have exposed himself, if, by retiring towards Ticonderoga, he had abandoned Clinton to himself, and thus voluntarily relinquished all the advantages that were expected from the junction of the two armies? We may, however, consider as vain the apology which was advanced by Burgoyne himself, when he alleged, that if he had returned to the lakes, Gates might have gone to join Washington, who, falling upon Howe with the combined armies, must have overpowered him, and decided the fate of the whole war. Gates would never have abandoned the shores of the Hudson, so long as the army of Burgoyne was opposed to him, whether in the position of Saratoga, or in that of Ticonderoga. It is, besides, to be observed, that as a great part of the army of Gates consisted in the New England militia, these, at least, would not have followed him, even if he had marched upon the Delaware. But, though we think that Burgoyne committed no error in resolving to prosecute his expedition, it nevertheless appears that he ought not to have passed the Hudson. By continuing upon the left bank, he could retire at will towards Ticonderoga, or push forward towards Albany. It was evidently more easy to execute this movement, while having between himself and the now formidable army of Gates, so broad a river as the Hudson. The roads above, from Batten Kill to Fort George, were much easier upon the left than those upon the right bank; and in going down towards Albany, if they were not better, at least they were not worse. The city of Albany, it is true, is situated upon the right bank; but when Burgoyne should have arrived opposite to that city, upon the left, the English from below might have come up with their boats, and transported the troops to the right bank. At any rate, Burgoyne might thus have operated his junction with Clinton. But the former, either confiding too much in his army, which was, in truth, equally brave and flourishing, or not esteeming the Americans enough, notwithstanding the more favorable opinion of them which the actions of Bennington and of Stanwix should have given him, resolved to quit the safer ground and try the fortune of a battle; he considered victory as certain and decisive. In like manner as the British ministers, erroneously estimating the constancy of the colonists, had persuaded themselves that they could reduce them to submission by rigorous laws, the generals deceiving themselves as strangely with respect to their courage, had no doubt that with their presence, a few threats, and a little rattling of their arms, they could put them to flight. From this blind confidence in victory, resulted a series of defeats, and the war was irretrievably lost from too sanguine an assurance of triumph.

But let us resume the course of events. The nineteenth of September was reserved by destiny for an obstinate and sanguinary action, in which it was at length to be decided whether the Americans, as some pretended, could only resist the English when protected

by the strength of works, or of woods, rivers and mountains, or if they were capable of meeting them upon equal ground, in fair and regular battle. General Burgoyne having surmounted the obstacles of thick woods and broken bridges, by which his progress was continually interrupted, at length arrived in the front of the enemy, some woods only of no great extent separating the two armies. Without a moment's delay, the English formed themselves in order of battle; their right wing rested upon some high grounds, which rise gradually from the river; it was flanked by the grenadiers and light infantry, who occupied the hills. At some distance in front, and upon the side of these, were posted those Indians, Canadians and loyalists, who had still remained in the camp. The left wing and artillery, under general Phillips and Reidesel, kept along the great road and meadows by the river side. The American army drew up in the same order from the Hudson to the hills; Gates had taken the right, and given the left to Arnold. Smart skirmishes immediately ensued between the foremost marksmen of either army. Morgan, with his light horse, and colonel Durbin with the light infantry, had attacked and routed the Canadians and savages; but the latter having been supported, they were both in their turn compelled to resume their place in the line. Meanwhile, Burgoyne, either intending to turn the left flank of the enemy, or wishing to avoid, by passing higher up, the hollows of the torrents which fall into the Hudson, extended his right wing upon the heights, in order to fall upon Arnold in flank and rear.

But Arnold was, at the same time, endeavoring to execute a similar manœuvre upon him, while neither of them was able, on account of the woods, to perceive the movements of his enemy.

The two parties met; general Frazer repulsed the Americans. Finding the right flank of the enemy's right wing so well defended, they left a sufficient guard to defend this passage, made a rapid movement to their right, and vigorously assailed the left flank of the same wing. Arnold exhibited upon this occasion all the impetuosity of his courage; he encouraged his men with voice and example. The action became extremely warm; the enemy fearing that Arnold, by cutting their line, would penetrate between their wings, as was manifestly his intention, hastened to reenforce the points attacked. General Frazer came up with the twenty-fourth regiment, some light infantry and Breyman's riflemen; he would have drawn more troops from the right flank, but the heights on which it was posted, were of too great importance to be totally evacuated. Meanwhile, such was the valor and impetuosity of the Americans, that the English began to fall into confusion; but general Phillips soon appeared with fresh men and a part of the artillery; upon hearing the firing he had rapidly made his way through a very difficult wood to the scene of danger. He restored the action at the very moment it was about being decided in favor of the enemy,

The Americans, however, renewed their attacks with such persevering energy that night only parted the combatants. The royalists passed it under arms upon the field of battle; the republicans retired. They had lost from three to four hundred men in killed and wounded; among the former were colonels Adams and Coburn. The English had to regret more than five hundred, and among others, captain Jones, of the artillery, an officer of great merit.

Both parties claimed the honor of victory. The English, it is true, kept possession of the field of battle; yet, as the intention of the Americans was not to advance, but to maintain their position, and that of the English not to maintain theirs, but to gain ground, and as besides it was a victory for the republicans not to be vanquished, it is easy to see which had the advantage of the day. On the other hand, the English were now convinced, to the great prejudice of their hopes, and even of their courage, that they would have to grapple with a foe as eager for action, as careless of danger, and as indifferent with respect to ground or cover as themselves.

The day following, general Burgoyne finding that he must abandon all idea of dislodging the enemy by force, from its intrenched positions, endeavored to console himself with the hope, that time might offer him some occasion, to operate with more effect.

