Although a promissory oath is not in point of law, ranked so high as a judicial oath; that is, it does not fall within the general provisions of the law in respect to perjury, yet it greatly increases the moral obligation of the party, and ought to make a deep impression on him. Every state officer, and every officer of the United States, on being elected or appointed, binds himself thereby, not only to abstain from all opposition to the Constitution, but to give it his firm and active

assistance.

It has been asked, why it was thought necessary that the state magistracy should be bound to support the Constitution of the United States, and unnecessary to impose an oath on the officers of the United States in favour of the state constitutions. The reason assigned, (as one of many,) by the authors of the Federalist, is, that the members of the general government will have no agency in carrying the state governments into effect, but the members and officers of the state governments will have an essential agency in giving effect to the general government.*

This answer is a solid one. An official oath ought to be confined to the duties of the office. It is not so broad and comprehensive as a general oath of allegiance and fidelity, which embraces all the duties of a citizen or subject. An officer appointed under the authority of the United States, is to perform only those duties which emanate from it; his obligation is limited by that authority, which, as repeatedly heretofore observed, is not controlled by the constitutions of the several states. An officer appointed under the authority of a state, is bound to support its, constitution, but so far as the Constitution of the United States in any respect supersedes it, another rule of obligation arises, which he is equally bound to comply with; and, as it is essential to the true interests of all

* Federalist, No. 44.

the states, that the powers granted to the general government should be fully effectuated, all their officers, legislative, executive, and judicial, should expressly undertake to do so.

The remarks on this subject may be concluded by drawing the attention of the reader to the liberal alternative of an oath or affirmation. No religious test, it is declared in the same sentence, shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States. Not only a numerous and respectable sect, but many other persons not of the people called Quakers, feel an invincible repugnance to taking an oath in any form. If the term affirmation had been omitted, all such persons would have been excluded from public trusts on account of religious opinion. The abstract declaration of perfect equality in matters of religion is thus realized.

CHAPTER XX.

OF SOME ARDUOUS PARTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S DUTIES.

ON a full view of the powers and duties of the president, the reader will probably perceive that they are of more importance in respect to foreign relations than to the internal administration of government.

At home his path, though dignified, is narrow. In the tranquillity which we have hitherto in time of peace enjoyed, little more has been requisite, in either his legislative or executive functions, than regularly to pursue the plain mandates of laws, and the certain text of the Constitution.

In his legislative capacity, the power of objecting to acts of congress, has been fairly exercised and respectfully submitted to. In the executive department he has had indeed two insurrections to cope with, one of which was inconsiderable, and the other, though more extensive, disappeared before the mere display of the force collected to subdue it. The transaction itself afforded a valuable proof of the patriotism of the people, and their attachment to the Constitution. The regular militia of the three adjoining states, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia, cheerfully co-operated with that of Pennsylvania, in which the opposition existed, and the governor of Pennsylvania, as a military officer, obeyed the orders of the governor of Virginia, on whom the president conferred the chief com. mand. A great proportion of this force consisted of volunteers;

numbers of whom were men of considerable property and civil eminence, and the governors of the states we have mentioned, except that of Maryland, who was prevented by particular circumstances, voluntarily took the field in person.

If the pages of our history are soiled in any degree by transient resistance to the laws of the Union, the disgrace is redeemed by the proof of that wisdom, by which the general Constitution now appeared to have been framed, and of that determination to support it, by which the majority were actuated. And should instances of insurrection again occur, either against the laws of the Union, or the government of any particular state, it cannot be doubted that the same general and noble animation would be again displayed in support of the great political ark of our safety and happiness.

But it is in respect to external relations; to transactions with foreign nations, and the events arising from them, that the president has an arduous task. Here he must chiefly act on his own independent judgment. The Constitution authorizes him indeed to require the opinions of the principal officers in the executive departments; but however useful those opinions may be, they would afford no sanction for any errors he might commit. And although if required, they are to be given in writing, they would involve the officers in no responsibility.

In respect to treaties, it is only after they have received the approbation of the senate, that his responsibility is diminished by being divided. But he is not obliged to submit the inchoate treaty to them. His instructions to the minister who negotiated it may have been misunderstood, or wilfully disregarded; the national interests may have been plainly neglected, and it may be altogether such a compact as he would not ratify if he stood alone. Under such circumstances, it would be a timorous policy to endeavour to fortify his own disapprobation by obtaining the concurrence of the senate. And if

he should continue to disapprove it, although it met their approbation, he would not be justified in giving it his further sanction. For by the express words of the Constitution, he in concurrence with the senate, and not the senate alone, is to make treaties. In case of an impeachment, it would be no valid defence for him to allege that he submitted his own opinion to that of the senate. If indeed the case was at first of a doubtful nature, if he conscientiously desired the deliberate assistance of the senate, and if an honest conviction was produced in his own mind by the advice he received from them; his compliance with it would be personally honourable to him, and clearly consistent with the Constitution.

The power of receiving foreign ambassadors, carries with it among other things, the right of judging in the case of a revolution in a foreign country, whether the new rulers ought to be recognised. The legislature indeed possesses a superior power, and may declare its dissent from the executive recognition or refusal, but until that sense is declared, the act of the executive is binding. The judicial power can take no notice of a new government, till one or the other of those two departments has acted on it.* Circumstances may render the decision of great importance to the interests and peace of the country. A precipitate acknowledgement of the independence of part of a foreign nation, separating itself from its former head, may provoke the resentment of the latter: a refusal to do so, may disgust the former, and prevent the attainment of amity and commerce with them, if they succeed. The principles on which the separation takes place must also be taken into consideration, and if they are conformable to those which led to our own independence, and appear likely to be preserved, a strong impulse will arise in favour of a recog

* 3 Wheaton, 643. The same rule prevails in England.