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lative body a predominating influence in government. Whenever there is a conflict between the two chambers, public sympathy is always with that body which it has directly elected and which it has power at relatively short intervals to influence and change. Thus in England, France, Italy, and a number of less important states the upper chamber is dominated by the lower. Conditions in the United States and Switzerland, where the upper house represents the constituent commonwealths of the union, and where almost equal control over the finances is vested in each of the two houses, are different and have resulted in an upper chamber of exceptional power.
III. RULES OF PROCEDURE IN LEGISLATIVE BUSINESS Need for Rules of Procedure in Legislative Business.-In a national legislative body where such a mass of business is continually pressing for attention, it has been necessary to devise certain methods of procedure to prevent confusion and interminable delay. The legislatures in all the leading states of the world have bodies of rules in accordance with which business must be transacted. These rules are, of course, made by the legislative bodies themselves and may upon occasion be amended or entirely disregarded. It is impossible to make these rules few in number and simple in character; indeed, Mr. Bryce is authority for the statement that in our own legislature experience through one entire session of Congress is necessary before a new member of the House of Representatives can learn the rules of procedure.
General Rules of Procedure.—There are certain rules which are common to the legislative bodies in many of the leading states which will illustrate in a general way the working of the legislative body.
(1) It is a general rule that a bill be subjected to three "readings" at intervals of time before its final passage. The object of this primarily is to insure the proper consideration of each bill and thus to prevent hasty legislation. In some cases
this rule has degenerated into a mere formality whereby only the title and number of the bill are mentioned for the first two times, no serious consideration being given to the substance of the bill by the whole house until its final reading. In other cases, however, notably in the English Parliament, the bill is voted upon at each reading, and its passage through each of the three stages provides opportunity for debate and serious consideration.
(2) Another general characteristic of procedure in legislative bodies is the reference of bills to committees. It has been found impossible to consider in the whole house each of the thousands of bills presented in a session, so that to expedite business numerous standing committees are created to which bills may be referred. In the Senate of the United States, for example, there are over fifty such committees. When a bill is introduced and read (usually by title and number only), it is referred at once to the appropriate committee. The bill may never be referred out of the committee,-most bills never are,--and in this case it dies, but within the committee it receives, theoretically at least, the consideration it deserves. Each committee is thus given extensive power, for upon its report in most instances the house acts. The committee may destroy a bill by an adverse report, may introduce a substitute of a very different character, or may (as indicated above) allow the bill to die by not referring it out to the house.
(3) A third rule commonly found in legislative chambers is one for restricting debate. Experience has shown the advisability of providing the majority of a house with the means of ending discussion and demanding a vote. This is done in our House of Representatives by moving "the previous question," which motion, if carried by a majority of the quorum present, operates to force a vote on the bill under discussion. In the House of Commons any member may make a motion to close the debate, but it is within the discretion of the speaker whether the motion shall be put to vote or not. The fault of the system by which debate may be closed is evident, namely,
that it provides the majority with a weapon by which legitimate discussion may be throttled; but the evils of the opposite system, whereby the opponents of a legitimate measure can by endless speeches hold up all the work of the legislature, have led to its adoption. Until 1917, the United States Senate was an exception to this rule. The senators held fast to the principle of unlimited debate. The abuse of the privilege, however, on the part of certain individuals led to the adoption (March 8, 1917) of a rule providing that, on the petition of sixteen members supported after an interval of two days by a twothirds vote of the senate, debate on a pending bill should be brought to a close, each senator being limited thereafter to one hour's time and no amendments being permitted except by unanimous consent.
IV. THE INDIVIDUAL LEGISLATOR
The Position of the Member of the Legislative.—The problem confronting a member of the legislative body, whether in the lower or the upper chamber, is very complex. His is a divided responsibility, a responsibility on the one side to the constituency which he represents, a responsibility on the other side to the state for which he is engaged in framing laws. The clash of the interests of the two is often enough very real. Theoretically, it may be argued that these two interests are the same, that the welfare of the whole state is conditioned upon the welfare of each of its constituent parts; but practically, as separate measures are introduced and discussed, each individual member is forced to reconcile as best he can the interests of his particular locality with the interest of the whole state, and vote accordingly.
Instructed vs. Uninstructed Representatives.—The difficulty of finding men who truly represent their constituencies has led to a discussion of the advisability of having instructed representatives, i.e. representatives instructed upon their election how to vote upon certain issues which it is known are to be introduced in the legislature. The argument for an in
structed representative is that his duty is to serve merely as the mouthpiece of those who elected him, to record the collective will of his constituents. Without denying the responsibility of the representative to his constituents, a different view of the position of the representative should be emphasized. A representative is a person elected by his constituents to do what they would do were it possible for all of them to act in his place, to weigh the pros and cons of debate, to consider the bearing of each measure, not alone on his own small district, but on the whole state. A representative is elected to think, decide, and act, for and in the place of the people of his constituency. To bind him by rigid instructions before he takes his place in the legislature, before he hears the arguments on the one side and the other, free from the circumscribed prejudices of his own district, before he estimates the good or evil possibilities for the country at large, is to deprive him of his capacity as representative and to make him merely a delegate. From this point of view England, France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland, all favor and provide for uninstructed representatives. The United States, though without definite provision, has tended toward the same ideal.
Statistics and Illustrative Citations METHOD OF CHOICE, SIZE OF CONSTITUENCIES, QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS, TENURE OF
OFFICE, ETC., OF LEGISLATIVE IN DIFFERENT STATES
£400 a year
One member per By direct election in Any male or female 5 years
to vote being con- zenship, except Eng-
or priests, govern-