As every thing which proceeded from the pen of that illus trious scholar Sir W. Jones must be interesting to our readers, we shall make no apology for presenting them with a letter written by him: "University College, Oxford, 3d January 1771. "It makes me very happy to hear, that my Lord Chief Justice retires from a motive that does him the highest honour. He will now enjoy the greatest happiness of human life, ease with dignity, after having passed through the most honourable labours without danger. I should think myself highly blessed, if I could pursue a similar course in my small sphere, and after having raised a competency at the Bar, could retire to the bowers of learning and the arts. "I have just begun to contemplate the stately edifice of the Laws of England, The gathered wisdom of a thousand years," If you will allow me to parody a line of Pope. I do not see why the study of the Law is called dry and unpleasant, and I very much suspect that it seems so to those only who would think any study unpleasant, which required a great application of the mind and exertion of the memory. I have read most attentively the two first volumes of Blackstone's Commentaries, and the two others will require much less attention. I am much pleased with the care he takes to quote his authorities in the margin, which not only give a sanction to what he asserts, bat point out the sources to which the student may apply for more diffusive knowledge. I have opened two com mon-place books, one of law, and the other of oratory; which is surely too much neglected by our modern speakers. I do not mean the popular eloquence which cannot be tolerated at the bar, but that correctness of style and elegance of method, which at once pleases and persuades the hearer. But I must lay aside my studies for about six weeks, while I am printing my grammar, from which a great deal is expected, and which I must endeavour to make as perfect as a human work can be. When that is finished, I shall attend the court of King's Bench very constantly, and shall either take a lodging in Westminster, or accept the invitation of a friend in Duke-street, who has made me an obliging offer of apartments. He has two nephews at Westminster-school, and by helping them now and then. in their exercises, I shall find an agreeable relaxation from severe studies. "On one of the Indian pictures that I saw at your house, there was a beautiful copy of Persian verses, which I will beg leave to transcribe, and should be glad to print it with a translation in the appendix of my grammar. I have not yet had my Persian proposals engraved, but when you write to your brother, you would much oblige me, if you would desire him to send me a little Persian manu script, if he can procure it without much trouble. It is a small poem which I wish to print. I have inclosed its full title in Persian and English. " W. JONES." We We shall close our extracts from this interesting publication, with the insertion of a few lines addressed to another of Sir Eardley's sons: "I am sorry for your own sake to hear you find a want of that moderation and constancy of mind, which alone enable a man to go through life with credit and comfort. "I am am very sensible that parts and spirits and natural abilities, and that elevation of soul, which unites humility and supereminent greatness together, are in the power of no man. cula divinæ auræ," perhaps infused by God, when he first animates They are "parti. the clay; and their effulgent brightness is visible to every discerning eye, whether it irradiate a prince or a beggar: but moderation is a virtue in every body's reach, and a very loose philosophical regimen is sure of bringing a cure along with it. I wish you would more particularly disclose in what instance you feel the want of it, and I will assume the office of a physician for the soul, and prescribe some of that medicine which I took from Plato when I was at the University. "Constancy, in my dictionary, is steadiness and perseverance in a resolution once rightly taken. What can be the difficulty of whipping all seducing, straggling thoughts out of the mind, intruding upon a man's own happiness? For if the resolution be rightly taken, your own felicity is the object of it; if it be not rightly taken, the sooner it is broken, the better. But remember, that to be humble is to be great, to be contented is to be wise, and to subdue the passions is to be good; and that habit is the best and surest friend to forward you towards the attainment of those great blessings. Read Longi nus again in Greek, in Latin, French, and English: Rouse up all your faculties, and let your soul out to strive for the prize in the tilts and tournaments of literate glory: throw off all your chains, and struggle, without intermission, for that dominion over yourself, which will do honour to my memory when I ecase to be "Your affectionate father." This great and good man died on the 5th February 1792, aged 82. After these ample quotations, we need scarcely add that we have perused the whole memoir with unfeigned pleasure, and recommend it with perfect confidence to the attention of our readers. We now come to the volume containing the Judgements and Opinions which are seventeen in number; we shall make extracts from those in which the topic discussed is of an interesting nature, and shall satisfy ourselves with stating the subjects of the remainder.