finds its counterpart in speculative opinion, so that, whereas Epicurus placed happiness in freedom from wants, modern hedonism usually considers a man the happier the more wants he has and is able to supply.1 fully repre theory of This practical tendency brings out the truth that does not it is not only by the subordination of self to cir- sent the cumstances, and the restriction of desire to present evolution. means of satisfaction, that the required harmony between outer and inner relations can be brought about. The other alternative is open circumstances may be subordinated to self. For this latter alternative the theory of evolution seems really to leave room as much as for the former. It is excluded only when a one-sided emphasis is laid on the necessity of adaptation to environment. For evolution implies a gradually increasing heterogeneity of structure as the prelude to perfect agreement with circumstances: "the limit of heterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses is the formation of as many specialisations and combinations of parts as there are specialised and combined forces to be met."2 The end of evolution is a correspondence between inner and outer which is not produced by the easy method of both being very simple, but which is consistent with, and indeed requires, the complexity and heterogeneity pro 1 Lange, Gesch. d. Materialismus, 2d ed., ii. 458. 2 Spencer, First Principles, p. 490. (b) As de scribing the ultimate condition of life, duced in both by constant interaction.1 The greater this complexity, the more filled with sensation, emotion, and thought life is, the greater is what Mr Spencer calls its "breadth." But, if "adaptation" is still regarded as expressing the end, then, the more perfect this adaptation is, the less room seems left for progress, and the end of human conduct is placed in a state of moving equilibrium in which action takes place without a jar and without disturbing the play of external conditions.2 This end of "adaptation " is looked upon by Mr Spencer not as representing the conduct prescribed by morality in present circumstances, but as describing the ultimate condition of human life. As such, it is the foundation of his Absolute Ethics-that "final permanent code" which "alone admits of being definitely formulated, and so constituting ethics as a science in contrast with empirical ethics." The "philosophical moralist," he tells us, "treats solely of the straight man. He determines the properties of the straight man; describes how the straight man comports himself; shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men; shows how a community of straight men is constituted. 1 An aspect of Mr Spencer's ethical theory which will be considered in the sequel: p. 228 ff. 2 Cf. A. Barratt, Physical Ethics, p. 294, where morality is placed in "reasonable obedience to the physical laws of nature." 3 Data of Ethics, p. 148. Any deviation from strict rectitude he is obliged wholly to ignore. It cannot be admitted into his premisses without vitiating all his conclusions. A problem in which a crooked man forms one of the elements is insoluble by him." "1 correspon environ ment. How, then, are we to conceive the nature or con- complete duct of the "straight man"? To begin with, it is dence with made clear that his dealings are only with straight men; for there are no "crooked men" in the ideal community. "The coexistence of a perfect man and an imperfect society is impossible; and could the two coexist the resulting conduct would not furnish the ethical standard sought."2 "The ultimate man is one in whom this process [of adaptation to the social state] has gone so far as to produce a correspondence between all the promptings of his nature and all the requirements of his life as carried on in society. If so, it is a necessary implication that there exists an ideal code of conduct formulating the behaviour of the completely-adapted man in the completely-evolved society." This is Resultant the code of Absolute Ethics, whose injunctions alone code of are "absolutely right," and which, "as a system of ideal conduct, is to serve as a standard for our guidance in solving, as well as we can, the problems of real conduct." At the outset, we were required to interpret the more developed by the less devel 1 Social Statics, quoted in Data of Ethics, p. 271. 2 Data of Ethics, p. 279. 3 Ibid., p. 275. absolute ethics (a) lays down ab stract prinrelation of ciples for individual to society; 3 oped; "1 the conclusion sets forth that the less developed is to be guided by the more developed, the real by the ideal. Now, ethics "includes all conduct which furthers or hinders, in either direct or indirect ways, the welfare of self or others."2 Thus Absolute Ethics, like Relative Ethics, has two divisions, personal and social. As to the latter, Mr Spencer formulates certain principles of justice, negative beneficence, and positive beneficence, which describe the harmonious co-operation of ideal men in the ideal state. These principles may perhaps be capable of a modified application to the present state of society, in which there is a conflict of interests: although Mr Spencer's representation of them which is still, however, incomplete-suggests the belief that they are not so much guides which the ideal gives to the real, as suggestions for the construction of a Utopia gathered from the requirements of present social life. But, supposing the "harmonious co-operation" of individuals to be thus provided for, what is the personal end? and what, it might be added, is the social end, if society has any further function than regulating the relation of its units to one another? Absolute ethics does not seem to be able to give much guid 1 Data of Ethics, p. 7. 2 Ibid., p. 281. 3 These are examined by Mr F. W. Maitland, in an incisive criticism of “Mr H. Spencer's Theory of Society," Mind, viii. 354 ff., 506 ff. ance here. A code of perfect personal conduct," (8) further can never be made definite.”1 only defines There end of con adaptation; we are told, are various types of activities, all of which may be- duct as long to lives" complete after their kinds." But yet "perfection of individual life" does imply "certain modes of action which are approximately alike in all cases, and which, therefore, become part of the subject-matter of ethics." We cannot lay down "precise rules for private conduct," but only "general requirements." And these are: to maintain the balance between waste and nutrition, to observe a relation between activity and rest, to marry and have children. This is "how the straight man comports himself." Apart, therefore, from the suggestion thrown out that a man's function may be the realisation of a type of activity complete after its kind-a suggestion to be considered in the sequel -all that we can say of the "completely-adapted man" would seem to be that he will be adapted to his circumstances. be shown to We have a right to demur if the pleasures of the (y) cannot final condition of equilibrium be held up to our lead to imagination as a reason for aiming at it. That it happiness. is "the establishment of the greatest perfection and most complete happiness," seems an unwarrantable assumption. Yet it is through this assumption that an apparent harmony between Mr 2 Ibid., p. 283. "3 1 Data of Ethics, p. 282. |