with the intelligence, and a request for prompt assistance. Rodney had already passed from Antigua to Barbadoes. Whether he believed the assailants more feeble, and the besieged more strong, than they really were, or that he was not apprised of the sailing of the French admiral with all his fleet for Tobago, instead of repairing with all his own to the relief of that island, he contented himself with sending admiral Drake thither with six sail of the line, some frigates, and a body of about six hundred troops. Drake approached Tobago; but seeing the enemy in such force, he relinquished the enterprise and hastened to regain Barbadoes. The count de Grasse pursued him, but could not prevent his reaching that island in safety, and advising admiral Rodney of the critical state of affairs. Meanwhile, the governor of Tobago was hard pressed. The French having taken possession of different heights which overlooked Concordia, he determined to retreat to a post on the Main Ridge, where a few huts had been built, and some provisions and ammunition previously lodged for the purpose. The garrison was already arrived at Caledonia, and thus occupied the road or path which leads to the post which they had in view. This road is so narrow and difficult that a few men might defend it against a whole army. The marquis de Bouille had reflected, that time and the nature of his enterprise did not admit of the lingering process of a regular siege. It was evident, however, that if the British governor should intrench himself in those inaccessible positions, the reduction of the island would require a series of operations as protracted as perilous. It would moreover prove in obstacle to the execution of ulterior designs. Finally, it was to be presumed that Rodney could not long delay to appear. Under these considerations, the marquis de Bouille thought proper to resort to more expeditious means than are usually employed in war. Departing from the accustomed lenity of his character, perhaps through irritation at the obstinacy of the islanders, and perhaps, also, from resentment for the late transactions at St. Eustatius, he sent to apprise the governor that he should begin with burning two habitations and two sugar plantations. His menaces were immediately accomplished. They were followed by that of consigning twice as many to the same fate, at the commencement of every four hours, until the island was laid waste or that a surrender should be made.

The inhabitants, convinced that perseverance was total ruin, were in no disposition to wait the slow approach of succours which the precipitate retreat of Drake rendered hourly more uncertain. They began to murmur; and very soon, to negotiate for conditions with the French general. Governor Ferguson at length perceived the impossibility of controlling events. couragement in his regular troops moment of capitulation was come.

He observed a manifest disthemselves, and felt that the He obtained honorable terms,

and similar to those which the marquis de Bouille, naturally generous towards his vanquished enemies, had granted to the inhabitants of Dominica. These transactions took place in the early part of June. Admiral Rodney appeared shortly after in view of the island with all his armament. But, on intelligence of its surrender, and at sight of the imposing force of the count de Grasse, he avoided an engagement, and returned to Barbadoes. In this manner, the French availing themselves with equal sagacity and promptitude of their naval superiority in the West Indies, both galled their enemies at sea, and deprived them of a rich and well fortified island.

These operations, however, were still but a part of the plau formed by the French government, and committed to the care of the count de Grasse. The instructions of that admiral enjoined him, after having attempted all those enterprises which the season should adinit of in the West Indies, to repair with all his force to the coasts of America, and there to cooperate with the French troops and those of Congress, to the entire extirpation of the British power in those regions. Washington and Rochambeau awaited his arrival, in order to commence the work. Already, by means of swift sailing vessels, they had concerted the plan of their combined action, after their junction should have taken place. It was hoped by the republicans that besides his fleet, the French admiral would furnish five or six thousand land troops, munitions of war and provisions, and especially money, of which the Americans, and the French themselves, experienced the greatest penury. Finally, they pressed him to show himself promptly, as well to support their efforts as to prevent the arrival of British reenforcements. The count de Grasse was personally stimulated by these important considerations. His imagination offered him a vivid perspective of the glory to be acquired by achieving what the count d' Estaing had attempted in vain, namely, the finishing of the American war by a decisive stroke. He accordingly made sail from Martinico for Cape Francois, in the island of St. Domingo. He was constrained to tarry there some time, to take on board the troops and military stores destined for the continent. But he exerted himself in vain to procure the needed funds. He ⚫ was joined, in that anchorage, by five ships of the line. All his pre

parations being completed, he sailed, the fifth of August, and commenced with escorting his numerous convoy till out of danger. Afterwards, having touched at the Havannah for money, which the Spaniards readily furnished him, he directed his course with a favorable wind for the Chesapeake. His fleet, composed of twenty-eight sail of the line and several frigates, carried three thousand regular troops, with every kind of succour; and might be considered as the great hinge upon which the fortune of the war, at least in America,

was to turn.

On the other hand, admiral Rodney, who followed with an attentive eye the movements of the count de Grasse, saw the importance of taking a decisive resolution. He instantly detached admiral Hood to the coast of America with fourteen sail of the line to join admiral Graves, and counteract the designs of the enemy. Being himself in feeble health, he set sail for England with some ships, much out of condition, and a large convoy. Rodney was censured with extreme asperity for the counsels taken by him about that time; and some even made him responsible for the sinister events which ensued shortly after. His adversaries contended, that if he had sailed with all his force, and without delay, in quest of the French admiral, had touched at Jamaica, in order to make his junction with the squadron of Hyde Parker, and then had proceeded to the coasts of North America, the count de Grasse would at least have found himself compelled to relinquish his projects, if not exposed to a defeat. Instead of adopting this measure,' said they, the only one that suited the occasion, Rodney, by returning to England with a part of the heaviest ships of his fleet, has reduced it to an alarming state of weakness, and abandoned the field of battle to the enemy.

