The stores destroyed, with the exception of the tents, were of inconsiderable value; and the burning of the houses of Danbury and Ridgefield, together with the other brutalities committed by the royal troops, did but increase the fury of the people, and confirm them in resistance. This occasion served also to demonstrate, how vain were the hopes which general Tryon had placed in the loyalists. Not one of them ventured to declare himself in favor of the English; the inhabitants rose, on the contrary, in all parts to repulse the assailants. It is even probable, that this enterprise of the English gave origin to another, full of audacity, on the part of the Americans. The generals of Connecticut had been informed that a commissary of the British army had formed immense magazines of forage, grain, and other necessaries for the troops, at a little port called Sagg Harbor, in Long Island; it was defended only by a detachment of infantry, and a sloop of twelve guns. The English, however, believed themselves sufficiently protected by their armed vessels which cruised in the Sound; they could never persuade themselves that the Americans would dare to pass it, and attempt any thing upon Long Island. But the latter were nowise intimidated by the obstacles, and resolved to surprise Sagg Harbor, by a sudden incursion. Accordingly, colonel Meigs, one of the intrepid companions of Arnold in the expedition of Canada, crossed the Sound with as much rapidity as ability, and arrived before day at the place where the magazines were situated. Notwithstanding the resistance of the garrison and the crews of the vessels, he burned a dozen brigs and sloops which lay at the wharf, and entirely destroyed every thing on shore. Having accomplished the object of the expedition, he returned without loss to Guilford, in Connecticut, bringing with him many prisoners. The Americans manifested, in this enterprise, the greatest humanity; they abstained from the pillage of private property, and even permitted the prisoners to retain their effects.

The winter had completely elapsed in the midst of these operations, and the season approached in which the armies were about to take the field anew. No one doubted that the English would exert their utmost endeavors to terminate the war in the present year. A formidable corps was prepared to attack the American provinces on the side of Canada, and a still more numerous army menaced those of the middle. All minds were suspended with the expectation of approaching events.

If the English generals could have commenced the campaign as soon as the season for action was arrived, it is certain, they might have obtained the most important advantages. When the spring opened, the army of Washington was still extremely feeble. If a part of those whose term of service was expired, had been induced to remain from a consideration of the weakness of the army, and the ruin which must attend their departure before it was reenforced, the

greater number, unable to endure the severity of winter in the fields, had returned home. In the meantime, the business of recruiting under an engagement to serve during the war, or even for three years, went on but slowly, notwithstanding the promised advantages; the genius and habits of the people being averse to all subjection. The making of draughts from the militia, which was the final resource, was considered as a dangerous innovation.

As a further check upon the increase of the force in New Jersey, the New England provinces, which abounded with men of a warlike spirit, were taken up with their domestic concerns, fearing for Ticonderoga, the river Hudson, and even for Boston itself. A multitude of American privateers had gone into that port with their prizes, and the English retained all their ancient hatred against the inhabitants. The British troops cantoned in Rhode Island, afforded continual room for apprehension; they might attack Massachusetts in flank, and make inroads with impunity into the neighboring provinces. Such, in effect, was the difficulty of raising men, that in some of the provinces the enlisting of apprentices and Irish indented servants was permitted, contrary to the former resolutions and decrees, with a promise of indemnification to their masters. The winter and spring had been employed in these preparations, but towards the latter end of May, the mild weather having commenced, the Americans took arms with promptitude, and Washington found himself daily reenforced from all quarters. The English thus lost the occasion of an easy victory; perhaps, as some have written, by the delay of tents. However this may have been, they deferred taking the field till obstacles were multiplied around them.

Washington, unable as yet to penetrate the designs of general Howe, sought with vigilance to observe the direction he was about to give to his arms. It was apprehended that renewing the war in New Jersey he would endeavor to penetrate to the Delaware; and, passing the river by means of a bridge, known to be constructed for the purpose, make himself master of Philadelphia. It was conjectured also, and this was the expectation of Washington, that the English general would proceed up the Hudson river into the upper parts of the province of New York, in order to cooperate with the British army of Canada, which was at the same time to attack the fortress of Ticonderoga, and after its reduction, to operate a junction with general Howe in the vicinity of Albany. This movement of the enemy was the more to be apprehended, as besides the advantages it promised, it was known to have been prescribed by the instructions of the British ministers. General Howe had been diverted from following them by the successes he had obtained in New Jersey, and the hope he had conceived of being able, of himself, to bring the war to a successful conclusion.

In so great an uncertainty in respect to the future operations of the enemy, Washington, having received his reenforcements, determined to take such positions as should be equally proper to oppose them, whether the English should move towards Albany, or should resolve to march against Philadelphia, by way of New Jersey. According to this plan, the troops raised in the northern provinces, were stationed partly at Ticonderoga, and partly at Peek's Kill, those of the middle and southern provinces, as far as North Carolina, occupied New Jersey, leaving a few corps for the protection of the more western provinces.