He was, besides, in daily expectation of news from general Clinton, with respect to whose movements he was still entirely in the dark. Resolving, therefore, to pause, he pitched his camp within cannon shot of the American lines. He threw up numerous intrenchments, both upon his right, the part which had been attacked, and upon his left, in order to defend the meadows near the river, where he had established his magazines and hospitals. An English regiment, the Hessians of Hanau, and a detachment of loyalists were encamped in the same meadows for greater security. General Gates continued to occupy his first position, taking care, however, to fortify himself strongly on the left. With the return of success, his army was continually reenforced by the accession of fresh bodies of the militia. General Lincoln joined him with two thousand men, well trained and disciplined, from the New England provinces. The English exerted the greatest vigilance to avoid surprise; and the Americans to prevent them from going out of their camp to forage. The skirmishes were animated and frequent.

The British general had for a long time been expecting news from New York; and his impatience was at its height, when, the twentieth of September, he received a letter of the tenth, written in cyphers, by general Clinton, informing him that about the twentieth of the month, he should with two thousand men attack Fort Montgomery, situated on the right bank of the Hudson, and upon the declivity of the highlands. He excused himself upon account of weakness for not doing more; and even declared, that if the enemy made any

movement towards the coasts of New York, he should be forced to return thither. Burgoyne immediately despatched an emissary, two officers in disguise, and some other trusty persons, by different routes, to general Clinton, with a full account of his present situation, urging him to a speedy execution of the diversions he had proposed, and informing him that he was provided with sufficient necessaries, to hold out in his present position till the twelfth of October. Although the assistance promised by Clinton was much less effectual than Burgoyne had kept in view, nevertheless, he still cherished a hope that the attack on Fort Montgomery, and the apprehension that the English after its reduction might make their way up the river, would induce Gates either to change the position of his camp, or to send large detachments down the river, to oppose the progress of Clinton, and that in either case, some occasion would be offered him to gain a decisive advantage, and open his passage to Albany. But whoever considers the great superiority, in spirit as well as number, of the army of Gates over that of Burgoyne, and that the former was continually increasing in force, will readily perceive how vain were the expectations of the British general. It appears, therefore, that the mere survey of his own weakness, of that of Clinton, and of the preponderant force of Gates, should have determined him for retreat, if, however, retreat was still in his power. For to cross the river in sight of so formidable an army, would have been too perilous an enterprise; and here it is again perceived how imprudent had been the measure of passing it at first, since from that moment it became alike impossible to advance or recede.

In the beginning of October, general Burgoyne thought it expedient, from the difficulty of his situation and the uncertainty of succour, to lessen the soldiers' rations of provisions; to this measure, from its necessity, they submitted with great cheerfulness. But the twelfth of October was approaching, the term limited for the stay of the army in its present encampment. The seventh was already arrived, and no tidings came of the operations that had been proposed for its relief. In this alarming state of things, the English general resolved to make a movement to the enemy's left, not only to discover whether there were any possible means of forcing a passage, should it be necessary to advance, or of dislodging them for the convenience of retreat, but also to cover a forage of the army. He was impelled by necessity to attempt a decisive stroke. Accordingly he put himself at the head of a detachment of fifteen hundred regular troops, with two twelve pounders, two howitzers, and six six pounders. He was seconded by general Phillips, Reidesel and Frazer, all officers distinguished for their zeal and ability. The guard of the camp upon the high grounds was committed to the brigadiers general Hamilton and Speight, that of the redoubts and plain near the river, to brigadier Goll.

The force of the enemy immediately in the front of his lines was so much superior, that Burgoyne could not venture to auginent his detachment beyond the number we have stated. He had given orders that during this first attack, several companies of loyalists and Indians should be pushed on through byways, to appear as a check upon the rear of the enemy's left flank. The column of regulars having already issued from the camp, were formed within three quarters of a mile of the enemy's left, and manifested an intention to turn it. But general Gates, who observed this movement, instantly penetrated the design of the English, and with exquisite discernment resolved to make a sudden and rapid attack upon the left of this corps, hoping thus to separate it from the remainder of the army, and to cut off its retreat to the camp. The Americans advanced to the charge with incredible impetuosity, but they were received with equal resolution by major Ackland, at the head of the grenadiers. Gates immediately detached a fresh and powerful reenforcement to the aid of the first, and the attack was soon extended along the whole front of the Germans, who were posted immediately on the right of Ackland's grenadiers. Hence the British general found it impracticable to move any part of that body, as he would have desired, for the purpose of forming a second line to support this left flank, where the great weight of the fire still fell. As yet the right was unengaged, when the British generals perceived that the enemy were marching a strong body round their flank, in order to cut off their retreat. To oppose this dangerous design of the American general, the light infantry, with a part of the twenty-fourth regiment, which were joined with them at that post, were thrown into a second line, in order to cover the retreat of the troops into camp. Whilst this movement was yet in process, Arnold came up with three regiments, and fell upon this right wing. Gates, at the same time, sent a strong reenforcement to decide the action on the English left, which being at length totally overpowered, fell into disorder and fled. The light infantry and the twenty-fourth advanced with all speed to check the victorious Americans, whose riflemen pursued the fugitives with great eagerness; there ensued an extremely warm affair, and many perished on both sides.

Upon this occasion, brigadier-general Frazer was mortally wounded, an officer whose loss was severely felt by the English, and whose valor and abilities justified their regrets. Their situation now became exceedingly critical; even their camp was threatened; the enemy, emboldened by victory, was advancing to storm it, and if he arrived before the retreating detachment, there could be little hope of defending it. Phillips and Reidesel were ordered to rally with all expedition those troops which were nearest, or most disengaged, to cover the retreat of the others, while Burgoyne himself, fiercely pursued by Arnold, retired with great precipitation towards the camp