make remonstrances, and if no attention is paid to them, CHAP. you will receive from me farther orders." 1 XXXIV. $ 57. 1840. 92. Whatever may have been the anxiety of M. Thiers to preserve the statu quo system, the measures of the allied Treaty of July 15, powers rendered it impossible to maintain it much longer, 1840. and drove matters to a crisis. The terms of the treaty of 15th July have been already mentioned,1 signed by c. xxxii. the representatives of the four allied powers, whereby it was agreed that intimation should be made to Mehemet Ali, that if he evacuated Syria and Candia in ten days, he should have his pashalic of Egypt in hereditary right, and that of Syria, with the fortress of St Jean d'Acre, for life; but if these offers were not acceded to, and the necessary orders not given in that time, the offer of the liferent of the pashalic of Acre should be withdrawn. This treaty was concluded by the four powers alone, without the concurrence of France, so that the latter power found herself in a manner excluded from the European family. The communication of the treaty, however, which was made on the 18th July, was accompanied with every expression which could soften the irritation likely to be experienced at the court of the Tuileries from this 203, 204. circumstance.2 2 Cap. x. 93. dum of the allied July 18. "The French Government," said the memorandum communicating the treaty, "has received during the whole Memorancourse of the negotiations, which began in the autumn of ad last year, the most incontestable proofs of the desire of powers. the courts of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, to arrive at an accord with the French Government in regard to the arrangements necessary for the pacification of the Levant. France may appreciate, from that circumstance, the importance which the courts attach to the moral effect likely to be produced by the harmony and combined action of the five powers in an affair attended with such grave consequences. The four powers have perceived with regret that their efforts to attain this end have been unsuccessful; and although, recently, they XXXIV. 1840. CHAP. have proposed to France to unite with them for the execution of an arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali, based on the views which the French ambassador proposed in the end of last year, the Government of France has not thought fit to accede to that combination. It has annexed to its corporation with the other powers, conditions which they regarded as inconsistent with the independence of the Ottoman empire, and the future peace of Europe. In these circumstances, nothing remained to the four powers but either to abandon to chance the future of the great affairs which they were called on to adjust, to manifest thus their impotence, and leave Europe exposed to constantly increasing hazards, or to advance in their own line, without the co-operation of France, and of themselves effect the pacification of the Levant. Placed in that alternative, and profoundly convinced of the necessity of a prompt decision to adjust the many important interests now at stake, they have considered it their duty to adopt the latter alternative. They have, in consequence, concluded a convention with the Sultan, in virtue of which the complications in the Levant will, they trust, be satisfactorily adjusted. In signing that convention, the four powers have felt the deepest regret at finding themselves momentarily separated from France in an affair so essentially European. They indulge the hope 1 Memoran- that their separation from France, on that subject, will be of short duration; and that it will in no degree disturb the sincere friendship which they so ardently desire to maintain with that power." dum, July 18, 1840 Moniteur, 94. in France of this treaty. Notwithstanding the delicate manner in which this Indignation unwelcome intelligence was conveyed to the French Govon hearing ernment, there was enough in it to awaken the jealousy of the Government and rouse the passions of the people. M. Thiers had expected the immediate signature of a treaty between the Sultan and the Pasha, which should have adjusted their differences according to his ideas; great therefore was his indignation when he found that XXXIV. 1840. he had been anticipated by the allied powers, and that CHAP. the affairs of the Levant were to be adjusted by the coalesced powers alone without the concurrence of France, and in direct opposition to its wishes. The public unanimously shared these sentiments. The French felt themselves wounded in their national honour, and, more sensitive than any people in Europe in that particular, they immediately took fire. The cry was universal for immediate and great preparations for war, in order to prevent the ratification of the treaty. "It is not yet ratified," it was said: "the cabinets will recoil from a step so injurious to French influence; to prevent the ratification of the treaty, we must arm on a gigantic scale. When Europe sees France determined on a national war, it will hesitate before adopting a repressive system, founded on the ignoring of its influence." These sentiments were loudly re- echoed by the public press. Not only the revolutionary journals, but the Royalist and Legitimist, called out aloud for war. The National indulged in the most menacing expressions; and even the Journal des Débats, understood to express the sentiments of the Journal