"The argument of withstanding all reformation, from the fear of the ill consequences that might ensue, made gentlemen come to a sort of compromise with themselves. We are sensible of certain defects; we feel certain inconveniences in the present state of representation; but fearing that we may make it worse by alteration, we will be content with it as it is.' This was a sort of argument to which he could not give his countenance. If gentlemen had at all times been content with this sort of average, the nation would have lost much of that excellence of which our Constitution now had to boast.

"If there always had been a House of Commons who were the faithful stewards of the interests of their country, the diligent checks on the administration of the finances, the constitutional advisers of the executive branch of the Legislature, the steady and uninfluenced friends of the People, he asked, IF THE BUR

DENS, WHICH THE CONSTITUENTS OF THAT HOUSE WERE NOW DOOMED TO ENDURE, WOULD HAVE BEEN INCURRED? Would the People of England have suffered the calamities to which they had lately been made subject?

"He needed not, he believed, to enumerate the arguments that presented themselves to his mind in favor of a reform. Every gentleman, who had taken pains to investigate the subject, must see that it was most materially wanted. To conquer the corruption that existed in those decayed boroughs, he believed that gentlemen would acknowledge to be impossible. The temptation were too great for poverty to resist, and the consequence of this corruption was so visible, that some plan of reforming the boroughs had clearly become absolutely necessary. In times of calamity and distress, how truly important was it to the people of this country that the House of Commons should sympathize with themselves, and that their interests should be indissoluble? It was most material that the People should have confidence in their own branch of the Legislature; the force of the Constitution, as well as its beauty, depended on that confidence, and on the union and sympathy which existed between the constituent and representative. The source of our glory and the muscles of our strength were the pure character of freedom which our Constitution bore. To lessen that character, to taint it, was to take from our vitals a part of their vigor, and to lessen not only our importance but our energy with our neighbours.

"The purity of representation was the only true andpermanent source of such confidence; for though occasionally bright characters had arisen, who, in spite of the general corruption and depravity of the day in which they lived, had manifested the superior influence of integrity and virtue, and had forced both Parliament

and People to countenance their Administration; yet it would be unwise for the People of England to leave their fate to the chance of such characters often arising, when prudence must dictate that the certain way of securing their properties and freedom was to purify the sources of representation, and to establish that strict relation between themselves and the House of Commons which it was the original idea of the Constitution to create. He hoped that the plan which he had mentioned was likely to re-establish such a relation; and he recommended to gentlemen not to suffer their minds to be alarmed by unnecessary fears. NOTHING WAS

SO HURTFUL TO IMPROVEMENT AS THE FEAR OF BEING CARRIED FARTHER THAN THE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH A PERSON SET OUT.

"It was common for gentlemen to reason with themselves, and to say that they would have no objection to go so far, and no farther, if they were sure, that in countenancing the first step, they might not either be led themselves, or lead others, farther than they intended to go. So much they were apt to say was right-so far they would go of such a scheme they approved; but fearing that it might be carried too far, they desisted from doing even what they conceived to be proper. He deprecated this conduct, and hoped that gntlemen would come to the consideration of this business, without fearing that it would lead to consequences that would either ruin or alarm us."

Parliamentary Register for 1785, p. 43 et seq.

PROPOSAL

FOR

A CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM,

FOUNDED ON PROPERTY, AND SUBVERSIVE OF OLIGARCHY, AND OCHLOCRACY.

THE necessity of Reform in the election of the House of Commons is felt by all, and denied by those only, whose private advantage is at variance with their public interest. But the great argument of the latter, is the discrepancy of opinion among the Reformers, "Let all men," they say, "unite in one consistent system of Reform, and we will listen to their suggestions." Had a complete similarity of opinions,—an event as unknown in history, as inconsistent with the nature of man,-been necessary for the adoption of any improvement, the world would still be immersed in the gloom of ignorance; neither Reformation nor Revolution would have taken place. It is to the general conviction of the existence of abuse, and to the good sense of a nation, that we are indebted for the salutary alterations that have been made in all public institutions.

