those already produced.1 It may be the fact that variation is, in the last resort, due to changes in surrounding circumstances, to the unequal incidence of external forces upon a finite aggregate.2 But, with living bodies as now constituted, it has, at any rate as proximate cause, a twofold source. It may be due to the direct effect of external forces, or it may be caused by the energy stored up in the organism in growth.3

directed in

man.

In man the outgo of this force is conscious; and, consciously by means of his conscious or intelligent volition, governed by interests of various kinds, he can anticipate and modify the action of natural selection. The law that the fittest organism survives may perhaps work in man as in the lower animals, if only we give a wide enough meaning to "fittest," so as to admit even of the weak being made fit through the sympathy and help of the strong. Natural selection becomes dependent upon variations of a kind different from those in the merely animal world, so that its practical effect may be in some cases apparently reversed. We thus see how it is that even Darwin holds that in moralised societies "natural selection apparently effects but little," at the same time that we may

1 Spencer, Biology, i. 257.

2 First Principles, p. 404 f,

3 Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, i. 101.

4 Descent of Man, 2d ed., p. 137, cf. pp. 198, 618; cf. A. R. Wallace, Contributions (1870), p. 330.

not be inclined to deny the truth of Schäffle's contention1 that, although circumstances differ, the law of action remains the same. Schäffle points out how, as we rise in the scale of life, especially as it is manifested in human society, the organisation becomes more delicate, and other than merely natural facts have to be taken account of, so that the fittest to live in the new social and intellectual environment is no longer the man of greatest physical strength and skill.

The theory of natural selection as applied to the ordinary spheres of plant and animal life, may perhaps, for some purposes, neglect consideration of the fact that it presupposes a tendency to variation in the organisms whose growth it describes. But, when the variation in the behaviour of the organism becomes conscious and designed, there is thereby produced a preliminary indication or determination of the lines on which natural selection is to work. And, before the theory of evolution can give a full account of the ethical in man, it must distinguish consciously-determined from merely natural action, and give an analysis of what is implied in the former. We must bear in mind that it may be the case that the ground and possibility of progress and of the efficiency of ideal ends in human conduct which "adaptation to environment" has been unable logically to explain or leave room for—are

1 Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., i. (1877), 543 ff.

to be found in this differentiating fact of conscious activity. But we must first of all see whether, from the empirical characteristics of variation, we can extract an ethical end or any guide for conduct.

this tend

ency to

variation

2. "The lower animals," says a writer on biology, 2. End sug" are just as well organised for the purposes of their gested by life as the higher are for theirs. The tape-worm is relatively quite as perfect as the man, and distinguished from him by many superior capabilities." 1 It is incorrect to look upon the evolution of animal life as working upon one line, so that the different kinds of living beings can be arranged, as it were, in an order of merit, in which the organisation of the higher animal plainly excels that of the lower. The conditions of life are manifold and various enough to permit of the existence of many species equally perfect in relation to their environments. The fact that we are still able to speak of one species or one animal as higher than another, is not owing to the one being better adapted to its environment than the other, but is supposed rather to be due to the higher forms having "their organs more distinctly specialised for different functions.” 2 Even Mr Spencer, for whom equilibrium is the goal of life, implicitly admits that "adaptation" alone is 1 Rolph, Biol. Probl., p. 33.

2 Darwin, Origin of Species, p. 336.

(a) prescribes self

not the end of human action, by his doctrine that the degree of evolution may be measured by the complexity of the adjustments it effects between organism and environment. The end, therefore, it development may be said, is no longer the mere "self-preservarather than tion" found in adaptation to environment, but the "self-development" which implies temporary disharmony between organism and surroundings.

self-preservation,

For "self-preservation" and "self-development,” though frequently spoken of as identical, are really distinct and often opposed notions—the former denoting a tendency to persist in one's present state of being, while the latter implies more or less change. It may be held, however, that for an organism such as man to persist in his state of being, implies modification of his faculties, and that this modification involves development. For any organism to exist apart from change is, of course, impossible. Life is only known to us as a series of changes. But that change does not necessarily mean development or "change to a higher condition." Degradation is as well known a fact as development; and between the two, there is room for a state of existence of which it is difficult to say whether it improves or deteriorates. And whatever may be intended by the phrase, “selfpreservation" points to a state of this kind rather than to an improving condition. The notion of self-development" has therefore a richer content

than that of "self-preservation"; but just on this account it cannot be explained by a reference to the nature of things as they are.

account of

It is true that self-development can only go on thus taking by a continuous process of adjustment; but it is variability also necessary for it that this tendency to adaptation should be continually hindered from becoming complete or lapsing into equilibrium. It is here that the function of variation comes in. On the one side there is this tendency to vary after a fashion often without any apparent regard to external conditions; on the other side, there is the action of the external conditions selecting and favouring those variations which bring the organism into closer correspondence with them. The wide range over which the theory of natural selection applies is due to the fact that the environment is never uniform and never constant, so that modifications on the part of the organism have a chance of suiting its varied and changing character. Its changes, moreover, are often the result not so much

of

any absolute alteration in external circumstances, as of a new relation between them and living beings having been brought about. For the enormous reproductive faculty of most organisms makes them multiply so rapidly as to press ever more and more closely against the limit of subsistence, and thus to produce competition for the means of living. Hence the fresh lines of development originated