—The first case is that of the Attorney-General against Lady Downing and others in Chancery, and arose on the will of Sir George Downing, which vested certain estates in trustees for the purpose of erecting a college to be called Downing College. The questions considered by the chief 8 justice justice on this will were, whether the trusts created by it were illegal and void; and, if not illegal and void, whether a court of equity cught to aid and assist their execution;--and lastly, supposing the trusts illegal and void, or of such a nature as not fit to be carried into execution by a court of equity, this court will apply the estate to some other charity ejusdem generis. The doctrine laid down under this last head of argument is curious, and illustrated by two apposite quotations from the digests: This court, (Sir Eardley observes,) has long made a distinction between superstitious Uses, and mistaken Charitable Uses. By mistaken, I mean such as are repugnant to that sound constitutional policy, which controuls the interest, wills, and wishes of individuals, when they clash with the interest and safety of the whole community. Property, destined to superstitious Uses, is given by act of parliament to the King, to dispose of as he pleases; and it falls properly under the cognizance of a Court of Revenue. But where property is given to mistaken charitable uses, this Court distinguishes between the charity and the use; and seeing a charitable bequest in the intention of the testator, they execute the intention, varying the use, as the King, who is the Curator of all charities, and the constitutional Trustee for the performance of them, pleases to direct and appoint. If it were res integra, much might be said for the heir at law; because in every other case, if the testator's intention in specie cannot take place, the heir at law takes the estate. And as the motive inducing the disinherison in a charitable devise, is a passion for that particular charity which he has named, if that particular charity cannot take place, cessante causâ, cessaret effectus. The right of the heir at law seems to arise as naturally in this case as in any other; but instead of favouring him as in all other cases, the testator is made to disinherit him for a charity he never thought of; perhaps for a charity repugnant to the testator's intention, and which directly opposes and encounters the charity he meant to establish. But this doctrine is now so fully settled, that it cannot be departed from; and the reason upon which it is founded, seems to be this: The donation was considered as proceeding from a general principle of piety in the testator. Charity was an expiation of sin, and to be rewarded in another state; and therefore, if political reasons negatived the particular charity given, this Court thought the merits of the charity ought not to be lost to the Testator, nor to the public, and that they were carrying on his general pious intention; and they proceeded upon a presumption, that the principle, which produced one charity, would have been equally active in producing another, in case the Testasor had been told the particular charity he meditated could not take place. The Court thought one kind of charity would embalm his memory as well as another, and being equally meritorious, would entitle him to the same reward. • There There is a law in the Digest, which seems to have furnished a hint for varying the destination of a donation to the public. Digest. xxxii. Tit. 2. De Usu & Usufr. Legatorum. De Legato Civitati ad certum Usum. 16. "Legatum civitati relictum est, ut ex reditibus quotannis in eâ civitate, memoriæ conservandæ defuncti gratiâ, spectaculum celebretur, quod illic celebrari non licet. Quæro quid de legato existimes? Modestinus respondit: Cum testator spectaculum edi voluerit in civitate, sed tale, quod ibi celebrari non licet, iniquum esse, hanc quantitatem, quam in spectaculum defunctus destinaverit, lucro hæredum cedere: Igitur adhibitis hæredibus & primoribus civitatis, inspiciendum est in quam rem converti debeat fideicommissum, ut memoria testatoris alio & licito genere celebretur." • Vide etiam Scævolæ responsum in sequenti. It is plain they looked at the motive of the gift, the immortaliz ing the memory of the donor, which was the only future reward a Pagan could enjoy. For this law was made 100 years before Christianity was the religion of the Empire. The particular spectacle directed was only the means by which that future reward was to be secured. Any other spectacle would as effectually answer that purpose. They looked at the end and aim of that benefaction, and shaped the means in such a manner, as without any violation of the laws, might secure the attainment of it. The reason, which animates the Law, applies as forcibly to a legacy given to a charitable use under the Christian dispensation.'