tion. Confounded by the blows of fortune, and little used to support them, the Americans thus gave themselves up for lost. Washington contended earnestly with exhortations, with persuasions, and with promises, to arrest the progress of the disorganisation. Wherein, if he did not succeed according to his desires, he obtained, however, more than his hopes. The greater part, yielding to his authority, and the benevolence they bore him, consented to remain. He had not neglected to address the Congress an energetic picture of the deplorable situation of his army; he represented to them how important it was to accept no more engagements, but for the total duration of the war; and he assured them that he must despair of American liberty, unless he was furnished with an army that should stand by him till the conclusion of the enterprise. The remonstrances and instances of the commander-in-chief, were seconded by all the military chiefs of distinction that were found at that time in America, and the Congress at length yielded to their desires. They decreed that a regular army should be formed, in which the soldiers should be enlisted to serve during the present war; and that it should be composed of eighty-eight battalions, to be raised in all the provinces according to their respective abilities.* To induce the inhabitants to enlist, the Congress decreed, besides, that a bounty of twenty dollars should be given to each man at the time of engagement, and portions of unoccupied lands were promised to the officers and soldiers. But from the difficulty of finding men who would enlist for the whole term of the war, this resolution was afterwards modified, so as to admit of engagements either for three years or during the war; specifying, however, that such as enlisted only for three years had no right to grants of land. This measure was of great utility. Here also is seen the power of good or ill fortune over nations. If those who allow themselves to be over elated by prosperity, are without courage in adversity, those who use the favors of fortune with moderation, are able to support its reverses with fortitude.

General Howe, wishing to take advantage of the terror which victory inspires, and persuading himself that the Americans, disheartened by so many checks, would be more modest in their pretensions, despatched general Sullivan to the Congress with a message purporting, that though he could not consistently treat with that assembly in the character they had assumed, yet he would gladly confer with some of their members in their private capacity, and would meet them

The eighty-eight battalions decreed by Congress, were to be furnished in the following proportion. Three in New Hampshire, fifteen in Massachusetts, two in Rhode Island, eight in Connecticut, four in New York, four in New Jersey, twelve in Pennsylvania, one in Delaware, eight in Maryland, fifteen in Virginia, nine in North Carolina, six in South Carolina, and one in Georgia.

The grant of lands was thus regulated. Five hundred acres to a colonel, four hundred to a major, three hundred to a captain, two hundred to a lieutenant, one hundred and fifty to an ensign, and one hundred to noncommissioned officers and soldiers.

at any place they would appoint. He informed them that he was empowered, with the admiral his brother, to terminate the contest between Great Britain and America upon conditions equally advantageous to both; these conditions, he added, he had not been able to obtain till after two months delay, which had prevented him from arriving before the declaration of independence. He expressed an earnest desire that an arrangement might take place before the events of the war became so decisive as to render it no longer a matter of choice for one of the parties to treat. He assured them, that if they were inclined to enter into an agreement, much might be granted to them which they had not required. He concluded by saying, that should the conference produce the probability of an accommodation, the authority of Congress would be acknowledged in order to render the treaty valid and complete in every respect. The commissioners hoped thus, by insidious words, to dispose the Americans to resume the yoke of England without dread.

It would be difficult to decide whether these propositions announced, on the part of the English, more hope than despair of victory. Perhaps the commissioners, not being authorised to grant all the conditions they offered, merely threw them out to create parties, or to amuse the Americans and to divert them from their preparations of war. However this may be, the Congress deliberated maturely upon this overture. Their refusal to listen to the proffered terms might alienate the minds of many; and their consenting to enter into negotiation was a tacit admission that the declaration of independence was not irrevocable, or that ill fortune began to shake their constancy. The Congress, to avoid either of these inconveniences, though persuaded of the insincerity of the commissioners, decided for a middle course. They made answer, through general Sullivan, that the Congress of the free and independent states of America could not, consistently with the trust reposed in them, send any of their members to confer with whomsoever, otherwise than in their public capacity. But that as they desired that peace might be concluded upon equitable conditions, they would depute a committee of their body to learn whether the commissioners were authorised to treat, and what proposals they had to offer. Washington was instructed, at the same time, to answer any overtures that might be made him, by saying that the United States having taken arms to defend their existence and their liberty, would willingly consent to peace, provided the terms of it were reasonable, and drawn up first in writing, in order to be laid before Congress.

Thus the Americans appeared to incline for independence, without insisting, however, upon this point as an indispensable condition of peace, in order to reserve a way open to reconciliation if the fate of arms should prove too adverse. The deputies, appointed by Congress to hear the propositions of the commissioners, were Benja

min Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge, all three zealous partisans of independence. The interview took place the eleventh of September, in Staten Island, opposite Amboy. Admiral Howe spoke the first, saying, that though he could not treat with them as a committee of Congress, yet as he was authorised to confer with any gentlemen of influence in the colonies, on the means of restoring peace, he felt a real gratification in the present occasion to discourse with them upon this important subject.

The deputies replied, that since they were come to hear him, he was at liberty to look upon them in what light he pleased; that they could not, however, consider themselves in any other character than that in which the Congress had placed them. Howe then entered upon the subject of the meeting; he demanded that the colonies should return to their allegiance and duty towards the British. crown; he assured them of the earnest desire of the king to make his government easy and acceptable to them in every respect; that those acts of parliament which were so obnoxious to them would undergo a revisal, and the instructions to governors would be reconsidered; that if any just causes of complaint were found in the acts or instructions, they might be removed.

