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The opinion of so many intelligent persons, is no doubt entitled to much respect; and would entirely set the question of Contagion, in that sense of the word in which by infection is meant the communication of the disease from one large body to another large body, at rest; were it not counterbalanced by some circumstances of an opposite tendency.-If we believe, as stated by one gentleman, that before the junction of this detachment, the disease had already found its way to several places intermediate between Delhi and Hansi, and Delhi and Kurnaul, we can be at no loss to account for its rise in Camp, without resorting to a belief in Contagion. For, the Camp presented to the Epidemic exactly that face of things, which we know to have been always particularly affected by it; namely, a large body of men collected within a narrow space. We are accordingly told, that previously to the junction of the Meerut Detachment, one or two cases had actually occurred amongst the Camp followers.-Admitting this to have been the case, the certain consequence of the great additional stock of pestilential matter imported from Delhi, would be to aggravate, and widely diffuse the disorder; and the whole mischief might very naturally be placed to the account of the new comers, by persons unaware of its having begun to operate, though in a less degree, previously to their arrival.-However this might have been, there were no grounds for supposing, that, even here, the disease was communicable from person to person; and the medical Officers are unanimously of opinion, that it was certainly not so.
The case of the Central Division is encompassed with still greater difficulties. The main body of this Division crossed the Jumna at Shergurh on the 28th October; and after one or two days halt, marched in a North Westerly direction, towards Loharee, Nuddeeka-gaon, and Terayt.-A detachment, composed of 5 Companies of the 2nd Battalion 13th Regiment Native Infantry, and two Companies of Pioneers, was left behind, in charge of the bridge of boats thrown over the Jumna.-It was here, that the Epidemic first shewed itself. A few cases appeared as early as the 2nd of November, in some troops then passing over; but on the 5th, the disease became common in the Detachment on guard. -On the 9th, this Detachment joined the main body of the Army at Terayt; and it is declared by some of the Medical Officers then on the spot, that during the two immediately subsequent days, the disorder was first observed in Camp. -In support of the opinion, that this Detachment brought the disease into the previously healthy Division, it is added, that the 2d Battalion of the 13th Regiment was brigaded to the left of the 1st Battalion 24th Regiment Native Infantry, and the 1st Battalion of the 24th to the left of the 2nd Battalion 11th Native Infantry; and that the 24th was attacked before the 11th. Lastly, in further proof of the communicativeness of the virus, it is affirmed, that the previously healthy villages, and among other places the town of Sumpter, got the infection from the Division.-This is the amount of facts in favor of the disease being capable of transmission by a large body from an infected, to a distant salubrious atmosphere; and thus communicable by contaminated, to healthy individuals.
It must be confessed, that this evidence is very strong, and would prove quite conclusive of the matter, were it to remain unshaken. But, unfortunately for the hypothesis meant to be established by it, there is hardly one item of it, that is not opposed by circumstances of a contrary tendency.-And, first with regard to the appearance of the disease in the main body of the Division, the testimony of different individuals, is so much at variance, as to be quite irreconcileable. Of twelve Medical Officers, who have given replies to the queries on this point, one states the disorder to have broken out on the 6th; two on the 7th ; one on the 8th; two on the 9th; one on the 10th; four on the 11th; and one on the 12th. This discrepancy, however great, is easily explicable, when the insidious nature of the disease at its first onset is taken into account; and when it is recollected, that the sphere of each individual's observation, would hardly go be.
yond the Battalion, immediately under his charge.-But, how are we to reconcile the assertion of its having appeared on the 6th, 7th, 8th, or even the 9th, with the assumed hypothesis of infection from the Shergurt Detachment.
In like manner, the fact of the Division communicating the virus to the villages lying on its route from Terayt to the Betwah, is equally disputed. It is held by some, that those villages were not at all affected; by others, that they had the disease independently of any intercourse with the Division; and by a third party, that the latter invariably carried the infection along with it.-One gentleman, having several times sent his Native assistants into the district, was uniformly told, that the pestilence was not amongst them.* Another declares, that all the neighbourhood was sickly: the dry and clean town of Sumpter, equally with the low and filthy village of Nuddeegaon. A third, that the Army having on the 13th marched from Terayt to Talgong, the inhabitants of the latter place got the disease the following morning; and a fourth, that Sileia was first affected, on being entered by the Division on the 19th." 143.