Tuileries, so far from restraining, loudly applauded the July 21, warlike enthusiasm, and in an especial manner directed x. 208, 209. it against England.1 1 des Débats, 1840; Cap. measures of Cabinet. A soldier who had fought at Jemappes, a sovereign 95. who had acted at Antwerp, Louis Philippe was sensitively Vigorous alive to the national honour, and deemed no sacrifices too the French great or dangers too serious to protect it from insult. He cordially acquiesced, accordingly, in the vigorous measures proposed by M. Thiers, and unanimously adopted by the Cabinet. It was immediately determined-1. To raise the army to the war establishment of 400,000 men, in anticipation of a serious continental as well as maritime contest; 2. To adopt a great system of fortifications around. Paris, so as to eschew the dangers which had proved so fatal in 1814 and 1815; 3. To augment largely the fleet in the Mediterranean, so as to enable the French XXXIV. 1840. CHAP. navy to act with effect in a European conflict; and, 4. To open an extraordinary credit of 100,000,000 francs (£4,000,000), authorised by a mere royal ordonnance on the responsibility of Ministers. These were very bold steps, and in another state of the public mind might have caused no small danger to the Ministers who recommended them. But in the present excited state of the public mind, and in a matter in which the honour of France was involved, no danger was to be apprehended from the adoption of any warlike measures, how decided soever.1 1 Cap. x. 209, 210; Ann. Hist. xxiii. 304, 305, 306. 96. opinion on tion of Paris. A great difference of opinion, however, soon arose as to the mode in which the fortification of Paris was to be Division of carried into effect. The King, with the concurrence of the the fortifica- Cabinet, inclined to the side of forts détachés, erected on all the eminences around Paris within half cannon-shot of each other, and each a fortress in itself capable of standing a separate siege. By means of this cross fire all access to the capital from without would be rendered impossible till the forts themselves were subdued; and beyond all doubt, if these detached forts had been in existence in 1814, the march of the Allies upon Paris after Napoleon's movement upon St Dizier would have terminated in disaster. This plan of defence also presented the immense advantage of keeping the horrors of war and the real defence of the capital at a distance from its edifices, and of giving the executive at the head of the army the means, by the guns of these, the entire command of the capital without firing a shot in the streets. But on this very account the project was from the first the object of jealousy and opposition to the Republican party, who had no desire to see the Government in possession of a line of forts around the capital, from which they might readily reduce any insurrection among its inhabitants, by either threatening them with the terrors of a bombardment, or cutting off their supplies of provisions from the country. For these reasons they strongly contended for the enceinte continue, or entire line of fortifications, which they hoped, without separating the soldiers XXXIV. 1840. from the citizens, would convert the capital into one huge CHAP. intrenched camp, in which, from the magnitude of their numbers, they themselves would have the superiority. The Government, however, held out steadily for the forts détachés, and, taking advantage of the general warlike fervour, commenced their construction, which was vigorously proceeded with. Their localities revealed the true idea which had prompted their construction; for it was soon discovered that they would be more formidable to an enemy within than without, and that by means of their converging fire any insurrection in the capital might 210, 211. hereafter be easily subdued.1* 1 Cap. x. 97. M. Thiers. Placed at Paris in the centre of the excitement, and, in a manner, in the front rank of the conflict, M. Thiers was Great prein his element, and beheld in the effervescence around parations of him the beau idéal in his conception of civilised societypopular excitement controlled by military force. His preparations were on the most formidable scale, and sufficiently proved that his administrative talents were fully equal to his oratorical abilities. Twelve new regiments were ordered to be raised, the artillery put on the war establishment, and the battalions and squadrons all filled up to their war footing. He boasted that in a few months he would have 400,000 regular troops under arms, besides 300,000 movable national guards. When he came to details, however, M. Thiers encountered many unexpected difficulties, and acquired melancholy proof how much the resources of France, in all but men, had been wasted by the devastation of the Revolution. For artillery horses he was obliged to go to Switzerland, for cavalry to Germany; the guns for the artillery could only be augmented by recourse to a house in connection * The Author is in possession of a very curious map, showing the proposed position of all the detached forts round Paris, and the range of their guns. Those of no less than six cross each other in the Rue St Antoine and the Place of the Bastile, the constant centre of insurrection !-A curious and instructive circumstance, that the fire of a hundred guns should be in the end concentrated upon the spot where the first triumph of popular insurrection took place! |