particular states "requested," to make or support certain propositions. But surely the opinion is erroneous. A senator is no more bound to obey the instructions of the state legislature, in opposition to his own judgment, than a representative of the people in the other house, is bound by the occasional instructions of his constituents. They are both elected for the purpose of freely and honestly exercising their own judgments according to the best of their capacities.

The moment they take their seats, they commence the task of legislating for the Union, including the state from which they are delegated, whose peculiar interests and desires, it may often be necessary to postpone to the general benefit. On the contrary, the state contemplates and urges its own interests; its inhabitants or the electoral sections of its inhabitants, in like manner, consider and pursue theirs, and it is perfectly proper that they should be represented to and directly pressed upon, the persons so delegated. But the powers and the duties of those delegates are essentially altered if such requests are converted into binding instructions. In respect to senators, the impropriety of the measure seems peculiarly striking. If one state possesses a right to direct the votes of its senators, every other state must have the same right, and if every state were to exercise such right, no portion of the legislative power would really reside in the senate, but would be held by the states; thus relapsing into the principles of the old confederation, or falling into something worse.

The appointment of a senator is for six consecutive years, but if a vacancy happens, an appointment is made by the executive of the state, for the proportion of the term of service which remains. Under the direction of the Constitution, the senators were at their first meeting divided into three classes: the seats of those of the first class to be vacated at the end of two years, of the second class at the end of four, and of the third at the end of six years; the reason of which was, that the

necessary for the attainment of those objects. In all other respects the sovereignty of the states is unaltered. The obligations of duty and allegiance to them are not impaired; but in all those instances which are within the sphere of the general government, the higher obligations of allegiance and duty to it, supersede what was due to the state governments, because from the nature of the case they cannot be co-equal. Two governments of concurrent right and power cannot exist in one society. Superiority must, therefore, be conferred on the general government, or its formation, instead of promoting domestic tranquillity, would produce perpetual discord and disorder.

The principles of this constitution to be thoroughly understood should be frequently contemplated. The composition of such a government presents a novel and sublime spectacle in political history. It is a society, formed not only out of the people of other societies, but in certain parts, formed by those societies themselves. The state is as much a member of the Union, and forms as much a part of the greater society as the people themselves, yet the state does not enter into the Union upon federate principles; it does not send representatives in the nature of federal delegates, or ambassadors; it cannot, at its own pleasure, increase or diminish their number. When the appointment is made, the person appointed becomes an officer of the United States, not of the state which sends him, and he is not politically responsible to his immediate constituent. In one case only is a vote taken by states, and the immediate representatives of the people, in that case, represent the state.

It will be seen that in some cases a state has the right to claim the aid of the judicial power of the Union, and in all, it is bound to support the legislative and executive acts of the general government when consistent with the constitution. As therefore it is neither a stranger, nor properly speaking a confederate,

it seems to follow that it must be considered as part of the greater nation, a term, which in the course of this work we shall chiefly use in reference to the United States, because although every political body, governed only by its own laws or internal regulations, may be denominated a nation, yet the states, not possessing that absolute independence, cannot with full propriety be so designated. But a name is of little importance if the substance be retained; and if Virginia or Pennsylvania are not known abroad as nations, it does not affect their power at home as states. In this relation every state must be viewed as entirely sovereign in all points not transferred by the people who compose it, to the government of the Union: and every exposition that may be given to the constitution, inconsistent with this principle, must be unsound. The supremacy of the Union in all those points that are thus transferred, and the sovereignty of the state in all those which are not transferred, must therefore be considered as two co-ordinate qualities, enabling us to decide on the true mode of giving a construction to the constitution. As different views have prevailed, different theories of construction have been formed. Some have contended that it should be construed strictly; others have asserted, that the most liberal construction should be allowed. By construction we can only mean the ascertaining the true meaning of an instrument, or other form of words, and by this rule alone ought we to be governed in respect to this constitution. A strict construction, adhering to the letter, without pursuing the sense of the composition, could only proceed from a needless jealousy, or rancorous enmity. On the other hand, a liberal construction may be carried to an injurious extreme; concessions of power may be conceived, or assumed, which never were intended, and which therefore are not necessary for its legitimate effect. The true rule therefore seems to be no other than that which is applied in all cases of impartial and correct exposition; which is to deduce the

meaning from its known intention and its entire text, and to give effect, if possible, to every part of it, consistently with the unity, and the harmony of the whole.

In many respects we have the benefit of the learned elucidations of judicial tribunals, and wherever the supreme court of the United States has pronounced its solemn decision upon constitutional points, the author has gladly availed himself of this irrefragable authority; but where a guide so certain, cannot be found, recourse can only be had, to an anxious and serious endeavour to display and expound, with truth and justice, the main features of a constitution, which must always be more admired, as it is more considered, and better understood. If these examinations produce the same effect upon the reader, that they have upon the author, the attachment to it, of our native citizens, and its attractions to foreigners will be increased; and those who are now here, and those who may hereafter be here, will concur to venerate and support a government, eminent above all others in promoting the freedom and the happiness of man.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER.

THE course proposed to be pursued, is first, to consider the legislative power as it resides in the senate and house of representatives; to what extent the president participates in general legislation, and his power in conjunction with the senate relative to making treaties, with the operation and effect of treaties; we shall then proceed to those powers of general legislation which are implied by the Constitution, or expressly enumerated, and conclude this head with a view of the restraints under which both the United States and the states severally, are constitutionally placed.

The legislative power is vested in the congress of the United States, consisting of the senate and house of representatives. The first paragraph evinces that it is a limited government. The term "all legislative powers herein granted," remind both the congress and the people, of the existence of some limitation. The introduction displays the general objects. The Constitution itself enumerates some of the powers of congress, and excludes others which might perhaps fall