danger is willingly conceded to those who choose to take the lead, and the proportionate aid to be given by each party becomes at length so nicely balanced, that the common cause is often sacrificed to vain distinctions and distrustful timidity. Such was the situation of the Spanish general Cardona and of Lorenzo de' Medici at Piacenza; where, whilst each of them stimulated the other to pass the Po to the aid of the Swiss, neither of them could be prevailed upon to take the first step for that purpose. In exculpation, however, of the Spaniards, it is alleged that Cinthio da Tivoli, the envoy of the pope to Francis I., having been seized upon by the Spanish troops, was compelled to disclose the purpose of his mission, in consequence of which Cardona lost all further confidence in the aid of the papal troops; and to this it is added, that Lorenzo had himself secretly despatched a messenger to the king, to assure him, that in opposing his arms he had no other motive than that of obedience to the commands of the papal see, and that he should avail himself of every opportunity, consistently with his own honour, of showing him how sincerely he was attached to his interests. The concurring testimony of the historians of these times may be admitted as evidence of facts, which the temporising course of conduct adopted by the pope on this occasion renders highly probable. But it is equally probable that Cardona availed himself of these circumstances as his justification for not doing that which he would equally have declined doing had they never occurred. Ferdinand of Aragon was at least as indecisive as the pontiff, and Cardona well knew the disposition of his sovereign. Day after day was appointed for the passage of the Po, and a part of the Spanish army had at one time made a movement for that purpose, but a pretext was easily found for their retreat; and the Swiss, deserted by those allies who had called for their aid, were left, almost alone, to support a contest which was to decide the fate of Milan, and perhaps the independence of Italy.

At the conclusion of one of those inflammatory exhortations with which the cardinal of Sion was accustomed to harangue his countrymen, the resolution was adopted instantly to attack the French, although only about two hours of day-light remained. By a rapid and unexpected march the whole body of the Swiss presented themselves before the French encampments at

Marignano, on the thirteenth day of September, 1515. The attack immediately commenced. Their impetuosity was irresistible. The intrenchments were soon carried, and a part of the artillery was already in the hands of the assailants. As the French recovered from their surprise, they began to make head against their adversaries, and the horse joining in the action, a dreadful engagement took place, which continued with various success and great slaughter to a late hour of the night. During this contest Francis was in the midst of the battle and received several wounds. The bandes noires, whom the Swiss had threatened with total extermination, contributed with the French Gendarmerie to retrieve the loss. The darkness of the night, although it did not terminate the contest, rendered it for a time impossible for the combatants to proceed in the work of destruction; and an involuntary truce of some hours took place, during which both parties kept the field, impatiently waiting for that light which might enable them to renew the engagement. Accordingly, with the dawn of day the battle again commenced, when it appeared that the French monarch had availed himself of this interval to arrange his artillery, and to reduce his troops into better order than when they had been attacked on the preceding day. The vanguard was now led by the Sieur de Palisse with seven hundred lances and ten thousand German infantry. The body of the army under the royal standard was commanded by the king, and consisted of eight hundred men at arms, ten thousand Germans, five thousand Gascons, and a large train of artillery directed by the duke of Bourbon. Trivulzio led the corps de reserve, which consisted of five hundred lances and five thousand Italian infantry. The light infantry, under the command of the Sieur de Chita and the bastard of Savoy, brother of the king, were ordered to act as circumstances might require.* The attack of the Swiss was now supported with unshaken firmness. A detachment which was intended to surprise the right wing of the French army was intercepted by the duke of Alençon, and pursued by the Basque infantry of Pietro Navarro, who put every man to the sword. After having resisted the charge, the French became the assailants. Francis at the head of his Gendarmes

* Murat. Ann. vol. x. p. 116.

+ Planta's Helv. Confed. vol. ii.

first made an impression on their line; but the numbers of the Swiss were so great, and their courage and discipline so exemplary, that he would in all probability have been repulsed, had not D'Alviano at that moment rushed into the midst of the combat, at the head of a small but select and intrepid body of cavalry, and by the cry of Marco, the war signal of the Venetians, given new courage to the French and dispirited the ranks of their adversaries, who conceived that the Venetian army had at this juncture joined in the engagement. After sustaining the contest for several hours, the Swiss were obliged to relinquish the palm of victory; but even under these circumstances they had the firmness and resolution to form in regular order, and to quit the scene of action under such discipline, that the French monarch, whose army was exhausted by watchfulness and fatigue, did not venture on a pursuit. Weakened by intestine divisions, deserted by their allies, and defeated by the French, they hastened to Milan, where they demanded from the duke such subsidies as they knew he was wholly unable to pay. This, however, afforded them a sufficient pretext for withdrawing themselves altogether from the theatre of war, and leaving their Italian allies to the mercy of the conquering army.*

