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day of July, 1847, and whose names are still on the rolls of attorneys or counsellors of that court:

2. Those in respect to whom an order has been entered by the supreme court, at any time since the first Monday of July, 1847, stating that they have been examined, and found to possess the qualifications required by the constitution, to entitle them to practice as attorneys and counsellors in the courts of this state.

§ 507. Any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, is entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this state.

§ 508. For the purpose of admission, he must apply to the supreme court in the district where he resides, on the first day of a general term, and must shew,

1. That he is a citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years; which proof may be made by his own affidavit: and,

2. That he is a person of good moral character; which may be proved by certificate, or other evidence satisfactory to the court.

§ 509. The applicant must also be examined, in open court, as to his qualifications of learning and ability, by the judges, or under their direction, at the term at which application for admission is made.

§ 510. If, upon the examination, he be found duly qualified, the court must direct an order to be entered,

to the effect that the applicant is a citizen of the United States, of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, to practice as an attorney and counsellor in all the courts of this state; and upon the entry of the order, he is entitled to practice as such attorney and counsellor.

ARTICLE III.

DUTIES OF ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELLORS.

SECTION 511. Their general duties.

512.

513.

Punishment for deceit or collusion.

Not to permit other persons to use his name.

§ 511. It is the duty of an attorney and counsellor,

1. To support the constitution and laws of the United States, and of this state :

2. To maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers:

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3. To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings or defences, only, as appear to him legal and just, except the defence of a person charged with a public offence:

4. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judges by any artifice or false statement of fact or law:

5. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets, of his clients:

6. To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudical to the honor or reputation of

a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged:

7. Not to encourge either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, from any motive of passion or interest: and

8. Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenceless or the oppressed.

The provisions of this section are taken substantially from the oath, prescribed to advocates by the laws of Geneva. That oath is as follows:

"I swear before God,

To be faithful to the Republic and the canton of Geneva; Never to depart from the respect due to the tribunals and authorities;

Never to counsel or maintain a cause, which does not appear to be just or equitable, unless it be the defence of an accused person;

Never to employ knowingly, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me, any means contrary to truth, and never to seek to mislead the judges by any artifice or false statement of fact or law;

To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact contrary to the honor or reputation of the parties, if it be not indispensable to the cause, with which I may be charged;

Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of a suit from any motive of passion or interest; Not to reject, for any considerations personal to myself, the cause of the weak, the stranger, or the oppressed."

This appears to us to express so justly the general duties of lawyers, that we cannot do better than take almost the very terms of it, in prescribing their duties.

The profession of a lawyer is essential to society. Its character and honor are public interests. Not only is the advice of lawyers necessary in the more difficult transactions of private life, but their intervention is necessary to repre

sent the suitor, and advocate his rights before the courts. In this position everything is confided to their integrity. The magnitude of the interests placed in their hands, property, character, liberty, life, the responsibility which they assume, the confidence which they receive, all demand and presuppose the highest qualities and character. No dishonest or dishonorable man can retain the confidence of honest and honorable men. The most intimate connection, in reality, subsists between the character of the community, and the character of the bar. An unscrupulous bar could not exist in a highminded community; and if anywhere a corrupt legal profession is to be found, it is found in the midst of a corrupt and corrupting people.

The judicial department is recruited from the legal profession. Judges must be lawyers. This circumstance alone, the mere fact that one of the great departments of government, co-ordinate in power, equal in dignity, and the one, upon which, especially the safety of the citizen depends, is, by the law of its condition, eligible only out of the ranks of one profession, is enough to give it a pre-eminence. The integrity of the judiciary, more than that of any other class of magistrates, is evidence of the soundness of the public mind, The character of the judges however is the character of the lawyers. Made at the bar; their moral characters there take their complexion. To degrade the bar therefore leads directly and inevitably to the degradation of the bench.

There are certain grave errors, somewhat current respecting the duties of lawyers, which deserve serious consideration. We refer particularly to their alleged indifference to the moral aspects of the causes they advocate-not that there is any thing like the indifference, which is supposed to exist. On the contrary, persons, more scrupulously exact never to take part with wrong, or seem to do so, cannot be found in any profession. But there is nevertheless an impression widely diffused, not only in the profession, but out of it, that a lawyer may properly advocate a bad cause. This view of the case, we here venture briefly to consider.

When a lawyer is asked for his opinion upon a purely legal question, his duty ends with stating the law as it is. In

many instances, however, more than this is asked. His client seeks his advice respecting his future conduct. In such cases his duty as a moral being requires him to advise justice. His position as a legal adviser does not exempt him from the moral duties which bind other men. He has no more right than another friend to advise what is unjust or oppressive. Undoubtedly the client must judge for himself of the moral quality of his own actions, and if he desires no more than to know what course the law requires under particular circumstances, the adviser's duty ends with explaining that. But in practice the client generally expects and asks more. He asks advice from a friend who knows what his legal rights are, and who probably has more of his confidence than an other person. In such circumstances, he is bound by moral and should be bound by human laws, to throw his influence upon the side of integrity. To assent to the bad scheme of an unjust client, is to become equally guilty with him, and the two are as much conspirators to effect a wrong, as if they had originally concocted a plan of iniquity with the view of sharing in the plunder. And when, in addition to advice, the client wants an advocate, and asks for active co-operation, the same laws bind him just as strongly to refrain from pursuing an unjust object.

It is sometimes said, that a lawyer is not at liberty to refuse his services to any person, and that when once engaged he is at liberty to employ every means in his power for his client. Indeed so eminent a person as Lord Brougham, is reported to have said, in a speech in the British House of Lords, that the advocate is bound to forget that there is any other person in the world besides his client, and to lose sight of every other consideration than of success.

Is it possible that this can be just? Should the advocate forget that there is a society, whose welfare he is bound by the highest sanctions to promote; that there are other parties, whose rights are at stake; that there are duties to society, to every member of it, as well as to the one who retained him? The doctrine appears to us unsound in theory, and most pernicious in practice. It assumes that a man has a right to whatever the law can give him, that the law is so plain that it cannot be mistaken or perverted, and that one may rightful

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