Book V. which he is to inherit, will always have a right to interpofe his advice, and even his authority, if it be neceffary, against any future violation of our liberties; and to procure an effectual redress of our grievances, which we have hitherto fought in vain. If all the English in both armies unite, as I hope they may, in this plan of pacification, they will be able to give the law to the forngners, and oblige both the king and the duke to confent to it: This will fecure the public tranquillity, and leave no fecret itings of refentment, to rankle in the hearts of a fuffering party, and produce future difturbances. As there will be no triumph, no infolence, no exclufive right to favour on either fide, there can be no fhame, no anger, no uneafy defire of change. It will be the work of the whole nation; and all must wish to fupport what all have eftablifhed. The fons of Stephen indeed may endeavour to oppofe it; but their efforts will be fruitless and must end very foon, either in their fubmiffion, or their ruin. Nor have they any reasonable cause to complain. Their father himself did not come to the crown by hereditary right. He was elected in preference to a woman and an infant, who were deemed not to be capable of ruling a kingdom. By that election our allegiance is bound to him during his life: but neither that bond, nor the reason for which we chofe him, will hold, as to the choice of a fucceffor. Henry Plantagenet is now grown up to an age of maturity, and every way qualified to fucceed to the crown. He is the grandfon of a king whofe memory is dear to us, and the nearest heir male to him in the courfe of descent : he appears to refemble him in all his good qualities, and to be worthy to reign reign over the Normans and English,' 'whose nobleft blood, united, enriches his veins. Normandy has already fubmitted to him with pleasure. Why fhould we now divide that duchy from England, when it is fo greatly the intereft of our nobility to keep them always connected? Îfwe had no other inducement to make'us defire a réconcilia

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tion between him and Stephen, this would be fufficient. Our estates in both countries will by that means be fecured, which otherwife we must forfeit, in the one or the other, while Henry remains poffeffed of Normandy and it will not be an eafy matter to drive him from thence, even though we should compel him to retire from England. But, by amicably compounding his quarrel with Stephen, we shall maintain all our interefts, private and public. His greatnefs abroad will increase the power of this kingdom; it will make us refpectable and formidable to France; England will be the head of all thofe ample dominions, which extend from the British ocean to the Pyrenean mountains. By governing, in his youth, fo many different ftates, he will learn to govern us, and come to the crown, after the decease of king Stephen, accomplished in all the arts of good policy? His mother has willingly refigned to him her pretenfions, or rather the acknowledges that his are fuperior we therefore can have nothing to apprehend on that fide. In every view, our peace, our fafety, the repofe of our confciences, the quiet and happiness of our pofterity, will be firmly established by the means I propose. Let Stephen continue to wear the crown that we give him, as long as he lives; but after his death let it defcend to 'that prince, who alone can put an end to our unhappy divifions. If you approve my advice, and will empower me to treat in your names, I will immediately convey your defires to the king and the duke.

CHAP. VIII.

MR. PULTENEY'S SPEECH ON THE MOTION FOR REDUCING THE ARMY..

SIR,

W E have heard a great deal about parliamentary armies, and about an army continued from year to year. I have always been, Sir, and always fhall be, against a ftanding army of any kind: to me it is a terrible thing, whether under that of parliamentary or any other defignation; a ftanding army is ftill a ftanding army, whatever name it be called by; they are a body of men distinct from the body of the people; they are governed by different laws, and blind obedience and an entire fubmiffion to the orders of their commanding officer, is their only principle. The nations around us, Sir, are already enflaved, and have been enslaved by thofe very means; by means of their standing armies they have every one loft their liberties; it is indeed impoffible that the liberties of the people can be preserved in any country where a numerous ftanding army is kept up. Shall we then take any of our measures from the example of our neighbours ? No, Sir, on the contrary, from their misfortunes we ought to learn to avoid those rocks upon which they have split.

It fignifies nothing to tell me, that our army is commanded by fuch gentlemen as cannot be supposed to join in any measures for enflaving their country it may be fo; I hope it is fo; I have a very good opinion of many gentlemen now in the army; I believe they would not join in any such measures; but their lives are uncertain, nor can we be fure how long they may be continued in command; they may be all difmiffed in a moment, and proper tools of power put in their room. Besides, Sir, we know the paffions of men, we know how dangerous it is to trust the best of men

with too much power. Where was there a braver army than that under Julius Cæfar? Where was there ever an army that had ferved their country more faithfully? That army was commanded generally by the best citizens of Rome, by men of great fortune and figure in their country; yet that army ·enslaved their country The affections of the foldiers towards their country, the honour and integrity of the under officers are not to be depended on; by the military law, the administration of juftice is fo quick, and the punishments fo fevere, that neither officer nor foldier dares offer to difpute the orders of his fupreme commander; he must not confult his own inclination; if an officer were commanded to pull his own father out of his house, he must do it; he dares not difobey; immediate death would be the fure confequence of the leaft grumbling. And if an officer were fent into the court of requests, accompanied by a body of musketeers with screwed bayonets, and with orders to tell us what we ought to do, and how we were to vote, I know what would be the duty of this houfe; I know it would be our duty to order the officer to be taken and hanged up at the door of the lobby: but, Sir, I doubt much if fuch a fpirit could be found in the house, or in any house of Commons that will ever be in England.

SIR, I talk not of imaginary things; I talk of what has happened to an English houfe of Commons, and from an English army; not only from an English army, but an army that was raised by that very houfe of Commons, an army that was paid by them, and an army that was commanded by generals appointed by them. Therefore do not let us vainly imagine, that an army raised and maintained by authority of Parliament, will always be fubmiffive to them: if an army be fo numerous as to have it in their power to over-awe the Parliament, they will be fubmiffive as long as the Parliament does nothing to difoblige their favourite general; but when that cafe happens, I am afraid that in place

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(of the Parliament's difmiffing the army, the army will difmifs the Parliament, as they have done heretofore. Nor does the legality or illegality of that Parliament, or of that army, alter the case for with respect to that army, and according to their way of thinking, the Parliament difmiffed by them was a legal Parliament; they were an army raised and maintained according to law, and at first they were raised, as they imagined for the preservation of those liberties which they afterwards deftroyed.

IT has been urged, Sir, that whoever is for the Proteftant fucceflion must be for continuing the army: for that very reafon, Sir, I am againft continuing the army. I know that neither the Proteftant fucceffion, in his Majefty's most illuftrious houfe, nor any fucceffion, can ever be fafe as long as there is a ftanding army in the country. Armies, Sir, have no regard to hereditary fucceffions. The first two Cæfars at Rome did pretty well, and found means to keep their armies in tolerable fubjection, becaufe the generals and officers were all their own creatures. But how did it fare with their fucceffors? Was not every one of them named by the army, without any regard to hereditary right, or to any right? A cobler, a gardener, or any man who happened to raise himfelf in the army, and could gain their affections, was made emperor of the world: was not every fucceeding emperor raised to the throne, or tumbled headJong into the duft, according to the mere whim, or mad frenzy of the foldiers ?,

WE are told this army is defired to be continued but for one year longer, or for a limited term of years. How abfurd is this diftinction ? Is there any army in the world continued for any term of years? Does the most abfolute monarch tell his army, that he is to continue them for any number of years, or any number of months? How long have we already continued our army from year to year? And if it thus continues, wherein will it differ from the standing armies of

thofe