In respect to the Meerut detachment communicating the disease to the Hansi force, it is quite ridiculous, when it is admitted that the camp of the latter "presented to the epidemic exactly that face of things which we know to have been always particularly affected by it—a large body of men collected within a narrow space." Add to this, that some cases had occurred before the Meerut division joined the camp of Hansi. Every person of enlightened views will see that the congregation of troops did not bring “additional stock of pestilential matter" from Delhi; but produced additional pabulum for the epidemic or endemic cause to work upon. As to the centre division, the accounts contradict each other; and if they were all accordant, it amounts only to the exploded and fallacious doctrine of post hoc ergo propter hoc. Two days after a detachment joins an army, the disease appears in that army! How often has this kind of argument been rendered futile in Europe during the present epidemic!
It has been observed in this country that persons coming to visit their relatives or friends dead or dying from the malady, have in several instances been themselves cut off. To a superficial examiner this might appear strong evidence in favour of contagion. But then it must be remembered, that these persons expose themselves to the epidemic and endemic influence, whatever it may be; and, in the latter instance, have superadded to this the predisposing causes of fear, fatigue, dejection. If a person, after visiting a place where cholera is, were not only to have the disease himself, but if, on his return, his fellow townsmen also were infected, then indeed all must own that a case in favour of contagion was made out. But how seldom has this been done? under our own eyes, never. Many assertions of this kind have been made, but when properly sifted, they have proved mere dust, fitter to blind than to clear our view.
"Under such extreme contrariety of testimony, it would be vain to attempt drawing any certain conclusion. This much, however, may be affirmed, from a review of the whole progress of the epidemic in this quarter, that the infectious medium, in whatever it consisted, was confined within a very circumscribed circle;
"Col. Philpot's official reports state positively, that the thinly scattered villages on the route of his march remained unaffected; while his detachment was suffering very severely."
and was very slowly extended to healthy parts of the atmosphere.—If, setting aside the circumstances militating against it, we take it for granted, that the infection was truly received by the Centre and Hansi Divisions from the Detachments above-mentioned, we must believe, that the disorder, although not communicable by contact from person to person, was so from one large body to auother large body; and that, wherever the poison got head amongst a number of men, it assumed some new quality, so as, when mixed with the atmosphere, to become infectious.-What constituted this additional quality, we cannot pretend to determine; but, in support of its existence, we may quote the predilection of the epidemic for cities and camps; the infection of the Left Division and the Nagpore, and Meerut Troops, immediately after entering into the diseased medium at Jubbulpore, Nagpore, and Delhi, and the similar case of the troops and followers in attendance upon the Governor General, being attacked shortly after communicating with an infected village, in the Gorruck pore district.To the same account may be placed, the progressive march of the disorder from one part of an infected place to another; as in the Centre and Hansi Divisions; and more particularly the Rajpootana Force, in which the virus seemed to be regularly propagated from Corps to Corps.* In some instances, the suffering body would appear to have sickened immediately upon coming into the poisonous medium; as was the case with the Nagpore Troops, who were affected on the very day in which they encamped at the infected village of Gaongong.-But, more frequently one or two days would seem to have been requisite to bring the virus into action. Thus the Meerut Detachment entered Delhi on the 29th, and was not affected till the 31st; thus too, the Hansi Troops had not the disease till the 6th, the day after the junction of that Detachment.-Again, by those abetting the opinion of the disorder being communicated to the Centre Division by the Shergur Detachment, it is stated that the first cases occurred on the 11th, two days after its junction. Lastly, the followers of the troops in personal attendance upon the Governor General in April, first suffered on the 23d, three days after encamping near an infected village." 146.
