XLVII. These resolutions proposed a national Legislature, to con- CHAPTER sist of two branches, the members of the first branch to be chosen by the people, and to be apportioned to the 1787. states in the ratio of free population or taxes; those of the second branch to be selected by the first branch, out of candidates nominated by the state Legislatures. A separate national executive was proposed, to be chosen by the national Legislature; also a national judiciary; and a council of revision, to consist of the executive and a part of the judiciary, with a qualified negative on every act of legislation, state as well as national. These resolutions of Randolph's, known as the "Virginia plan," were referred to a committee of the whole, as was a sketch submitted by Charles Pinckney, which, in its form and arrangement, seems to have furnished the outline of the Constitution as ultimately adopted. That, however, which is printed as Pinckney's sketch, contains many things which could hardly have been found in the original draft-interpolations, probably, from the subsequent proceedings of the Convention. At the very threshold of debate an important question arose, and at every step it threatened to recur, What was the limit of the powers of the Convention? Could the amendment of the Articles of Confederation be carried so far as to establish an entirely new system? The delegates from the small states saw, or thought they saw, in the establishment of a strong national government, the speedy downfall of state sovereignty. They argued that, by the very terms of its appointment, the authority of the Convention was limited to amendment, without the power so to alter as, in fact, to destroy the existing system. The answer was, that one of Randolph's resolutions proposed to submit whatever might be now agreed upon to the sanction and approval of conventions CHAPTER to be specially called for that purpose by the Legislatures XLVII. of the respective states; and that hence this question of 1787. authority was of little consequence, and ought not to deter the Convention from proposing a plan fully adequate to existing difficulties. Other questions, intimately connected with the preceding, related to the ratio of representation and the rule of voting in the national Legislature, whether it should be by states or by the individual members. The small states desired to retain that equal vote which, under the Confederation, they already possessed-a point, indeed, which the members from Delaware had express instructions not to yield. The larger states, on the other hand, were firmly resolved to secure to themselves, under the new arrangement, a weight proportionate to their superior wealth and numbers. During the discussion of Randolph's resolutions in Committee of the Whole, deep differences of opinion became manifest upon these points. The plan, however, of a national government, based upon proportionate representation, was supported by a majority of the states present. The party of the smaller states, or what may be called the State Rights party, included the delegates from Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, and a majority of those from Maryland and New York. The party of the larger states, or National party, included not only the delegates from Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, but also those from the two Carolinas and Georgia, states which anticipated a very rapid increase of population. Indeed, they flattered themselves with the idea of having, within no very distant period, a greater number of people than all the rest of the Union together. North Carolina, it should be recollected, included the present state of Tennessee, and Georgia the present states of Alabama and XLVII. Mississippi-vast tracts, of which the settlement had CHAPTER hardly begun. The states thus stood six for the national view to five for the state rights view. Under this as- 1787. pect, the absence of Rhode Island and New Hampshire was a very fortunate circumstance. Had they been present to side with the small states, the adoption of any truly national plan of government would have been rendered very difficult, if not impossible. This party division of large and small states, involving the question of a national, self-acting central government, or of a mere confederation, lay at the bottom of all the earlier discussions in the Convention; but on collateral questions, the delegates, as we shall see, were more or less influenced by other considerations. The election by the people of the first branch of the national Legislature was opposed by Sherman, who thought the less the people had to do immediately about the government the better. He was very warmly supported by Gerry, to whose confidence in the people the late rebellion of Shays had given a severe shock. "All the evils we experience," said Gerry, "flow from excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In Massachusetts they are daily misled into the most baleful measures and opinions. He had been too republican heretofore, but had been taught by experience the danger of a leveling spirit." The South Carolina delegates esteemed a choice by the people impracticable in a scattered population. Wilson, Madison, and Mason argued very ably that no republican government could stand without popular confidence, which confidence could only be secured by giving to the people the election of one branch of the Legislature. Gerry's colleagues went against him, and the election by the people was carried; New Jersey and South Carolina against it, Connecticut and Delaware divided. CHAPTER On the question of the time for which the members of this first branch should be elected, there seemed to be a 1787. change of sides. Sherman moved one year, and Gerry strenuously supported it. Madison proposed three years, and that term was agreed to; Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the two Carolinas against it. The term of seven years for the members of the second branch of the national Legislature was earnestly urged by Madison and Randolph. "The democratic licentious ness of the state Legislatures prove," said Randolph, “the necessity of a firm Senate." Sherman thought the term of seven years too long. If the members did well, they would be re-elected; if not, the sooner they were got rid of the better. Seven years was agreed to; Connecticut against it, Massachusetts and New York divided. How the members of this second branch should be chosen was a point still more warmly discussed. Wilson was zealous for their election by the people, but only Pennsylvania supported him. Read proposed their appointment by the executive out of candidates to be nominated by the state Legislatures, but this motion was not seconded. Dickinson, supported by the smaller states, insisted upon the election of the members of the second branch by the state Legislatures, and that point, after considerable opposition, was at length conceded. But the national party steadily refused to yield what the smaller states still more earnestly demanded, an equality of representation in this second branch. It was carried, six states to five, that the same ratio of representation should prevail in both branches. By what should that ratio be determined? Sherman suggested the number of free inhabitants. Rutledge and Butler, of South Carolina, insisting that money was power, proposed that representation should be in proportion XLVII. to rates of contribution. But if the revenue, or a part CHAPTER of it, were raised by duties on imports, how were rates of contribution to be determined? Wilson suggested 1787. the ratio recommended by Congress as an amendment to the Articles of Confederation on the subject of rates of contribution, and already assented to by eleven states -the number of free citizens and three fifths of all other persons. This was opposed by Gerry, on the ground that persons, and not property, ought to be the basis of representation; but it passed, only New Jersey and Delaware voting against it. The constitution of the Legislature being disposed of, attention was turned to the executive. Should it consist of one person or of several ? Some hesitation appeared at expressing an opinion on this point, the members looking round at each other before venturing to avow themselves. At length Wilson moved that it be composed of a single person. This motion was zealously supported by C. Pinckney, Rutledge, and Gerry. Randolph opposed it violently. He denounced unity in the executive office as "the fœtus of monarchy." It was carried, however; New York, Delaware, and Maryland in the negative. Wilson then proposed, not without expressing some apprehensions that his opinion on that point might be thought chimerical, the election of the national executive directly by the people. Sherman proposed an election by the Legislature, and an executive completely dependent upon it. Mason inclined to favor an election by the people, but thought it impracticable. Wilson then proposed a college of electors, to be chosen by the people, the states to be divided into districts for that purpose. Gerry inclined to this plan, but feared it would alarm the partisans of state rights. Only Maryland and Pennsylvania |