another; and, however vexed Colonel Wellesley might have been by his repulse on the night of the 5th, he must have had the consolation -however inadequate-of having foreseen it, and of having suggested as well as executed, the manoeuvre which so easily accomplished the desired object on the morning of the 6th.'

To these remarks, confirmed as it appears to us by Colonel Wellesley's letter to his brother, we steadfastly adhere. Indeed, it seems by no means impossible from that letter that notwithstanding the note to Lord Harris, Colonel Wellesley was left without any sufficiently precise indication of what was expected of him.

The failure was, as it turned out, a trifling matter; and no more would probably have been heard of it if it had happened to any one else; but it afforded to our great soldier a lesson of the difficulties attendant upon such operations, which was, we may be sure, well remembered. General Harris considerately delayed the renewal of the attack in the morning, as Mr. Lushington relates, on purpose to allow Colonel Wellesley, who had not, by some mistake, been warned for it, to retrieve his reputation. As soon as he arrived he took command of the troops and proceeded to the attack, which was successful, and the position of the army was established before Seringapatam.

*

Mr. Lushington quotes a letter which was brought at this time by a native hurkarrah (messenger) to General Harris from Lord Mornington, dated 3rd of April, 1799. It was written with his own hand on both sides of a slip of paper, and sealed up in a quill, in order that it might be the better concealed in the journey through Tippoo's country. It was unimportant in other respects, but contained the expression Do not allow Arthur to fatigue himself too much.' We have thought this worthy of notice, as being more elegant than the somewhat similar 'Take care of Dowb.' which so puzzled our General commanding in the Crimea.

Even then the situation was, however, extremely urgent. Immediate success was necessary to the existence of the army. When the breaching batteries which had been dragged so many weary miles had done their work, and when all was prepared, General Harris told off Baird for the assault, and Wellesley for the reserve in the trenches. He had also determined, as he said to Captain (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm, to lead the rest of the army in person if necessary, as a last resource. Mr. Gleig puts it:

'In the final assault and capture of the place which occurred on the 4th May, Colonel Wellesley appears not to have been engaged.

*Life of Lord Harris,' p. 228.

He

remained

remained with his corps in observation, as the bulk of a besieging army under similar circumstances usually does.'

We may add that Baird carried the place with great gallantry by a midday assault, and applied in the evening to be relieved for a short time that he might report the details of his success in person. Colonel Wellesley followed him into the town on the following morning, as the next senior officer for duty, to restore order, which he did with great determination,-gallows were erected in seven streets and seven* marauders soon dangled from them.' Wellesley was appointed by Harris Commandant of Seringapatam, and the appointment was confirmed by the Governor-General, who said, in writing to General Harris, †—

'With respect to the language which you say people held of my brother's appointment to command in Seringapatam, you know that I never recommended my brother to you, and of course never suggested how, or where he should be employed; and I believe you know also, that you would not have pleased me by placing him in any situation in which his appointment could be injurious to the public service. My opinion, or rather knowledge and experience of his discretion, judgment, temper, and integrity are such, that if you had not placed him in Seringapatam, I would have done so of my own authority, because I think him in every point of view the most proper for that service.' And there can be no doubt that Lord Mornington was right in his opinion.

General Baird was much annoyed by this appointment. Colonel Wellesley had previously obtained the command of the Nizam's contingents over his head, ostensibly because he was brother to the Governor-General. Baird had now carried with great gallantry the fortress in which he had previously suffered a lengthened and cruel imprisonment; and he found himself once more, and permanently, superseded by a junior officer, in a command which he thought he had fairly won. General Harris had, however, other proper and strong reasons for acting as he did; and after administering to him a sharp rebuke, he allowed him to withdraw his angry letters of remonstrance, and gave him credit not only for his own gallantry, but also for the arrangements which he (General Harris) had himself so carefully made for the assaults. Colonel Wellesley was as yet by no means relieved from anxiety in regard to his pecuniary affairs, for he wrote to his brother,

Nor was it until four men had been executed for plunder that perfect tranquillity was restored."-Gurwood, vol. i. p. 38.

tLife of Lord Harris,' p. 320.

Vol. 120.-No. 239.

*

'Since I went into the field in December last I have commanded an army with a large staff attached to me, which has not been unattended by a very great expense, particularly latterly. About six weeks ago I was sent in here with a garrison, consisting of about half the army and a large staff, and I have not received one shilling more than I did in Fort St. George. The consequence is, that I am ruined. . . . . I should be ashamed of doing any of the dirty things that I am told are done in some of the commands in the Carnatic as I believe I proved sufficiently at Wallajah-Nuggur : but if Government do not consider my situation here, I must either give up the command or submit to be ruined for ever.'

6

But Mr. Gleig tells us that his emoluments as Commandant of Seringapatam, and afterwards on the removal of General Harris's army, as Civil Superintendent of the district, together with 70007, his share of prize-money, enabled him to repay to his brother the price of his promotion and made him independent. Mr. Gleig adds, 'this was a great weight taken from his mind;' but on referring to Colonel Wellesley's letter of the 14th June, 1799, to his brother, we find him saying, my share of the prizemoney, amounting in jewels to about 3000 pagodas, and in money to 7000, will enable me to pay the money which you advanced to purchase my Lieutenant-Colonelcy, and that which was borrowed from Captain Stapleton on our joint bond.' The prizemoney, therefore amounted, including jewels and money, to 10,000 pagodas, equal to about 40007. And Mr. Gleig omits to notice Lord Mornington's reply, dated 19th June, 1799, which the present Duke has properly added in a note at page 246 of the first volume of the Supplemental Despatches.'