This closes the section on contagion, and with it is almost terminated this article. With regard to contagion, we may say, as the Board say on another occasion, that the proofs in favour of it in fact amount to nothing, certainly to nothing satisfactory or decisive. That they frequently are calculated to breed suspicion, we freely allow, and they check the precipitancy of those who unhesitatingly declare that cholera is under no circumstances contagious. That contagion can be generated under certain conditions, we firmly believe; but what these are, we do not precisely know. That filth and crowding can call it into life, is probable enough, but whether other circum
"The line of this Force faced nearly North and by East. The troops were arranged in the following order, commencing from the left. The 1st Battalion 28th Native Infantry: 6th and 7th Companies Pioneers; Goolundaz and Gun Lascars; the Park in the Centre; 5 Companies 1st Battalion European Artillery; 1st Battalion 27th Native Infantry; Squadron 2d Regiment Cavalry; 2d Local Cavalry; in the rear of the Park were 415 Ordnance Drivers, with lines of Officers' tents intervening. The 1st Battalion 28th and Goolundaz were attacked on the 14th September; on the 15th a few cases occurred amongst the Pioneers and Lascars; but among them and the Gunner Drivers they were not numerous till the 19th. On the 18th the Squadron of Cavalry was attacked; and on the 20th, the Local Cavalry, and 1st Battalion 27th N. I. It must, however, be remembered, that the ground was drier on the right, than on the left of the line."
stances and what, can do the same, we feel ourselves unable to determine. Perhaps at some future period, when party spirit has declined, when more facts are before the world, and a calmer and more impartial consideration of them is adopted, the obscurity that veils this subject may be dispelled, or at all events diminished. Till then we adhere to contingent contagion, the safest, most philosophic tenet, as squaring with most facts, and now the most prevailing opinion.
Passing over the section on the predisposing and exciting causes, which contains nothing remarkable, we shall linger for a moment at that which tells of the mortality caused by the disease in Bengal. It appears that the accounts of the mortality in the towns and villages are not to be relied on. In addition to those sources of delusion which European communities have displayed, there were many of native growth, which we need not stop to mention. We shall confine the few extracts we intend to make, to those which give us information which deserves to be depended on. It appears that, in Bengal, males were liable in a greater proportion than females, whilst children and infants almost escaped. In this country, women have suffered more than men, and children in a greater proportion than in India. In Paris it has been different. After displaying the reputed and computed mortality in different cities and districts of Bengal, a mortality that makes a very formidable appearance, being formed of liberal allowances of sums of 10,000, 8,000, and so on, the Board state the ascertained loss in the army. Even here it is probable than inaccuracies have occurred, but they are not to be looked on as invalidating the returns.
"Let us next examine the amount of the loss sustained in the different Corps of the Army. In the Centre Division the mortality was, on conjecture, variously calculated at five, eight, and twelve thousand.-The truth is, that in all cases, it is next to impossible to compute correctly the exact amount of the vast variety of persons, constituting the class of Camp followers with an Indian Army; and amid the confusion and desertion occurring in the Centre Division during the sickly period, even had its original strength in numbers been known, the real extent of its loss could hardly have been ascertained. The mortality was undoubtedly greatest from the 14th to the 19th of November; and it was calculated, that, at the very least, five thousand of all classes perished during these five days. The armed force consisted of 3,500 Europeans, and 8,000 Natives. Of the former, 230, and of the latter 534, died. The average loss of each Battalion was computed at 50 men; but this is mere conjecture, as no accurate returns were obtained. In some Corps the number attacked was very great. Thus the 1st Battalion 8th Native Infantry had 350 seizures, and 40 deaths; and the 3d Regiment Cavalry 154, and 18 deaths. In the 2d Battalion 1st Regiment Native Infantry, 48 Sepoys, and 25 followers died, between the 10th and 26th. From the 2d Battalion 11th Regiment Native Infantry, 268 cases were admitted, of whom 43 died.—In the Rocket Troop, 27 Europeans, of whom one only died; and 87 Natives, of whom 18 died. Of 2,000 of all classes, attached to the King's 67th Regiment of Foot, 90 died. The mortality amongst a given number seized, varied, according to the difference in the period, and in the class of the individuals attacked. From the 10th to the 15th, it did not exceed one in eight; and was then chiefly confined to the bearers and other descriptions of Camp followers; from the 15th to the 19th, it increased to one in three and a half, and then occurred, principally amongst the Europeans and Sepoys; and from the 22d, to the 30th, it decreased greatly. We have said, that the disease was at its height on the 18th. Of the 2d Battalion 11th Native Infantry, 56 Sepoys were admitted on that day; from 20 to 30 on each succeeding day to the 22d, and from
thence to the end of the month only 20 in all. Of the European Artillery, the average of deaths was one fourth; of Golundaz, rather more than a fifth; of gun lascars, less than a fifth; of drivers a third; and of Magazine men, a half. Of the Natives, the two former classes are chiefly Moossulmans, the two latter Hindoos. The great mortality amongst Europeans may be ascribed to their constitutions having been previously debilitated by irregular modes of living, and uncongenial climate; to the comparative severity of the attack, and greater struggle in a plethoric habit and muscular frame. Women were equally with men obnoxious to the disease; and died in a like proportion. Thus of 268 females attacked, 43, or one-sixth died. It was observed, that concubines and prostitutes suffered in a larger proportion than other descriptions of women: probably from their dissipated habits, and precarious mode of life.