— The Master of the Rolls having delivered his opinion to the same effect; and the Lord Chancellor having agreed with them both : • Declared their unanimous Opinion, that the Trusts of the Charity in question ought to be carried into execution, in case his Majesty shall be pleased to grant his Royal Charter to incorporate the College, and his Royal Licence for such incorporated College to take the devised premises in mortmain.' The case of Mansell against Mansell relates to a power of jointuring, as created by will, and the decree proceeded on the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Bridgman against Green, which was the case of a gross imposition by an artful servant on his master, a man of weak intellects, we meet with these sensible and discriminating observations: It was truly said at the Bar, that if the Decree proceed upon a principle of taking away that power which the Law gives every man over his own property, it ought to be reversed: and most certainly it ought; for our laws, very unfortunately for the owners, leave them at liberty to dissipate their fortunes as they please, to the ruin of themselves and their families. The Roman Laws drew a line between liberality and profusion; they very wisely for the public, and very kindly for the parties, considered immoderate extravagance-inconsulta largitio"-as a distemper of the mind, and treated a "prodigus" "prodigus" as a madman: they said, "expedit rei-publicæ nequis sua re male utatur." They thought it safer for the public, as well as kinder to individuals, to lay by their estates, whilst they were under the tyranny of their passions, and reserve them for their use, when under the direction of their reason. But our Laws strike no such boundary; "stat pro ratione voluntas," is the Law with us; every man may give a part, or all of his fortune to the most worth less object in the creation; and this Court never did, nor ever will rescind or annul donations merely because they are improvident, and such as a wise man would not have made, or a man of very nice honour would not have accepted: nor will this Court measure the degrees of understanding, and say, that a weak man, provided he is out of the reach of a Commission, may not give, as well as a wise man. But though this Court disclaims any such Jurisdiction, yet where a gift is immoderate, bears no proportion to the circumstances of the giver; "ubi modus non adhibetur, ubi non refertur ad facultates," where no reason at all appears, or the reason given is falsified, and proved to be a fiction, and the giver is a weak man, of a facile easy temper, liable to be imposed upon, this Court will look upon such a gift with a very jealous eye, and very strictly examine the conduct and behaviour of the persons in whose favour it is made: if it see that any arts or stratagems, or any undue means have been used by them to procure such a gift; if it see the least speck of Im position at the bottom, or that the Donor is in such a situation with respect to the Donee, as may naturally give him an undue influence over him; if there be the least scintilla of fraud; in such a case, this Court will and ought to interpose; and by the exertion of such a jurisdiction, they are so far from infringing the right of alienation, which is the inseparable incident to property, that it acts upon the principle of securing the full, ample, and uninfluenced enjoy ment of it.' The House of Commons, in the year 1758, passed a Bill intitled "An Act for giving a more speedy Remedy to the Subject upon the Writ of Habeas Corpus:" on the second reading of which in the House of Lords, the judges were ordered to attend, and to deliver their opinions seriatim, on ten questions, which were proposed to them. The fourth case in this volume contains the answer of Mr. Justice Wilmot on these questions, and presents a very able view of the law on this most interesting topic: exhibiting the different remedies which the subject possessed before the passing of the celebrated statute of Charles the Second. The variety of sound legal and constitutional knowlege introduced into this opinion intitles it to a careful and frequent perusal from every student.-The Bill was rejected by the Lords.-An account of the circumstances in which it originated, and a short, though not very impartial, history of the proceeding, will be found in Smollet's Continuation of Hume, vol, iv. p. 251. 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