described, to Fort Edward, while another column, embarking at Ticonderoga, should proceed up Lake George, reduce the fort of that name, situated at its extremity, and afterwards rejoin him at Fort Edward. Upon the acquisition of Fort George, the stores, provisions and necessaries were to be conveyed to the camp by way of the lake, the navigation of which is easier and more expeditious than that of Wood Creek, and there was, besides, a good wagon road between the two forts. Such were the efforts exerted by the two belligerents; the English believing themselves secure of victory; the Americans hardly venturing to hope for better fortune. Nothing could exceed the consternation and terror which the victory of Ticonderoga, and the subsequent successes of Burgoyne, spread throughout the American provinces, nor the joy and exultation they excited in England. The arrival of these glad tidings was celebrated by the most brilliant rejoicings at court, and welcomed with the same enthusiasm by all those who desired the unconditional reduction of America. They already announced the approaching termination of this glorious war; they openly declared it a thing impossible, that the rebels should ever recover from the shock of their recent losses, as well of men as of arms and of military stores; and especially that they should ever regain their courage and reputation, which, in war, contribute to success, as much, at least, as arms themselves. Even the ancient reproaches of cowardice were renewed against the Americans, and their own partisans abated much of the esteem they had borne them. They were more than half disposed to pronounce the colonists unworthy to defend that liberty, which they gloried in, with so much complacency. The ministers, pluming themselves upon their good fortune, marched through the court as if to exact the tribute of felicitation. No praises were refused them; their obstinacy was denominated constancy; their projects, which had appeared full of temerity, were now acknowledged to have been dictated by the profoundest sagacity; and their pertinacity in rejecting every proposition for accommodation, was pronounced to have been a noble zeal for the interests of the state. The military counsels of the ministers having resulted in such brilliant success, even those who had heretofore inclined for the ways of conciliation, welcomed with all sail this prosperous breeze of fortune, and appeared now rather to wish the reduction, than the voluntary reunion of the Americans.

But in America, the loss of the fortress and the lakes, which were considered as the keys of the United States, appeared the more alarming, as it was unexpected; for, the greater part of the inhabitants, as well as the Congress, and Washington himself, were impressed with a belief, that the British army in Canada was weaker, and that of general Schuyler stronger, than they were in effect. They entertained no doubt in particular, that the garrison left in

Ticonderoga was sufficient for its entire security. Malignity began to assail the reputation of the officers of the northern army; its envenomed shafts were especially aimed at St. Clair. Schuyler himself, that able general and devoted patriot, whose long services had only been repaid by long ingratitude, escaped not the serpent tongue of calumny. As the friend of the New Yorkers, he was no favorite with the inhabitants of New England, and the latter were those who aspersed him with the most bitterness. The Congress, for the honor of their arms, and to satisfy the people, decreed an an inquiry into the conduct of the officers, and that successors should be despatched to relieve them in command. The result of the investigation was favorable to them; by the intercession of Washington, the appointment of successors was waived. But what was not a little remarkable, is, that in the midst of all these disasters, no sort of disposition to submit appeared in any quarter. No public body discovered symptoms of dismay, and if a few individuals betrayed a want of firmness, they were chiefly persons without influence, and without character.

Meanwhile, the Congress apprehending that the news of these sinister events might operate to the prejudice of the negotiations opened with the court of France, and, as it too often happens, being more tender of their own interests than of the reputation of their generals, they hesitated not to disguise the truth of facts, by throwing upon St. Clair the imputation of imbecility and misconduct. Their agents were accordingly instructed to declare that all these reverses were to be attributed to those officers who, with a garrison of five thousand men, well armed and equipped, had wanted capacity to defend an almost impregnable fortress; that, as for the rest, the Americans, far from being discouraged, only waited for the occasion to avenge their defeats. Washington, who in this crisis as in all the preceding, manifested an unshaken constancy, was entirely occupied in providing means to confirm the tottering state of the republic; he exerted the utmost diligence in sending reenforcements and necessaries to the army of Schuyler. The artillery and warlike stores were expedited from Massachusetts. General Lincoln, a man of great influence in New England, was sent there to encourage the militia to enlist. Arnold, in like manner, repaired thither; it was thought his ardor might serve to inspirit the dejected troops. Colonel Morgan, an officer whose brilliant valor we have already had occasion to remark, was ordered to take the same direction with his troop of light horse. All these measures, conceived with prudence and executed with promptitude, produced the natural effect. The Americans recovered by degrees their former ardor, and their army increased from day to day.

