advice to be correct, but says, 'the only question is, can the outbreak of hostilities be prevented? can the Sultan consent to a prolongation of the actual state of things without some real guarantee for a peaceable solution of the question at issuewhich presupposes that Egypt should disarm? I cannot judge how far the European cabinets possess the power and the will to effect this-according to the best of my knowledge and judgment in case of a war, the strategical position, the relative strength of the two armies, and the feeling of the country are all in favour of the Porte.'

How wonderfully like this is to the present state of things! In September 1871 we have accounts from Smyrna showing that the old system of intrigue has recommenced, by the Khedive endeavouring to gain partisans as the champion of pure Islamism, and the spring of 1872 will probably see another Syrian

war.

To return to Moltke. His view of the whole state of affairs and strategical plans for the ensuing campaign were, like everything he does, lucid, simple, and straight forward. As is well known, the Asiatic army of the Porte is distributed in two main bodies: at Konieh under Hadschi Ali Pascha, and in Kurdistan (Malatja, Diarbekir, Orfa) under Hafiz Pascha. If Ibrahim Pascha decides on an offensive war, he is most likely to endeavour to force this pass, the Kulek Boghas, despite of all our forts, because a successful operation in this direction would procure for him those rapid and decisive advantages on which, in his present precarious position, his very existence depends. Hadschi Ali Pascha would meet him on that shortest and most important road from Syria to Constantinople; his force is, however, inferior to that

thrown on the defensive, and have to rely on his fortified position to keep his enemy at bay. What can Hafiz Pascha do with the army of Kurdistan? Of course he cannot remain inactive; but neither can he oppose himself to Ibrahim's advance.

'My accurate knowledge of the country enables me to say that Hafiz could only join Hadschi Ali by an immense détour (from Diarbekir, Orfa, Malatja) by Kaiserieh; in fact, we should have 150 hours' march to the Kulek Boghas, whilst the enemy has only the same distance to get over from that pass to Constantinople. We should, therefore, arrive too late; and nothing remains for us but to advance directly to the front (from Malatja, &c. to Bir-adschik), thereby making a diversion which will frustrate any attempt of the enemy against the capital so long as Hafiz Pascha shall not have suffered a decisive defeat. We must, therefore, secure for ourselves the possibility of making such an advance. All our intelligence from Syria agrees in showing that Ibrahim is preparing to concentrate his forces near Aleppo. It is clear that Hafiz cannot, under these circumstances, remain in cantonments separated from each other by chains of mountains (the Taurus range) and a large river (the Euphrates). He must concentrate his forces, and occupy some fortified point of im portance on the (Syrian) frontier: for even assuming that Ibrahim will most probably advance on Constantinople by Konieh, he is sure to endeavour to prevent our interfering with that movement by making a sudden and sharp attack on us. Hafiz Pascha will now have to expect this, and take his measures accordingly."

This plan was carried into execution. On April 14, 1839, all the different troops of Hafiz Pascha's

K

army commenced their movement of concentration, which was to have been effected at Karakaik, twenty English miles south of Samosat-on both banks of the Euphrates, and the corps was then to move southward to Bir-adschik, where an entrenched camp was prepared on the right (western) bank of the river. The passage of the mountains from Malatja was effected with the greatest difficulty, in torrents of rain, which, melting the snow, rendered all the rivers nearly im passable. It took fifteen days to cross the mountains, and even then the troops had not, as yet, effected their concentration, which, bad enough in itself, was rendered still worse by Hafiz Pascha wanting to move up the various isolated columns to Bir-adschik. Moltke says, that if Ibrahim Pascha, whose irregular cavalry were plundering all the surrounding villages, and whose scouts were watching the passage of the river by Turkish troops coming from the left bank, had only attacked the unfinished and half-manned field-works of the entrenched camp of Bir-adschik, he would have annihilated the whole force. But he lost his opportunity, having been, no doubt, in difficulties himself.

Towards the end of May, all the troops and artillery had been got together in the entrenched camp at Bir-adschik; and, as Dr. Ludwig Herrman asserts, a courier arrived from Constantinople bringing the appointment of Hafiz Pascha as Generalissimo of all the Turkish forces, which should have been sent months before to be useful, and also a secret autograph order from the Sultan to advance forthwith and attack Ibrahim, which should never have been sent. The Sultan, how. ever, felt the approach of death, and the finances could bear the strain no longer. Early in June, the force, under Hafiz, advanced about three hours' march to Nisib,

and occupied the entrenched posi tions there, leaving only a small force to guard the camp at Biradschik. At the same time, orders were sent to Hadschi Ali Pascha to advance from Konieh through the Cilician passes against the left wing of the Egyptians, and to Izzet Pascha to bring up his corps from Angora by Marasch.

It was no doubt the wish of Hafiz to suspend operations until these two corps should have come up; but Ibrahim Pascha received on June 15 an order from his father Mehemed desiring him to attack Hafiz at once. On June 19 Turkish Baschi Bozuks brought in intelligence of the approach of the Egyptian army; and on the evening of the following day the Egyptian army, after debouching from the defiles of Mizar, came and encamped about four English miles in front of the Turkish position, after surprising and capturing the tents of the Turkish irregular cavalry and of a brigade of cavalry of the Guards at Misar. Ibrahim's force was about 10,000 men stronger than that of Hafiz; but if time had been left to bring up Hadschi Ali and Izzet, the Turks would have far outnumbered the Egyptians.