The mortality in the Hansi Force was very inconsiderable. Not more than 271 persons in all were seized; of whom 51, or one in five and a half perished. Of these a large proportion was Sepoys; of whom 126 were attacked, and 27, or rather more than a fifth, died. The majority of deaths occurred in the early part of the disease; when it was more virulent than afterwards. Six Europeans only were attacked, of whom one died.
In the Rajpootana Force, which in fighting men and followers amounted perhaps to 15,000, the mortality was greater. The armed part of the Force consisted of 96 Europeans, (Officers not included) and 4,100 Natives; of whom 292 were admitted, and 122, nearly one half, died. The different Corps were variously affected. Of the European Artillery, only 3 were seized: all of whom recovered. Of the Goolundaz 240 in number, 6 sickened, and 2 died; of 250 Gun lascars, 21, of whom 12 died; of 392 Ordnance Drivers, 44, of whom 17 died; of 294 Pioneers, 53, of whom 23 died: Of the 2d Cavalry, 600 strong, 8, of whom 2 died; of the 2d Local Cavalry, 720 strong, 4, of whom 2 died; of 5 Companies 1st Battalion 27th Regiment, 18, of whom 7 died; of the 1st Battalion 28th Regiment, 944 strong, 135, of whom 57 died; and of 2d Battalion 19th Regiment, 887 strong, 3, of whom none died. Of 75 Camp followers who took medicine, 15 died. Here Europeans were slightly affected, and the lower classes suffered most. This was not uniformly the case; for according to one statement, the Sepoys suffered more than the camp followers in the 1st Battalion 28th Regiment. By this account, the strength of the Battalion is stated at 1,004; of whom fell ill 144, and died 60; whilst of 513 Camp followers, 35 only were seized, and 14 died: the casualties among the Sepoys being in double proportion to those of the followers. The Battalion consisted of 878 Hindoos, and 126 Mussulmen; of the former, three fifths were Bramins and Rajpoots; the remainder of low cast-57 Bramins were taken ill, and 30 died; Rajpoots, 47, and 16 died; low casts, 21, and 9 died: or of the whole affected, a little more than one half. Of the Mahometans, 19 were seized, and 5, or one fourth, died. So that the disease was more fatal to Bramins than to Rajpoots; to Rajpoots than to the lower casts; and to Mussulmans the least so of all. It was most destructive from the 14th to the 22d September; of 108 admitted from this Rattalion in the 1st week of its visit, 51 died; after which the average was about one fourth.
In the Left Division, of 8,500 fighting men, 125 cases occurred, of whom 49, more than a third, died; 30 in April, 18 in May, and 1 in June. Here the disease equally attacked Hindoos and Mussulmans of all orders: Drivers, Lascars, Bearers, Grooms, and Grasscutters, not being more liable than the regular troops. Children were peculiarly exempt; females not. The mortality was greatest from the 10th to the 21st April.
In the Nagpore Force, from the 31st May to the 15th June, of about 4,000 regular troops, 13 Europeans were seized, of whom 6 died; 211 Sepoys, of whom 29, or one seventh, died. The mortality was greatest, perhaps two thirds, at first. The Camp followers were affected very severely; grooms more so than