During this interval, general Burgoyne exerted himself with extreme diligence in opening a passage from Fort Anne to Fort

Edward. But notwithstanding the ardor with which the whole army engaged in the work, their progress was exceedingly slow; so formidable were the obstacles which nature as well as art had thrown in their way. Besides having to remove the fallen trees with which the enemy had obstructed the roads, they had no less than forty bridges to construct, and many others to repair. Finally, the army encountered so many impediments in measuring this inconsiderable space, that it could not arrive upon the banks of the Hudson, near Fort Edward, until the thirtieth of July. The Americans, either because they were too feeble to oppose the enemy, or that Fort Edward was no better than a ruin, unsusceptible of defence, or finally, because they were apprehensive that colonel St. Leger, after the reduction of Fort Stanwix might descend by the left bank of the Mohawk to the Hudson, and thus intercept their retreat, retired lower down to Stillwater, where they threw up intrenchments. At the same time they evacuated Fort George, having previously burned their vessels upon the lake, and interrupted in various places the road which leads thence to Fort Edward. The route from Ticonderoga to this fortress by Lake George was thus left entirely open by the republicans. The English, upon their arrival on the Hudson river, which had been so long the object of their wishes, and which had been at length attained at the expense of so many toils and hardships, were seized with a delirium of joy, and persuaded themselves that victory could now no longer escape them. But ere it was long, their brilliant hopes were succeeded by anxiety and embarrassment. All the country around them was hostile, and they could obtain no provisions but what they drew from Ticonderoga. Accordingly, from the thirtieth of July to the fifteenth of August, the English army was continually employed in forwarding batteaux, provisions, and ammunition, from Fort George to the first navigable part of the Hudson, a distance of about eighteen miles. The toil was excessive in this operation, and the advantage gained by it in no degree an equivalent to the expense of labor and time. The roads were in some parts steep, and in others required great repairs. Of the horses that were expected from Canada, scarcely one third were yet arrived, and it was with difficulty that fifty pair of oxen had been procured. Heavy and continual rains added to these impediments; and notwithstanding all the efforts which had been used, it was found difficult to supply the army with provisions for its current consumption, and utterly impracticable in this mode to establish such a magazine as would enable it to prosecute the further operations of the campaign. On the fifteenth, there was not above four days' provision in store, nor above ten batteaux in the Hudson river.

General Burgoyne was severely censured, as well for having lost so much time by crossing the wilderness of Fort Anne, as for having exposed himself to want subsistence in his camp at Fort Edward.

It was alleged that, instead of entangling himself in those dangerous defiles, he should, after the occupation of Skeenesborough and the total discomfiture of the enemy's army, have returned immediately down the South river to Ticonderoga, where he might again have embarked the army on Lake George, and proceeded to the fort which takes its name; this being reduced, a broad firm road lay before him to Fort Edward. In this manner, it was added, would have been avoided delays as detrimental to the British army, as propitious to the Americans. Thus, it was maintained, the army might have made itself master of Albany, before the enemy would have had time to recollect himself. But, in justification of Burgoyne, it was advanced, that a retrograde motion in the height of victory, would have diminished the spirit of his troops, and revived the hopes of the enemy; that the Americans would undoubtedly have made a stand at Fort George, and in the meantime would have broken up the road leading to Fort Edward; that by passing, as he had done, through the desert of Fort Anne, besides inuring his troops to the war of the woods, a war so embarrassing and difficult, he compelled the enemy to evacuate Fort George without striking a blow; that having already opened himself a road, it was to be hoped the Americans would not interrupt the other; that the route by land left the vessels, which would have been required for the transport of the troops, upon Lake George, at liberty to be employed in that of arms, ammunition, provisions, and baggage. Finally, it was represented, that by preferring the way upon the left to that upon the right by Lake George, he had enabled himself to detach a strong corps under the command of general Reidesel, to agitate alarms in Connecticut and throughout the country of Vermont.

