, that Christianity likewise is entitled to the same; and for an individual unceremoniously to reject it, because to his taste it seems unpalatable, is, to say the least, a very unfair and illogical mode of procedure, and quite incompatible with Mr. Holyoake's pretensions as a public teacher.

On another occasion, the lecturer remarked to the effect, that he knew not where to find the morality of the Christian; there was something so indefinite and vague about it, that if he were to attempt to define it, he would find himself quite incompetent to the task. Now really, Sir, one would think that no sensible man could unblushingly give utterance to such language; where to find it? where is it to be found at all, if it is not to be found in that book hoary with years, and yet fresh and pure as the mountain stream which rolls its pellucid waters through the valleys, below, slaking the thirst and refreshing the spirits of myriads of living creatures, at which proud infidelity itself stoops to drink, and, then for sooth asks the Christian, where is your morality? as though the morality it enforced were quite original, totally distinct from that of the Christian, and infinitely superior to it. It might, with propriety, be asked, where are the great moral precepts of infidelity? Where is its statute-book, and by what sanctions are its laws enforced? Secularism or secular lecturers, not being able to set forth anything new; finding themselves straitened on all sides by the purity and breadth of those great moral precepts given to us in the Bible, immediately resort to a mode of procedure most unjustifiable; which common sense and candour must utterly repudiate and contemn. I will give you, Mr. Editor, a specimen or two.

Mr. Holyoake one evening animadverted on the fourth commandment: Remember the Sabbath-day to keep it holy." Who was to know, said the lecturer, what is meant by keeping holy the Sabbath-day; "what was holiness? rather let it be said, remember the Sabbath to keep it healthy." And is not this term open to the same interrogation, what is health? In what does it consist? Would all men agree as to the mode of keeping the day healthy? Would they all come to the conclusion that to breathe the pure air, and roam over the wide fields would be the best way to keep the day healthy? On the contrary, there would be a great diversity of opinion, differing according to each man's tastes and habits; although according to the laws of physiological science it would not be difficult to determine, what would be the most healthy way of keeping it. So there may be various opinions entertained with respect to the holy word in its application to the Sabbath by some men, but, I presume, to every man of common understanding, that has reverence for the Scripture, this word carries with it an idea of sacredness, both definite and intelligible.

Again, "do justice and love mercy and walk humbly with thy God." Well, this appears very good, said the lecturer, but what is justice? What is mercy? They are not defined, therefore, how are we to understand what is meant?* Now when Mr. Holyoake addresses an audience does he take it for granted, that his hearers are so obtuse, that the terms he employs, and the principles he lays down must be submitted to a thorough

* If this be the style of criticism on the Bible, those who employ it, should never advocate truth, justice, morals, &c., these being general térms, N 3

VOL. II.

analysis, and reduced to their simple elements, ere they can understand what he means? On the contrary, he clothes his ideas in what he considers common language, and leaves the interpretation of them to the general good sense and intelligence of his auditory: let him then in this respect deal with another, as he would have another deal with him; this is what a plain man understands by justice.

Again, Mr. Holyoake says, "we are moral for other reasons than the Christian, we appeal to human nature, utility, and intelligence, and find reasons for being moral there." There can be no doubt I think, Sir, that in human nature we find the foundation of morality, and not either in utility or intelligence. If there were no common standard of appeal, it would be impossible to come to any satisfactory conclusion as to what was moral or what was not; society, therefore, would be rent by divisions on that which constitutes its strongest bond. All men feel they are capable of distinguishing between right and wrong, good and evil, so that an immoral act finds in human nature its judge, and by human nature is condemned. It instinctively shrinks from evil in proportion as it is enlight ened, while it feels great satisfaction in the performance of an act which it is led to consider as virtuous and moral.

Admitting that we can appeal to utility and intelligence for moral conduct, at the same time we see that these form an uncertain and varying standard; for the while on the one hand a man may be convinced that it is, and will be to his advantage to conduct himself morally, on the other hand, many are led to pursue an opposite course, because it appears to them to be to their advantage to do so; their intelligence, combined with a strong sense of utility, instead of leading them to the practise of morality, leads them to outrage the better feelings of their nature, and prac tice injustice: their motto is utility, personal advantage, self-aggrandisement; therefore, they are led at all hazards to strive after these, although the struggle should involve others in disgrace and ruin.

We find some men set their minds on the acquisition of wealth; power and influence appear to them to be of immense importance, to become rich is their dominant desire, their ruling passion; and to this all things are made subservient; appeals to the humanity and intelligence of such men meet with but a slight response, because the medium through which they are led to view things, is, a worldly utility.

Again, the man who meets his fellow on the high-road, and plunders him of his property is led to do so not because his nature suggests its rectitude, but because he is influenced by utility. The man who in various ways defrauds his neighbour, and robs him of his rights, is led to do so, not because human nature asserts its lawfulness, but because he is influenced and controlled by utility. The despot who keeps in abject subjection thousands of human beings, is led thus to act from a feeling of utility, his intelligence ministering to his selfishness; and what atrocities will not men sometimes be led to perpetrate from a conviction that some personal advantage will be the result. Human nature then requires some higher mo tives for the practise of morality than what are to be found in itself: appeals to its intelligence and to utility are not sufficiently powerful to produce virtuous conduct; man needs to have his vicious tendencies corrected and his virtuous emotions strengthened by an appeal to the higher power,