In this manner, if general Howe moved against Philadelphia, he found in front all the forces assembled in New Jersey, and in addition, those encamped at Peek's Kill, who would have descended to harass his right flank. If, on the other hand, he took the direction of Albany, the corps of Peek's Kill defended the passages in front, while his left flank might also be attacked by the troops of New Jersey, upon the banks of the Hudson. If, on the contrary, the English army of Canada came by way of the sea, to join that of general Howe upon the shores of New Jersey, the troops of Peek's Kill could immediately unite with those that occupied the same province, and thus compose a formidable army for the defence of Philadelphia. If, finally, the army of Canada attacked Ticonderoga, the camp of Peek's Kill might carry succours to those who were charged with the defence of that fortress. But as it was of inexpressible importance to preserve Philadelphia in the power of the United States, the Congress ordained the forination of a camp upon the western bank of the Delaware, with the double object of receiving all the troops that arrived from the south and west, and of serving, in case of need, as a reserve. Here also were to assemble all the recruits of Pennsylvania, reenforced by several regiments of regular troops. This army was placed under the command of general Arnold, who was then at Philadelphia. All these arrangements being made, on the twenty-eighth of May, Washington quitted his former position in the neighborhood of Morristown, and advancing within a few miles of Brunswick, upon the left bank of the Rariton, took possession of the strong country along Middlebrook. He turned this advantageous situation to every account of which it was capable; his camp, winding along the course of the hills, was strongly intrenched and covered with artillery; nor was it better secured by its immediate natural or artificial advantages, than by the difficulties of approach which the ground in front threw in the way of an enemy. In this situation he commanded a view of the British encampment on the hills of Brunswick, and of most of the intermediate country towards that place and Amboy. The American army, at this epoch, amounted to fifteen thousand men, inclusive of the North Carolinians, and the militia of New Jersey; but this number

comprehended many apprentices, and some totally undisciplined companies.

Always controlled by a sort of fatal necessity, which was the manifest cause of all the reverses of his party, general Howe would never ascend the river Hudson towards Canada to cooperate and join with the northern British army. He persisted in his favorite object of invading New Jersey and Pennsylvania, according to the design he had conceived of penetrating through the first of these provinces to the Delaware, driving Washington before him, and reducing the whole country to so effectual a state of subjection as to establish a safe and open communication between the army and New York.

He presumed, either that Washington would hazard a battle, and in that case he entertained no doubt of success; or that the Americans would constantly retire, which appeared to him the most probable. In the latter case, having by the reduction of New Jersey, left every thing safe in his rear, and secured the passage of the Delaware; he became, of course, master of Philadelphia, which from its situation, was incapable of any effectual defence, and could only be protected by Washington at the certain expense and hazard of a battle; than which nothing was more coveted by the English.

If the obstacles in New Jersey were found so great that they could not be overcome without much loss of time and expense of blood, his intention was to profit of the powerful naval force, and the great number of transports and vessels of all sorts which lay at New York. By means of this numerous marine, the army might be conveyed either to the mouths of the Delaware and thence to Philadelphia, or into the bay of Chesapeake, which opened the way into the heart of the central provinces, and led either directly, or by crossing a country of no great extent to the possession of that city. That point gained, Philadelphia was to become the place of arms and centre of action, whilst every part of the hostile provinces of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland would, from their deep bays and navigable rivers, be exposed to the continual attacks of an enemy so powerful by sea. But it is evident that the first object of the views of the English general, was the destruction of the army of Washington, and therefore before resorting to the aid of his marine, he resolved to make trial of fortune in New Jersey, by using all the resources of art to force the enemy to an action. Accordingly, having received from Europe his tents, and other field equipage, with some reenforcements composed principally of German troops, he passed over to the frontiers of New Jersey, and moved with his whole army to Brunswick, having left however a sufficient garrison at Amboy. When he had accurately examined the strength of the posts which Washington occupied, he renounced the scheme of assaulting him in his camp. He continued for several days in front of his lines, offering him battle; but the American general refusing it, he pushed on detachments,

and made movements as if he intended to pass him, and advanced to the Delaware, hoping that his enemy, alarmed for the safety of Philadelphia, would have abandoned this impregnable post to follow him. But Washington, firm in his resolution of never committing the fortune of America to the hazard of a single action, made no move

ment.

Meanwhile, having observed by the demonstrations of the English, that their design was to prosecute their operations, not against the passages leading to Canada, but in the province of New Jersey, he ordered the troops at Peek's Kill to march to his succour. He gave colonel Morgan, the same who had displayed so brilliant a valor at the assault of Quebec, the command of a troop of light horse, destined to annoy the left flank of the English army, and to repress, or cut off its advanced parties. General Sullivan, who occupied Princeton with a strong detachment, was ordered to fall back to a more secure position, upon the heights of Rocky Hill. But general Howe, perceiving that Washington was not to be enticed by these demonstrations to quit his fastnesses, resolved to put himself in motion, and to approach nearer to the Delaware. Accordingly, in the night of the fourteenth of June, the entire British army, with the exception of two thousand soldiers, who remained for the protection of Brunswick, began to move, in two columns, towards the river. The van of the first, conducted by lord Cornwallis, and which had taken the road to the right, arrived by break of day at Somerset Court House, nine miles distant from New Brunswick, having passed without obstacle the little river Millstone. The column of the left, under general Heister, reached at the same time the village of Middlebush, situated lower down upon the road of Princeton. But Washington, faithful to his temporising plan, had too much penetration to be diverted from it by circumvention or sleight. He reflected, that without supposing in the enemy a temerity, which was absolutely foreign to the prudent and circumspect character of general Howe, it could not be imagined that he would venture to advance upon the Delaware, and to cross that river, having to combat an army on the opposite bank, and another, still more formidable, in his rear. It was, besides, evident that if the real intention of the English had hitherto been to pass the Delaware, they would have marched rapidly towards it, without halting, as they had done, at half way. He was not ignorant, moreover, that they had advanced light to this point, leaving at Brunswick their baggage, batteaux, and bridge equipage. Having well pondered these circumstances, Washington concluded that the project of the enemy was not to proceed to the Delaware, but to allure him from his camp of Middlebrook, in order to reduce him to the necessity of fighting. Wherefore he made no movement, but continued to remain quietly within his intrenchments. Only, as the enemy was so near, he drew up his army in order of battle, upon the