However, the truth was, Schuyler profited with great dexterity of these delays. Several regiments of regular troops from Peek's Kill were already arrived at the camp, and although it was then the season of harvest, the militia of New England assembled from all quarters, and hastened to join the principal army. These reenforcements placed it in a situation, if not to resume the offensive, at least to occupy all the tenable positions, and defend them with energy and effect

In the meantime, general Burgoyne received intelligence that colonel St. Leger, whose detachment had been reenforced by a considerable, party of savages, after descending by the Lake Oneida from Oswego, in the country of the Mohawks, had arrived before, and was closely besieging, Fort Stanwix. He immediately conceived the hope of deriving an important advantage from this operation. For if the American army in his front proceeded up the Mohawk to the relief of Fort Stanwix, the English found the way open to Albany, and thus attained the first object of their desires. Moreover, if St. Leger succeeded, the Americans would find themselves between

two royal armies, that of St. Leger in front, and that of Burgoyne in rear. If, on the other hand, the republicans abandoned Fort Stanwix to its fate, and withdrew towards Albany, the country on the Mohawk would fall into the power of the English, and they might form a junction with colonel St. Leger. Their army thus reenforced, and victualled by the Mohawks, would be in a situation to move forward. From these operations it must result, either that the enemy would resolve to stand an action, and, in this case, Burgoyne felt assured of victory; or, that he would gradually retire down the Hudson, and thus abandon to the English the city of Albany. If the propriety of a rapid movement forward was therefore evident, the difficulty of finding means to execute it was not less manifest, as the want of subsistence still continued; and this want would of necessity increase with the distance of the army from the lakes, through which it received its provisions. To maintain such a communication with Fort George, during the whole time of so extensive a movement, as would secure the convoys from being intercepted by the enemy, was obviously impracticable. The army was too weak to afford a chain of posts for such an extent; and continual escorts for every separate supply, would be a still greater drain. Burgoyne therefore perceived distinctly that he must have recourse to some other source of supply, or totally relinquish the enterprise. He knew that the Americans had accumulated considerable stores of live cattle, corn, and other necessaries, besides a large number of wheel carriages, at a village called Bennington, situated between two streams, which, afterwards uniting, form the river Hosack. This place lies only twenty miles distant from the Hudson; it was the repository of all the supplies intended for the republican camp, which were expedited from New England by the upper part of Connecticut river, and thence through the country of Vermont. From Bennington they were conveyed, as occasion required, to the different parts of the army. The magazines were only guarded, however, by detachments of militia, whose numbers varied continually, as they went and came at discretion. Though the distance was considerable from the camp of Burgoyne to Bennington, yet as the whole country through which the corps of Reidesel had lately passed appeared peaceable, and even well inclined to submission, the English general, impelled by necessity, and allured by an ardent thirst of glory, did not despair of being able to surprise Bennington, and bring off the provisions of the enemy by means of his own carriages. Having taken this resolution, he entrusted the execution of it to lieutenantcolonel Baum, a German officer of great bravery, and well versed in this sort of partisan war.

The force allotted to this service, amounted to about five hundred men, consisting of two hundred of Reidesel's dismounted dragoons, captain Frazer's marksmen, the Canada volunteers, a party of pro