The battle of Marignano is justly considered by both the French and Italian historians as highly honourable to the gallantry and prowess of the French arms." The example of Francis I., who had in the course of the conflict repeatedly extricated himself from situations of imminent danger by his own personal courage, had animated his soldiers to the most daring acts of heroism; insomuch that Trivulzio, who had before been engaged in no less than eighteen important battles, declared that they resembled only the sports of children in comparison with this, which might truly be called a war of giants. The chevalier Bayard fought at the side of his sovereign, where he gave such proofs of romantic courage, that Francis, immediately after the engagement, insisted on being knighted by him upon. the field of battle. The ceremony was instantly performed in the true spirit of chivalry, and Bayard, making two leaps, returned his sword into the scabbard, vowing never more to

* Guicciard. lib. xii.

unsheath it except against the Turks, the Saracens, and the Moors. This victory is chiefly to be attributed to the superiority of the French artillery; but the arrival of D'Alviano, although accompanied by so small a body of soldiers, undoubtedly contributed to the success of the day. The number of Swiss left dead on the field is stated by different historians at eight, ten, fourteen, and even fifteen thousand; whilst the loss of the French varies from three to six thousand, among whom, however, were many of the chief nobility of France. On this spot, polluted with carnage, Francis gave orders that three solemn masses should be performed; one to return thanks to God for the victory, another for the souls of those who were slain in battle, and a third to supplicate the restoration of peace. He also directed that a chapel should be built adjacent to the field of battle, as a testimony of his gratitude, and a permanent memorial of his success.

No sooner was the event of the battle of Marignano known at Milan, than the duke Maximilian Sforza, accompanied by his general, Giovanni Gonzaga, and his chancellor and confidential adviser, Morone, shut himself up in the castle, which was strongly fortified and garrisoned by a considerable body of Swiss, Italian, and Spanish soldiers. The inhabitants of Milan, deprived of all means of defence, sent deputies to the king to testify their entire submission to his authority; but Francis refused to enter the city, conceiving that it would be derogatory from his honour to take up his residence in a place, the fortress of which was yet held by his enemies. Operations <were therefore instantly commenced against the castle, under the directions of Pietro Navarro, who promised to reduce it in less than a month; but although he was successful in destroying a part of the fortifications, it is probable that the task which he had undertaken would have required considerable time, had not the assailants found means to open a negotiation with the principal advisers of the duke. "Influenced by the treacherous recommendation, or the dastardly apprehensions of Morone, the duke was induced to listen to terms of accommodation, by which he agreed, not only to surrender the fortress of Milan, and that of Cremona, which was yet held by his

* Moreri, Dict. Hist. art. Bayard.

7

friends, but also to relinquish for ever the sovereignty of Milan and its dependent states. As a compensation for these concessions, Francis agreed to use his influence with the pope to appoint Maximilian a cardinal, with ecclesiastical preferments and benefices to the annual amount of thirty-six thousand livres, promising to pay him in the mean time a pension to the like amount, and also to advance him, within the space of two years, ninety-four thousand livres, to be disposed of at his own pleasure. A provision was also made for the other members of the house of Sforza, and Morone, who negotiated the treaty, stipulated that he should himself enjoy the rank of a senator of Milan, with the office of master of requests of the hotel to the king. Thus terminated the brief government of Maximilian Sforza; without his having, by his misfortunes, excited in others the sensations of sympathy or regret which usually accompany those who suddenly fall from high rank into the mediocrity of private life. The only observation recorded of him upon this occasion, is an expression of his satisfaction on being at length freed from the tyranny of the Swiss, the persecution of the emperor elect, and the deceit of Ferdinand of Aragon; a remark which is no proof of that want of intellect which has been imputed to him, but which, on the contrary, shows that he had compared the advantages of sovereignty with the inconveniences and dangers that attend it, and had reconciled himself to that destiny which it was no longer in his power to resist.

The cautious pontiff, who had waited only to observe from what quarter the wind of fortune would blow, no sooner found that the French monarch had defeated the Swiss, and subjugated the state of Milan, than he exerted all the means in his power to obtain the favour and secure the alliance of the conqueror. Had he stood in need of an apology to his allies for this apparent versatility, he might have found it in the temporising negotiations of the Swiss before the engagement, and their speedy desertion after it; in the hesitating conduct of the viceroy Cardona, and the total inattention of the emperor elect to the interests of the league; but it is probable that he was much more anxious to excuse himself to the king for the apparent opposition which he had manifested to his views, than to his allies for his dereliction of a cause which was now become