'My dear Arthur, To your letter of the 14th I answer, that no consideration can induce me to accept payment of the sums which I have formerly advanced for you. I am in no want of money, and probably never shall be when I am, it will be time enough to call upon you.'

The Duke's generosity was, as is well known, conspicuously displayed in his protection of the son of Dhoondiah Waugh, the 'King of the World.' He had with great skill and gallantry, and after a most exciting chase, overtaken and killed that robberchief, and dispersed his army. Afterwards, when leaving India, he left a sum of money to give the lad a start in life. He declined to interrupt his campaign against Dhoondiah for the sake of joining a force which Lord Mornington proposed to employ for the reduction of Batavia, but we think that Mr. Gleig has over-estimated the self-denial which he thus exercised. He

* June 14, 1799, 'Supplementary Despatches,' vol. i. pp. 246, 247.

was

was engaged in an exciting campaign, and was in charge of an extensive district, in which, as his far-seeing sagacity could hardly fail to tell him, there was much work still to be done and much credit to be gained.

The Mahratta chiefs having become temporarily quiet, Colonel Wellesley declared himself ready for service elsewhere. He was thereupon appointed by his brother, in an official communication which Mr. Gleig states to have been 'somewhat ambiguous,' to take part in the next expedition, and he was directed to proceed to the rendezvous at Trincomalee, in Ceylon. The force appears to have been intended for service-either in Egypt to take Buonaparte in reverse, or against the Isle of France, or against Batavia-and not in the first instance, as Mr. Gleig infers, against the Isle of France only, though the last was the Governor-General's pet scheme. Colonel Wellesley conceived that he was to have absolute command of this expedition, travelled rapidly to Trincomalee, and set to work with his accustomed activity to perfect the arrangements. Admiral Rainier (not Renier) refused, in the absence of orders from home, to operate with him against the Isle of France, but consented to join in an expedition against Batavia; and Lord Wellesley's 'anxious hope' as regards the Isle of France was thus frustrated. Mr. Gleig says, 'His labours continued at Trincomalee till the resources of the country were exhausted, and then, on his own responsibility, he carried the armament to Bombay, as being better able to supply its wants and nearer to the scene of intended operations. But further than this he resolved not to go.' But the truth is, that a despatch from the home Government to the Governor-General, directed in the mean time the immediate preparation and prompt execution of the scheme against the French in Egypt. Of this despatch Colonel Wellesley received a copy via Madras, before the GovernorGeneral had time to communicate with him. The despatch

The Governor-General's despatch, Nov. 14, 1800, is given in vol. ii. p. 284 of the 'Supplementary Despatches.' It recites-The Governor-General in Council is pleased to appoint you to the chief command of the above-mentioned forces; and Colonel J. Champagné, of his Majesty's 80th Regiment, to be second in command of the said forces.' The forces, mentioned in the preceding paragraph, were the 80th, 19th, 10th Regiments, 1000 Sepoys, 38 European Artillery, 46 Golundauze, 100 Lascars, four 12-pounders, six 6-pounders, and 2 howitzer, guns.

The despatch commences-Sir, The Governor-General in Council has judged it necessary, in consequence of the late successes of the French in Europe and in Egypt, to adopt certain measures of precaution. . . . and also with the further view of answering any demand which may be made by his Majesty's Ministers in England, for the co-operation of the British Government of India in the expulsion of the French from Egypt.' c 2

reached

reached him without any specific instructions from the Governor of Madras, but Colonel Wellesley knew that his own troops were the only force available for service in Egypt, and that that country had been looked upon as one of their possible destinations, and he determined not to lose valuable time. He took upon himself, therefore, to assume the command of the expedition to Egypt, and to issue the necessary orders. He at the same time communicated his intentions to his brother, and he called at Bombay en route, by the advice of Captain Malcolm, of H.M.S. 'Suffolk,' to obtain supplies and receive his instructions overland from Calcutta. But Lord Mornington had selected General Baird for the command of the expedition when he resumed the scheme against Batavia,* and he proposed that an expedition under Colonel Wellesley should be dispatched from that place to the Isle of France. He naturally continued Baird in command when the destination of the force to Egypt was finally determined on, and he then offered Colonel Wellesley the alternative of resuming his duties at Mysore, or of going forward as second in command, though he pressed the latter much, for every reason, upon him. Mr. Gleig says:

Colonel Wellesley was not free from the weaknesses which appertain to men in general, however marvellous might be his power to overcome them. He felt keenly enough the slight that had been put upon himself, but he felt still more the injustice which others had suffered.'

He quotes a letter from him :—

I can easily get the better of my own disappointment, but how can I look in the face of the officers who, from a desire to share my fortunes, gave up lucrative appointments, and must go with one whom none of them admires? I declare that I can't think of the whole business with common patience.'

And he says further,

'Lord Mornington, conscious that he had acted somewhat unfairly, proposed to reinstate him in his command at Mysore.'

But he neglects to look at this disagreeable business, which created ill-feeling between all the three parties directly concerned, from any point of view but that of his hero. We do not think that Lord Mornington can properly be accused at any time of unfairness as against his brother. He would, no doubt, in consulting his own inclinations, have acted differently. He may, indeed, be said to have devoted himself very much to his brother's advancement from the commencement to the termination of the

* Supplementary Despatches,' vol. ii. p. 333.

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