suggests

This constant modification of the objects in which one takes pleasure, or which give one pain, is, indeed, a fact which must be admitted by any theory of feeling. A state of mind may be at first pleasurable; but, if it be long-continued, the pleasure will give way to the pain of monotony. The same is true of a painful state of mind: its continuance does not prolong the same intensity of painful consciousness, but the sensibility becomes dulled and the pain diminishes. The transition is still more striking in the case of motor activities. In learning to walk, or to ride, or to play any instrument, the first experiences are those of painful effort. Gradually, however, the co-ordinations of movement required entail less and less pain, till the feeling passes over into its opposite, and we have a pleasurable sense of successful effort and well-adapted functioning. But, just as pain gave way to pleasure, so pleasure itself subsides, the action becomes merely reflex and passes out of consciousness altogether, unless it be so long continued as to produce fatigue- that is, pain. Habit, as Dumont remarks,1 intensifies perceptions, but weakens pleasure and pain.

These are psychological facts-not mere theories that feeling which hold true even of the individual experience.

depends on objective intensity.

But they have led psychologists to the theory, supported by a vast amount of direct experiment, that

1 Théorie scientifique, p. 78.

there is no object or action which can be said to be absolutely and in itself either pleasant or painful.1 The feeling of pleasure or pain accompanying the object is a function of its intensity in relation to the subject. This proposition cannot, indeed, be fully demonstrated regarding each simple sensation: to the emotions into which intricate relations of perceptions enter, it does not apply, till their complexity has been reduced. Some sensations and perceptions are certainly felt as painful in any intensity in which they are distinctly present to consciousness. But, although this is a real difficulty, it does not seem insuperable. The instances which Mill cites 2 to throw doubt on the generalisation that quality of feeling depends on intensity are unfortunately chosen for his purpose. For to take his example-the taste of rhubarb is to many not painful but pleasant; and, indeed, every case of acquired taste shows that pleasure and pain can be modified through habit and custom, and suggests that, even in the case of those. sensations which are painful in any form we have been able to experience them, there is a degree of intensity below which they would, if experienced, be pleasant. Experiment has proved of the majority even of sensible qualities, and analogy leads us to conclude of all, that there is a degree in which each

1 Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., p. 470; Fechner, Vorschule der Aesthetik, ii. 243 f.

2 Exam. of Hamilton's Philosophy, 5th ed., p. 559.

may be pleasant, and a degree in which each may be painful, and, between them, a—real or imaginary -zero-point of feeling, where there is neither pleasure nor pain. This must, it is true, be received as a hypothesis only; but it is a hypothesis which is suggested by a wide range of facts, and which is able to include even those facts with which it is seemingly inconsistent, by supposing that could their intensity be indefinitely diminished without their passing out of consciousness, these sensations would reach a point after which they would be felt as pleasant and not as painful. Further, experiment shows that this dividing-point which separates the two poles of feeling is not always placed at the same degree of intensity, that it differs not only for every object, but for each individual subject as well, and that it undergoes modification in the course of the subject's development.1

What is true of sense-perception is still more evident regarding those experiences in which the activity of the subject is more obviously involved. As any function may, if carried beyond a certain degree of intensity, be painful, so any function consistent with life may be a source of pleasure.

From the preceding discussion two things may be inferred: first, the dependence of pleasure and pain on the subject-activity, whether the activity be that 1 See Fechner, loc. cit.

of perception or of what is specifically called action; and secondly, the modification of pleasure and pain, and transition from one to the other, along with the modification of that subject-activity. To the application of both these conclusions there may be limits; but their general accuracy does not seem doubtful. What the doctrine of evolution adds to this is its proof of the indefinite modifiability of human function. "It is an essential principle of life," Mr Spencer wrote,1 before he had arrived at his general theory of evolution, "that a faculty to which circumstances do not allow full exercise diminishes; and that a faculty on which circumstances make excessive demands increases;" and to this we must now add, "that, supposing it consistent with maintenance of life, there is no kind of activity which will not become a source of pleasure if continued; and that therefore pleasure will eventually accompany every mode of action demanded by social conditions." 2 It is, he holds, a “biological truth," that "everywhere faculties adjust themselves to the conditions of existence in such wise that the activities those conditions require become pleasurable." The vast periods of time over which evolution stretches are scarcely needed to show how pleasure may be made to follow from almost any course of action consistent with the continuance of life. The change of habits which 2 Data of Ethics, p. 186.

1 Social Statics, p. 79.

3 Mind, vi. 85.

(c) Applica

tion of the

theory of

evolution :

consistent

tions of life

will come to

be pleasur

able;

often takes place in the history of a nation, and even in the life of an individual, makes this sufficiently obvious. But, if we still think of making attainment of pleasure the end of conduct, the doctrine of evolution must give us pause. It has been already argued that, given certain sources of, and susceptibilities for, pleasure, the course of evolution has not been such as to produce an exact coincidence between them any conduct and the actions which further life. But it would with condi- seem that, given habits of acting which are consistent with the conditions of life, and which are systematically carried out, these will not fail to grow pleasant as the organism becomes adapted to them. At the best, it is difficult enough to say, even for the individual, whether one imagined object or course of action will exceed another in pleasurable feeling or not. But, when we remember that function and feeling may be modified indefinitely, it is impossible to say what course of conduct will produce the greatest amount of pleasure for the race. Taking in all its effects, we cannot say that one way of seeking pleasure is better—that is, will bring more pleasure-than another. Bearing in mind the modifications which evolution produces, it seems impossible to guide the active tendencies of mankind towards the goal of greatest pleasure, except by saying that the greatest pleasure will be got from the greatest amount of successful, or of unrestrained, or of medium activity.