other virtue of the mind, is to be kept alive only by constant action; that it is impoffible to enflave this nation while it is perpetually upon its guard.-Let country gentlemen then, by having frequent opportunities of exerting themselves, be kept warm and active in their contention for the public good; this will raife that zeal and fpirit, which will at last get the better of those undue influences by which the officers of the crown, though unknown to the feveral boroughs, have been able to fupplant country gentlemen of great characters and fortune, who live in their neighbourhood. I do not say this upon idle fpeculation only. I live in a country where it is too well known, and I appeal to many gentlemen in the house, to more out of it (and who are so for this very reafon), for the truth of my affertion. Sir, it is a fore which has been long eating into the most vital part of our conftitution, and I hope the time will come when you will probe it to the bottom. For if a minister should ever gain a corrupt familiarity with our boroughs, if he should keep a register of them in his clofet, and, by fending down his treafury mandates, fhould procure a fpurious reprefentative of the people, the offspring of his corruption, who will be at all times ready to reconcile and juftify the most contradictory measures of his administration, and even to vote every crude indigefted dream of their patron into, a law; if the maintenance of his power fhould become the fole object of their attention, and they fhould be guilty of the most violent breach of Parliamentary truft, by giving the King a difcretionary liberty of taxing the people without limitation or controul; the last fatal compliment they can pay to the crown:if this fhould ever be the unhappy condition of this nation, the people indeed may complain; but the doors of that place where their complaints should be heard, will for ever be fhut against them.

OUR disease, I fear, is of a complicated nature, and I

MR. CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER,

THOUGH the queftion has been already fo fully oppofed, that there is no great occafion to fay any thing farther againft it, yet, I hope, the houfe will indulge me the liberty of giving fome of thofe reafons, which induce me to be against the motion. In general I muft take notice, that the nature of our conftitution feems to be very much mistaken by the gentlemen who have fpoken in favour of this motion. It is certain, that ours is a mixt government, and the perfection of our conftitution confifts in this, that the monarchical, ariftocratical, and democratical forms of government, are mixt and interwoven in ours, fo as to give us all the advantages of each, without fubjecting us to the dangers and inconveniences of either. The democratical form of government, which is the only one I have now occafion to take notice of, is liable to thefe inconveniences : that they are generally too tedious in their coming to any refolution, and feldom brifk and expeditious enough in carrying their refolutions into execution: that they are always wavering in their refolutions, and never fteady in any of the

measures

measures they refolve to purfue; and that they are often involved in factions, feditions, and infurrections, which expofes them to be made the tools, if not the prey of their neighbours; therefore in all the regulations we make, with refpect to our conftitution, we are to guard against running too much into that form of government which is properly called democratical: this was, in my opinion, the effect of the triennial law, and will again be the effect, if ever it fhould be restored.

THAT triennial elections would make our government too tedious in all their refolves, is evider; because, in fuch cafe no prudent administration would ever refolve upon any measure of confequence, till they had felt not only the pulse of the parliament, but the pulfe of the people; and the minifters of ftate would always labour under this difadvantage, that as fecrets of ftate must not be immediately divulged, their enemies (and enemies they will always have) would have a handle for expofing their meafures, and rendering them difagreeable to the people, and thereby carrying perhaps a new election against them, before they could have an opportunity of justifying their meafures, by divulging those facts and circumstances, from whence the juftice and the wifdom of their measures would clearly appear.

THEN, Sir, it is by experience well known, that what is. called the populace of every country, are apt to be too much elated with fuccefs, and too much dejected with every misfortune; this makes them wavering in their opinions about affairs of ftate, and never long of the same mind; and as this houfe is chofen by the free and unbiaffed voice of the people in general, if this choice were so often renewed, we might expect, that this houfe would be as wavering and as unfteady as the people ufually are; and it being impoffible to carry on the public affairs of the nation without the concurrence of this house, the ministers

would

would always be obliged to comply, and confequently would be obliged to change their meafures as often as the people changed their minds.

WITH feptennial Parliaments, Sir, we are not exposed to either of thefe misfortunes, because, if the minifters, after having felt the pulfe of the Parliament, which they can always foon do, refolve upon any measures, they have generally time enough, before the new elections come on, to give the people proper information, in order to fhew them the justice and the wisdom of the measures they have purfued; and if the people. fhould at any time be too much elated, or too much dejected, or fhould without a caufe change their minds, thofe at the helm of affairs have time to fet them right before a new election comes on.

As to faction and fedition, Sir, I will grant, that in monarchical and ariftocratical governments, it generally arifes from violence and oppreffion; but in democratical governments, it always arifes from the people's having too great a hare in the government; for in all countries, and in all governments, there always will be many factious and unquiet fpirits, who can never be at reft either in power or out of power; when in power,, they are never eafy, unless every man fubmits entirely to their direction; and when out of power, they are always working and intriguing against thofe that are in, without any regard to juftice, or to the interest, of their country in popular governments fuch men have too much game, they have too many opportunities for working upon and corrupting the minds of the people, in order to give them a bad impreffion of, and to raise discontents against those that have the management of the public affairs for the time; and these difcontents often break out into seditions and infurrections. This, Sir, would in my opinion be our misfortune, if our Parliaments were either annual or triennial by fuch frequent elections, there would be so much power thrown into the hands of the people, as would I

deftroy

:

deftroy that equal mixture, which is the beauty of our conftitution in fhort, our government would really become a democratical government, and might from thence very probably diverge into a tyrannical. Therefore, in order to preferve our conftitution, in order to prevent our falling under tyranny and arbitrary power, we ought to preferve that law, which I really think has brought our conftitution to a more equal mixture, and confequently to greater perfection than it was ever in, before that law took place.

As to bribery and corruption, Sir, if it were poffible to influence, by fuch base means, the majority of the electors of Great Britain, to chufe fuch men as would probably give

up their liberties; if it were poffible to influence, by fuch means, a majority of the members of this houfe, to confent to the establishment of arbitrary power, I would readily allow that the calculations made by the gentlemen of the other side were just, and their inference true; but I am perfuaded that neither of these is poffible. As the members of this house generally are, and must always be gentlemen of fortune and figure in their country, is it poffible to fuppofe, that any of them could, by a penfion, or a poft, be influenced to confent to the overthrow of our conftitution; by which the enjoyment, not only of what he got, but of what he before had, would be rendered altogether precarious? I will allow, Sir, that with refpect to bribery, the price must be higher or lower, generally in proportion to the virtue of the man who is to be bribed; but it must likewise be granted, that the humour he happens to be in at the time, the fpirit he happens to be endowed with, adds a great deal to his virtue. When no incroachments are made upon the rights of the people, when the people do not think themselves in any danger, there may be many of the electors, who by a bribe of ten guineas might be induced to vote for one candidate rather than another ; but if the court were making any inagong altag bleuf ent each invzuia croachments