After having recounted the tyrannical acts of parliament, of which all their supplications had failed to procure the repeal, the deputies added, in reply, that a return to the domination of Great Britain was not now to be expected. There was no doubt, they said, that the Americans were inclined to peace, and willing to enter into any treaty with Britain that might be advantageous to both countries. If there was the same good disposition on her part, it would be easier for the cominissioners, though not empowered at present to treat with them as independent states, to obtain fresh powers from their government for that purpose, than it would be for the Congress to procure them from the colonies to consent to submission.'

Howe then put an end to the conference, by saying that he deeply. regretted there was no longer any hope of an accommodation.

The three deputies made their report to Congress of the issue of this interview, observing that the powers of the English commissioners were insufficient, and that it was impossible to place any dependence upon their offers or their promises. The Congress approved their conduct. This attempt at negotiation, therefore, served only to demonstrate, on the one hand, that the Congress persevering in their resolution and undaunted by reverses, were determined not to receive conditions from their enemies; and on the other, how greatly the English government was still deceived with respect to the spirit which prevailed in America, and as to the means proper to be employed for the reestablishment of the ancient order of things.

But it seems in this revolution to have been the destiny of things, that the remedies should always arrive after the evils were become

incurable; and that the government refusing out of pride at the favorable moment, to acquiesce in useful concessions, should afterwards have to submit to the rejection of its useless propositions.

The English generals, convinced by experience, that they must renounce all hope of accommodation, now turned their attention exclusively to military operations. The royal army found itself separated from that of the Congress only by the East river, which communicating with Harlem Creek flows between Long Island and Morrisania on the one part, and the island of New York on the other. The intention of the English was to land in some part of this last, where the least resistance could be opposed to them. Their ships cruised along the coasts, threatening sometimes one place and sometimes another, in order to keep the enemy at all points in uncertainty, and afterwards to attack upon one only with more advantage. A part of the fleet having doubled Long Island appeared in the Sound, a gulf of great breadth which separates this island from the coast of Connecticut, and communicates with the East river, by means of a narrow channel, which a very dangerous navigation and frequent shipwrecks have caused to receive the name of Hell Gate.

The English had taken possession of the island of Montesoro, situated in this strait, where they had erected a battery to answer that which the Americans had planted upon the opposite side of the river at Hovenshook. Two frigates, passing between Governor's Island and the point of Red Hook, had ascended into the East river, without receiving any injury from the artillery of the enemy, and had anchored out of its reach near a little island. The main body of the English fleet was moored in the waters of Governor's Island,. ready to attack the city of New York itself, or to enter either the East river, or the Hudson.

Meanwhile, the ships were continually engaged with the batteries on shore, and frequent actions ensued for the possession of the little islands which are found in the first of these rivers. The English had need of them for the execution of their projects, and the Americans saw the necessity of defending them. But whether the English artillery was better served, or that the soldiers of this nation had acquired more confidence from their victory, and especially owing to the assistance of their ships, they succeeded in carrying, one after another, such of these islands, as their convenience acquired, and thus secured for themselves the entrance of the East river.

Washington had furnished the two shores of the island of New York with a numerous artillery, and had thrown up intrenchments in different places. He had four thousand five hundred men in the city; six thousand five hundred at Harlem, a village situated in front of the opening of the sound; and twelve thousand at Kingsbridge, at

the extremity of the island. He had been particularly careful to fortify this passage, in order to secure a free communication with the continent, and to prevent the enemy from seizing it by surprise, and thus entirely locking up the American army within the island itself. But the commander-in-chief felt extreme apprehensions for the city, and began to despair of preserving it in the power of the confederation. The enemy being considerably reenforced in the northern parts of Long Island, and having the command of the sound, it was to be feared he might disembark in the centre of the island of New York, near the mouth of the sound, in which case the garrison of the city, and all the troops encamped in its environs, having their retreat intercepted, would have been compelled to surrender; or else that, traversing the sound and Morrisania, he would go and establish himself with the greater part of his army in the rear of Kingsbridge.

In this last hypothesis the Americans losing all communication with the continent, would be forced either to capitulate, or to fight a battle whose success appeared secure in advance to the English by the choice of ground and of time, and the discouragement which still prevailed among the troops of the Congress.

The fortune of the Americans would then be past all hope, as well in consequence of the terror with which they would be seized, as from the loss of arms, of munitions, and of baggage. Washington had, therefore, signified to Congress his apprehensions, praying them to inform him of their intentions relative to the city of New York, if he found himself constrained to evacuate it. The Congress humanely replied, that it should be left entire and safe. Having afterwards assembled a council of war, he invited them to deliberate upon the necessity of an immediate evacuation of the city, and it evidently appeared that he was himself in favor of this measure. Some were of the same opinion, for the reasons above mentioned, in which they were confirmed by another consideration; they calculated, that by retiring further into the country, the English would be deprived of the important advantage they derived from the cooperation of their fleets. Other members of the council manifested a contrary sentiment, because they considered that the defence of New York would cause the enemy to consume time, and that, in the meanwhile, the season for military operations would have elapsed. They also thought that the evacuation of New York would have too much the appearance of cowardice, and that it might have the most fatal influence upon the spirit of the soldiers and of the inhabitants; the opinion of these prevailed. But at length the English having reenforced themselves greatly at the entrance of the sound, and in the islands of Montesoro and of Buchanan, a second council of war decided that it was not only prudent but even necessary to abandon New York. Accordingly, no time was lost in removing, by way of the Hudson river, the sick, the baggage, and the munitions, which were landed far above,