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On motion of Ellsworth, "government of the United CHAPTER States" was substituted instead of "national government;" but this change of phraseology, designed to grat- 1787. ify the smaller states, did not touch the great question of the degree of power which the states were to possess under the new system; how far they were to control it, and how far they were to be controlled by it. The principal item of this question was the ratio of representation in the national Legislature; and the discussion on that point was again renewed with great ardor, and even acrimony. Alarmed at the state of feeling thus exhibited, Franklin sought to allay the rising storm by an appeal to religious ideas. He moved that a chaplain be appointed, and that prayers be read in the Convention. The motion, however, was evaded by an adjournment. It was feared, according to Madison, lest prayers for the first time, at that late day, might alarm the public, by giving an impression that matters were already desperate. After a very warm debate, in which Martin took the lead for the State Rights party, a proportional representation in the first branch of the Legislature was retained by the same vote as before, except that Maryland was now divided. Defeated on this point, the State Rights party bent all their energy to secure an equality of votes in the second branch. Ellsworth strenuously urged it, as a compromise between the large and small states; but, after an energetic debate, his motion to that effect was lost by a tie vote, Maryland going with the State Rights party, Georgia divided. The excitement was now so great, and the delegates of the State Rights party were so totally dissatisfied, that the Convention seemed in danger of breaking up or splitting. As a last resource, Sherman proposed, and the Convention appointed, a grand committee of conference of one member from each state; and July 2.

CHAPTER to give time for consultation, and opportunity to celebrate XLVIL the anniversary of independence, the Convention adjourn

1787. ed over for three days.

In the Committee of Conference, Franklin proposed, and this proposition was reluctantly submitted to by the other members from the larger states, that while in the first branch of the national Legislature there should be one representative for every forty thousand persons (according to the three fifths ratio), in the other branch the states should be equally represented; all money bills to originate with the first branch.

This report was received by the State Rights party July 5. with great exultation as a decided triumph. The more zealous of the National party were not a little mortified, and some very warm discussion ensued as to the equal vote in the second branch. But attention was soon drawn off to that part of the report which related to the ratio of representation in the first branch-a topic, in the consideration of which new questions arose, leading to new combinations, and new conflicts of interest and opinion. Should the number of representatives from each state be fixed, or should it vary with the changing condition of the states? If new states were admitted, ought they to come in on an equal footing, or should the original states secure for themselves a permanent majority? Ought wealth to be represented? if so, in what way? Of how many representatives should the first branch consist, and how should they be distributed at the first organization? These questions developed a Northern and a Southern party; the southern states, by reason of their negroes and staple products, being esteemed the wealthier portion of the Union, and, judging from the experience of the last fifty years, the most likely to increase rapidly in population.

The number and apportionment of the members of the

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first branch being referred to a select committee of five, CHAPTER that committee reported a House of fifty-six members, distributed among the states according to an estimate 1787. of wealth and population combined; the future distribution to be regulated by the Legislature on the principle of wealth and numbers. Fifty-six members were deemed too few; nor was the particular distribution satisfactory. This part of the report was referred to a new committee, which proposed that temporary apportion- July 10. ment ultimately introduced into the Constitution, Virginia being allowed ten members, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania eight each, New York and Maryland six each, Connecticut and the two Carolinas five each, New Jersey four, New Hampshire and Georgia three each, Rhode Island and Delaware one each, making a House of sixty-five members.

What should be the rule of apportionment in future was not so easily settled. Patterson considered a mere reference to wealth and numbers too vague. He could regard negro slaves in no light but as property. "Has a man in Virginia a number of votes in proportion to the number of his slaves? If negroes are not represented in the states to which they belong, why should they be represented in the general government? What is the true principle of representation? It is an expedient by which an assembly of certain individuals chosen by the people is substituted in place of the inconvenient meeting of the people themselves. If such a meeting of the people were actually to take place, would the slaves vote? Why, then, should they be represented? He was against such an indirect encouragement of the slave trade. Congress, in their act concerning quotas, had been ashamed to use the word slaves,' and had substituted a description." Admitting the soundness of this general doctrine, MadiIII.-I I

6

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CHAPTER son contended that it ought forever to silence the pretensions of the smaller states to an equal vote in either 1787. branch. He suggested that in the first branch the number of free inhabitants might determine the number of representatives, while the second branch, which had for one of its primary objects the guardianship of property, might be based on the whole number, slaves included.

King had always expected that, as the southern states were the richest, they would not league themselves with the northern states unless some respect were paid to their superior wealth. "If the northern states expect those preferential distinctions in commerce, and other advantages which they will derive from the connection, they must be ready to allow some advantages in return. Eleven out of the thirteen states have agreed to consider slaves in the apportionment of taxation, and taxation and representation ought to go together."

Gouverneur Morris expressed great apprehensions of new states to be formed in the West; and for the avowed purpose of putting it into the power of the old states to maintain their political preponderancy, he proposed to leave the future apportionment of members of the first branch to the discretion of the Legislature. Rutledge concurred with him; but Randolph, Mason, and Wilson objected that this would put the majority into the power of the minority. Unless some precise provision were made beforehand, it would be difficult or impossible to bring about a periodical apportionment. If new states were admitted, they must come in on an equality with the old ones. Randolph therefore proposed that future apportionments should be regulated by a periodical census. Williamson moved, as a substitute, to reckon in this census the whole number of freemen, and three fifths of all others. Butler and C. C. Pinckney insisted, on the other hand, that

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all the slaves ought to be counted. Gerry thought that, CHAPTER to say the least, three fifths were quite enough. Gorham supported the proposition of Williamson as most 1787. fairly representing, on the whole, the relative wealth of the states, Congress having recommended it, on that very account, as the basis of state quotas. The southern states had opposed that basis on the ground that three freemen were superior in productive power to five slaves.; but now, on this question of representation, they argued that slaves were quite as productive as freemen. Williamson reminded Gorham that when the matter was debated in Congress, the question then being a question of taxation, the delegates from the northern states argued so too. But neither then nor now did he concur with either extreme; he approved the three fifths ratio then, and he approved it still. Butler insisted that the labor of a slave in South Carolina was as productive and valuable as that of a freeman in Massachusetts; that, as wealth was the great means of defense and utility to the nation, slaves were equally valuable to it with freemen; and that an equal representation ought to be allowed for them in a government instituted principally for the protection of property, and itself to be supported by property." Mason remarked that slaves raised the value of land, and increased the exports and imports. Being thus useful to the community, they ought not to be excluded from the estimate of representation. But he did not think them equal to freemen, and could not vote for them as such. Gouverneur Morris, though a great stickler for the representation of property, strongly opposed, and for that very reason, the three fifths clause. He denounced it as "an encouragement to the slave trade, and an injustice to human nature;" but to protect the rights of human nature was not his chief anxiety. By the ap