thofe countries which have already fubmitted their necks to the yoke? We are now come to the Rubicon; our army is now to be reduced, or it never will; from his Majesty's own mouth we are affured of a profound tranquillity abroad, we know there is one at home; if this is not a proper time, if thefe circumftances do not afford us a fafe opportunity for reducing at least a part of our regular forces, we never can expect to fee any reduction; and this nation, already overburdened with debts and taxes, must be loaded with the heavy charge of perpetually fupporting a numerous standing army, and remain for ever exposed to the danger of having its liberties and privileges trampled upon by any future King or Ministry, who fhall take it in their heads to do so, and shall take a proper care to model the army for that porpose.

CHAP. IX.

SIR JOHN ST. AUBIN'S SPEECH FOR REPEALING THE SEPTENNIAL ACT.

MR. SPEAKER,

THE fubject matter of this debate is of fuch importance, that I fhould be ashamed to return to my electors, without endeavouring, in the best manner I am able, to declare publicly the reasons which induced me to give my most ready affent to this question.

THE people have an unquestionable right to frequent new parliaments by ancient ufage; and this ufage has been confirmed by feveral laws, which have been progreffively made by our ancestors, as often as they found it neceffary to infift on this effential privilege.

PARLIAMENTS were generally annual, but never continued longer than three years, till the remarkable reign of Henry VIII. He, Sir, was a prince of unruly appetites, and of an arbitrary will; he was impatient of every reftraint; the laws of God and man fell equally a facrifice,

as they flood in the way of his avarice, or disappointed his ambition; he therefore introduced long Parliaments, because he very well knew, that they would become the proper inftruments of both; and what a slavish obedience they paid to all his meafures is fufficiently known.

If we come to the reign of King Charles the First, we must acknowledge him to be a prince of a contrary temper; he had certainly an innate love for religion and virtue. But here lay the misfortune- -he was led from his natural difpofition by fycophants and flatterers; they advised him to neglect the calling of frequent new Parliaments, and therefore, by not taking the conftant fenfe of his people in what he did, he was worked up into fo high a notion of prerogative, that the commons (in order to reftrain it) obtained that independent fatal power, which at last unhappily brought him to his most tragical end, and at the fame time fubverted the whole conftitution. And I hope we fhall learn this leffon from it, never to compliment the crown with any new or extravagant powers, nor to deny the people thofe rights, which by ancient ufage they are entitled to; but to preferve the juft and equal balance, from which they will both derive mutual fecurity, and which, if duly obferved, will render our constitution the envy and

admiration of all the world.

KING CHARLES the Second naturally took a furfeit of Parliaments in his father's time, and was therefore extremely defirous to lay them afide. But this was a scheme impracticable. However, in effect he did fo; for he obtained a Parliament, which, by its long duration, like an army of veterans, became fo exactly difciplined, to his own meafures, that they knew no other command, but from that perfon who gave them their pay.

T

THIS was a fafe and moft ingenious way of enflaving a nation. It was very well known, that arbitrary power, if it was open and avowed, would never prevail here. The

people

people were therefore amufed with the fpecious form of. their ancient conftitution: it existed, indeed, in their fancy; but, like a mere phantom, had no substance nor reality in it; for the power, the authority, the dignity of Parliaments were wholly loft. This was that remarkable Parliament which fo juftly obtained the opprobrious name of the PENSION PARLIAMENT; and was the model, from which, I. belive, fome later Parliaments have been exactly copied.