At nine A.M. on the morning of June 21 the Egyptians sent a force of nine regiments of cavalry, eighteen guns, and a brigade of infantry, to reconnoitre the Turkish position, which was found to be so strong that Ibrahim did not venture to attack. June 22, early in the morning, the Egyptians could be seen sending their baggage back through the defiles of Misar, and later in the day the army itself followed, to the great delight of the Mollahs and Imams, who surrounded Hafiz, and fancied that Ibrahim was in full retreat on Aleppo, not daring to encounter the army of his sovereign, Moltke at once perceived that the Egyptians were marching round the left of the Turkish position to place

themselves between Nisib, where the Turks stood, and Bir-adschik, where all their stores and supplies were. He implored Hafiz to retreat to the fortified camp at the last named place, which, being covered on three sides by a bend of the river, would have been of itself impregnable, and not having a bridge in rear would offer no opportunity to the Turkish soldiery of running away. Every man to the last Kurd would have been compelled to fight.' This excellent advice was obstinately rejected; the Mollahs would not hear of a retreat, and Hafiz himself seems to have feared that his whole force would have run away the moment a retrograde movement was commenced; perhaps, too, the secret instructions from Sultan Mahmud compelled him to act as he did.

Whatever the cause or causes may have been, Ibrahim was permitted to effect his turning movement without the slightest interruption, for Moltke could not induce Hafiz to fall upon the Egyptians during their retreat, and on the evening of June 23 the two armies had completely interchanged positions; the Turks now having their front towards Bir-adschik, whilst the Egyptians were drawn up opposite to them, cutting them completely off from their supplies and line of retreat. Both armies had, in fact, lost their lines of communication with their basis; the Egyptians hav ing voluntarily abandoned theirs, which was of the less consequence, as they were altogether without food or stores of any kind, having only one day's bread for the troops. In order to leave nothing untried, Moltke obtained permission to make a night attack on the enemy's en campment with twelve howitzers and a brigade of infantry, and this was carried out successfully. It had, however, no important conse quences; and the next morning, June 24, the battle was fought, or rather the Egyptian artillery opened

a very heavy fire on the Turkish position, at such an enormous distance, 1,800 to 2,000 yards, that the guns had to be laid at a very great elevation, the consequence of which was that the projectiles came down in an iron shower out of the sky; and, after standing this pelting for a couple of hours at the utmost, and making a few feeble efforts to come to close quarters, the whole Turkish army broke and fled in the utmost disorder.

The victorious Egyptians were, however, in equal disorder themselves. After the battle had been decided in their favour, two of their battalions deserted to the beaten Turks, and a number of Egyptian cuirassiers ran away in company with the fugitive Turkish cavalry, which, by the way, having been Europeanised, had become utterly useless; 3,000 Egyptians delivered up their arms to the Turkish guard of the entrenched camp at Bir-adschik, and then escaped across the river Euphrates; 3,000 Turks under Osman Pascha, on hearing the news of defeat at Nisib, threw away their arms and ran away at Gögzin, and 12,000 men of Izzet Pascha's followed their brilliant example eight days later at Derindeh. Ibrahim Pascha remained immovable, and in fact nothing came of the whole campaign. Moltke says: "If diplomatic influences were able to exert so decisive an influence (on the Egyptians) after all the mischief had been done, it is a pity they were not exerted in time to prevent it altogether.'

We must wind up with Moltke's summary of the state of affairs, which, written in 1839, is almost literally applicable at this moment.

The European Cabinets all express a wish to see the Ottoman Empire rendered as strong and vigorous as possible, but each of them understands something very different by this. France seems to think that the best means of affording security

to the East is by making Turkey and Egypt equally strong, pour avoir deux fortes puissances en Orient. This amounts to saying, "If you throw two weights into the political balance, divide them and put one in each scale on the right and the left; the trifle Algeria will have to be taken off one for the sake of equilibrium, sauf l'intégrité de la Porte." England, on the contrary, thinks that the Porte should be assisted in recovering its property, and then its Viceroy in Egypt will not venture to make any difficulties about commercial treaties, railroads, or the like; forgetting altogether that the Sultan lost an army and a fleet in June 1839, and offering the conqueror, as the price of peace, one half of what he possessed before his victory. Russia has no objection to seeing one royal phantom sovereign on the Bosphorus and another on the Nile; it is quite natural that this power should desire to continue the "status quo." Even

Greece, which has home-work enough on its hands, dreams of the restitution of a Byzantine monarchy. Nothing can be done on account of the conflicting interests of the Great Powers.' Since then, however, a new and real Great Power, the Ger man Empire, has been constituted. This, indeed, has made an enor mous difference.

The Prussian officers had been doing a work which was quite as much political and diplomatic as military. They returned to Berlin at the end of 1839. Since then the Crimean war brought French and English troops to Constantinople, and officers of these two nationali.

ties have been employed ever since as instructors. Now we hear that the French and English instructors have been or are to be sent home, and replaced by Prus sians. Field-Marshal Count von Moltke (who was Captain in 1839) may yet revisit the shores of the Bosphorus.