Time is the universal innovator. As all public systems are subject to the frailty that pervades all the works of man, time will gradually and imperceptibly sap the foundations, and impair the stability of every human edifice. It is therefore the business of a wise policy to repair or rebuild that edifice, and prevent the impending ruin. To this salutary object the following short suggestions are dedicated. They will displease the violent of all parties, the Radical Whigs, who indulge the wild and absurd reveries of Annual Parliaments and Universal Suffrage; and the Radical Tories, who aim at the perpetuation of every corrupted and corrupting practice.

The English Constitution theoretically consists of the Monarchy, the Aristocracy, and the Democracy. But the slow and certain workings of corruption have introduced into its practical operation two extraneous bodies, an Oligarchy and au Ochlocracy.

The first is the most important and the most powerful. The members of it command the King, the Lords and the Commons;

and keep the administration in such a state of dependence, that the latter, sensible of the necessity of propitiating their influence and securing their support, dare not propose those plans of economy and retrenchment, which their duty and their inclination might induce them to attempt. The effects of those close elections, to which they owe their power, on the public morals are lamentable. Every engine of bribery and corruption is employed, and produces perjury and the most abject selfishness that degrades the human mind. To those, who understand the history of their country, it is unnecessary to trace the origin of those boroughs, or to describe the means by which they have gradually become the instruments of undermining the beautiful fabric of the Constitution.

The Ochlocracy is a species of Universal Suffrage, and therefore equally productive of bribery and corruption. The members of it are of two kinds,the forty-shilling freeholders, and the non-resident freemen of certain boroughs,

1

...Leaseholders and copyholders were originally considered as dependent on the Lords of manors, and therefore unfit to be trusted with the elective franchise. That cause has long ceased to operate, and they are now under no political control. But, by an absurdity, the continuance of which is unaccountable, a man possessing a large copyhold or leasehold property, is not permitted to vote, while a laborer in his service has the power of electing his legislators.

The non-resident freemen of boroughs are generally equally low in the scale of society, and must be sent for by the candidates, at a considerable expense, from East, West, North, and South; and, like the low freeholders, are usually at the service of the highest bidder. It is not a very uncommon case to see the resident voters, who have placed their confidence in some neighbour of known integrity, as the object of their choice, defeated and overwhelmed by the sudden irruption of the out-voters, introducing a stranger, whose chief merit consists in the weight of his purse.

To correct these evils, and to bring the Representation to that state of purity, which was originally designed; and to prevent the injurious consequences, which have resulted from the present practice, the following sketch of a plan is humbly submitted to the

consideration of the impartial, the independent, the moderate, the moral, and the religious part of the community. From others, the most labored treatises, the most powerful arguments would not elicit the least expression of satisfaction or conviction.

Every Proprietor, and every Householder, paying direct taxes to the amount of eight pounds a year, shall be entitled to vote.

IN BOROUGH ELECTIONS,

Every resident Householder, paying direct taxes to the amount of four pounds a year, shall have a vote.-But no Borough shall have the privilege of sending Representatives to Parliament, that has not at least one hundred such voters.-The example of the disfranchisement of Grampound shall be followed; the deficiency shall be supplied by Counties, and by the large towns at present unrepresented.

The advantages obtained, and the evils averted, by this plan, are too obvious to need description. It is merely a sketch; the wisdom of Parliament would easily mature and complete the system. It might be necessary to fix the qualification to vote on a basis, which would, at certain periods, accommodate itself to the fluctuations of the value of money.

It is probable that this plan would not only prove an incentive to industry, but would tend to the increase of the revenue. Householders in Counties, paying six or seven pounds a year, and in Boroughs two or three pounds, finding that the right of voting was attended with some degree of respectability and consequence, might be induced to make some augmentation in their establishments to attain that privilege.