At the time of the Revolution, the people made a fresh claim of their ancient privileges; and as they had fo lately. experienced the misfortune of long and fervile Parliaments, it was then declared, that they should be held frequently. But it feems, their full meaning was not understood by this declaration and therefore, as in every new fettlement the intention of all parties fhould be fpecifically manifefted, the Parliament never ceafed ftruggling with the crown, till the triennial law was obtained: the preamble of it is extremely full and ftrong; and in the body of the bill you will find the word declared before enacted, by which I apprehend, that though this law did not immediately take place at the time of the Revolution, it was certainly intended as declaratory of their first meaning, and therefore ftands a part of that original contract under which the conftitution was then fettled. His Majesty's title to the crown is primarily derived from that contract; and if, upon a review, there fhall appear to be any deviations from it, we ought to treat them fo many injuries done to that title. And I dare fay, that this house, which has gone through so long a series of fervices to his Majefty, will at last be willing to revert to thofe original ftated measures of government, to renew and strengthen that title.

as

BUT, Sir, I think the manner in which the feptennial-law was first introduced, is a very strong reafon why it should be repealed. People, in their fears, have very often recourse to desperate expedients, which, if not cancelled in

feafon,

feafon, will themfelves prove fatal to that conftitution, which they were meant to fecure Such is the nature of the feptennial law; it was intended only as a prefervative against a temporary inconvenience: the inconvenience is removed, but the mischievous effects ftill continue; for it not only altered the conftitution of Parliaments, but it extended that fame Parliament beyond its natural duration: and therefore carries this moft unjuft implication with it, that you may at any time ufurp the most indubitable, the moft effential privilege of the people I mean that of chufing their own reprefentatives. A precedent of fuch a

ous confequence, of fo fatal a tendency, that I think

it would be a reproach to our fatute-book, if that law was any longer to fubfift, which might record it to pofterity.

THIS is a feafon of virtue and public fpirit. Let us take advantage of it to repeal thofe laws which infringe our liberties, and introduce fuch as may restore the vigour of our ancient conftitution..

HUMAN nature is fo very corrupt, that all obligations lofe their force, unless they are frequently renewed.. Long Parliaments become therefore independent of the people, and when they do fo, there always happens a moft dangerous dependence elsewhere.

LONG Parliaments give the minifter an opportunity of. getting acquaintance with members, of practifing his feveral arts to win them into his fchemes. -This muft be the work of time.Corruption is of fo bafe a nature, that at firft fight it is extremely fhocking. Hardly any one has fubmited to it all at once- His difpofition must Be previously understood, the particular bait must be found out with which he is to be allured, and after all, it is not without many ftruggles that he furrenders his virtue. Indeed, there are fome, who will at once plunge themfelves into any base action, but the generality of mankind are of a more cautious nature, and will proceed only by

leifurely

leifarely degrees. One or two perhaps have deferted. their colours the first campaign, fome have done it a fecond. But a great many, who have not that eager dispofition to vice, will wait till a third.

FOR this reafon, fhort Parliaments have been lefs corrupt than long ones; they are obferved, like ftreams of water, always to grow more impure the greater diftance they run from the fountain-head.

I AM aware, it may be faid, that frequent new Parliaments will produce frequent new expences, but I think quite the contrary; I am really of opinion, that it will be a proper remedy against the evil of bribery at elections, especially as you have provided fo wholefome a law to co-operate upon thefe occafions.

BRIBERY at elections, whence did it arife? Not from country gentlemen, for they are fure of being chofen without it; it was, Sir, the invention of wicked and corrupt minifters, who have from time to time, led weak princes into fuch deftructive measures, that they did not dare to rely upon the natural reprefentation of the people.

Long Parliaments, Sir, first introduced bribery, because they were worth purchafing at any rate :---Country gentlemen, who have only their private fortunes to rely upon, and have no mercenary ends to ferye, are unable to oppofe it, cfpecially if at any time the public treasure shall be unfaithfully fquandered away to corrupt their boroughs,Country gentlemen, indeed, may make fome weak efforts; but as they generally prove unfuccefsful, and the time of a fresh ftruggle is at fo great a distance, they at last grow faint in the difpute, give up their country for loft, and retire in defpair. -Defpair naturally produces indolence, and that is the proper difpofition for flavery. Minifters of state understand this very well, and are therefore unwilling to awaken the nation out of its lethargy by frequent elections.- -They know that the fpirit of liberty, like every

other