'It is a capital error thus to have divided the armament into several little squadrons, as leaving some ships at the leeward islands, where the French have not left one, and detaching three others to Jamaica, which nobody thought of attacking, and, finally, sending sir Samuel Hood with an unequal and insufficient force to America. Is it possible to be too much astonished that our admiral has chosen to fritter away his force into small parts, at the very moment when the French assembled all theirs upon a single point? The world may see what are the effects of this fatal resolution, it has already cost but too many of England's tears.' Rodney nevertheless found defenders. 'The admiral's return to Europe,' they answered, was rather constrained by the state of his health, than decided by his choice. The ships he has brought with him are in such a worn out state, that they could not have been repaired in the West Indies. The French admiral having under his protection a rich and numerous convoy, it was fairly to be presumed that he would not have left it to pursue its homeward voyage without a respectable escort. It was even to be supposed that he would have sent the greater part of his fleet along with the merchantmen to France, and that he would only have retained those ships which were in condition to undergo the American service. But independent of that circumstance, the force sent to America under sir Samuel Hood, when combined with that of admiral Graves, would have been perfectly adequate to sustain the brunt of the whole French fleet. But what has Graves done? Instead of keeping his squadron entire and together in the port of New York, he preferred to fatigue himself in a fruitless cruise before Boston, until the bad weather which he met had disabled the greater

part of his ships. Hence it followed of necessity that even after the arrival of admiral Hood at New York our force was still inferior to that of the French. It indeed now appears that no timely notice had been received by admiral Graves either of the count de Grasse's motions, or of Hood's destination to the coasts of America. But if the expresses which sir George Rodney had despatched for that purpose were taken by the enemy, or otherwise detained, it is no fault on his side; it is a misfortune to be regretted; but which could neither have been absolutely foreseen, nor prevented if it could. Finally, the commander-in-chief cannot be reproached for having detached sir Samuel Hood to America, instead of repairing thither himself; for what naval officer is more worthy of all our confidence than Hood?'

Without undertaking to decide between these opposite opinions, we shall content ourselves with remarking, that though, in military facts, it is not allowable to judge by the event, it is nevertheless just to consider the causes which have produced it; and nothing is more certain than that the conduct of admiral Rodney, in the present conjuncture, had an influence upon the chances of the continental struggle, upon the fortune of America herself, and even upon the issue of all this war.

Having sketched the events which signalised the present year, as well in Europe as in the West Indies, we are now to record those which occupied the scene upon the continent of America. It was the theatre of the principal efforts of the two parties that contended, arms in hand, for its possession. Every where else the contest had in view the success of the campaign, and to obtain a better peace; there, its object was existence itself. But before undertaking the portraiture of military operations, it is necessary to apply the attention to objects which, though less brilliant and glorious, are however the first source, and the firmest foundation of warlike exploits. Such, doubtless, is the internal administration of the state. The situation of the United States at the commencement of the year 1781, presented, in general, only objects of affliction and disquietude. The efforts which the Americans had made the preceding year, and the events which had passed in the Carolinas, had revived public spirit and produced happy effects. But these effects being founded only upon the fugitive ardor of particular men, and not upon a settled and permanent order of things, it followed that discouragement and distress reappeared with more alarming symptoms than ever. The public treasury was empty, or only filled with bills of credit, no longer of any worth. The army supplies totally failed, or were only procured by compulsion, accompanied with certificates of receipt, which had lost all sort of credit. The inhabitants became disgusted, and concealed their commodities. If by dint of effort some scanty recruit of provision was at length collected, it could not be transported to

the place of its destination, for want of money to pay the wagoners. In some districts, where it was attempted to impress them, there arose violent murmurs; which even degenerated into more strenuous collisions. No where had it been possible to form magazines; scarcely did there exist here and there some repositories, which often contained neither food nor clothing of any denomination; even the arsenals were without arms. The soldiers, covered with tatters, or half naked, destitute of all comforts, implored in vain the compassion of the country they defended. The veterans deserted; the recruits refused to join the army. The Congress had decreed that by the first of January, there should be thirty-seven thousand men under arms; it would have been difficult to have mustered the eighth part of that number in the month of May. In a word, it seemed as if America, at the very crisis of her fate, was about to prove wanting to herself, and that after having gained the better part of her career, she was more than half inclined to retrace her steps. Far from the Americans being thought capable of waging an offensive war, it was scarcely believed that they could defend their firesides. Already, it began to be feared that instead of assisting the French to drive out the soldiers of king George, they would prove unable to prevent the latter from expelling the troops of Lewis XVI. So disastrous was the change of fortune occasioned by the exhaustion of the fianances, and, still more, by the want of a system of administration proper to reestablish them. This state of things was not overlooked by the American government, and it exerted every utmost effort to apply a remedy. But its power was far from corresponding to its intentions. The only means that Congress had for administering to the wants of the state, consisted in a new emission of bills of credit, or an increase of taxes. But the paper money had lost all sort of value. The Congress itself had been constrained to request the different states to repeal the laws by which they had made the bills of credit a tender in all payments. It had even ordained that in all future contracts for the supplies of the army, the prices should be stipulated in specie. This was the same as declaring formally that the state itself would no longer acknowledge its own bills for current money, and that this paper not only no longer had, but no longer could have, the least value. As to taxes, the Congress had not the right to impose them; it belonged exclusively to the provincial assemblies. But these exercised it with more backwardness than could comport with the public interests. This coldness proceeded from several causes. The rulers of the particular states were, for the most part, men who owed their places to popular favor. They apprehended losing it, if they subjected to contributions of any importance, the inhabitants of a country where from the happy, shall I call it, or baleful facility of issuing paper money, to answer the public exigencies, they were accustomed to pay no taxes, or next to none. Moreover, although