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ous in motive,1 it is higher in the moral scale, we seem to have got hold of something which may be a guide for determining the ethical end. The mark of what is higher in evolution, and consequently in morality, will be greater heterogeneity or complexity.2

This conclusion follows from an attempt not merely to treat "moral phenomena as phenomena of evolution," but also to find the "ultimate interpretations" of ethics "only in those fundamental truths which are common to all" the sciences, physical, biological, psychological, sociological.3 Now the fundamental truths which these sciences have in common are those only which are most abstract. But as we pass from mere relations be- Difficulties tween matter and motion to life, and from life theory: to self-consciousness, we have something different from these fundamental truths with the addition of certain others not fundamental: we find that things are not merely more changed in aspect and nature.

complex, but are
Even though it

be true that the new phenomena may still admit

suit the heterogeneity in the combination of motions will be extreme."

1 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 106: "The acts characterised by the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts, have all along been of higher authority for guidance."

2 Cf. Clifford, Lectures and Essays, i. 94 f., where a similar definition is given in answer to the question, "What is the meaning of better?"

3 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 63.

of the

of analysis into the old simpler terms, and that life, mind, and society may be interpreted as redistributions of matter and motion, it must yet at least be admitted that the change passed through is one similar to those which Mill compared to chemical composition: the new compound differs fundamentally in mode of action from the elements out of which it was formed. Now, in saying that the most complex adjustments of acts to ends are the highest kinds of conduct, and that we should be guided by the more complex in preference to simpler motives, this obvious difficulty is passed over. It is true that Mr Spencer, in chapters rich in suggestion, and filled with skilfully chosen illustrations, has passed in review the various aspects of conduct according as we look at it from the point of view of the physical environment, of life, of mind, or of society. But when these different aspects are brought together and compared, it becomes clear that the attempt to judge conduct by reference to the "fundamental truth' that evolution implies an advance towards greater complexity, must necessarily end in failure.2

1 Cf. Spencer, First Principles, p. 566.

2 So far as the following criticism may appear to apply to Mr Spencer, and not merely to a possible way of defining moral conduct, it is necessary to bear in mind the words of his preface to the 'Data of Ethics': "With a view to clearness, I have treated separately some correlative aspects of conduct, drawing conclusions either of which becomes untrue if divorced from the other."

produced by

and indi

In the first place, there is a notable discrep- (a) antinomy ancy between the biological and the sociological it between aspect. For the complete development of the the social individual life implies that every function should vidual ends; be fulfilled, and that its fulfilment should interfere with the performance of no other function. "The performance of every function is, in a sense, a moral obligation." "The ideally moral man . . . is one in whom the functions of all kinds are duly fulfilled,”—that is to say, "discharged in degrees duly adjusted to the conditions of existence."1 A fully evolved life is marked by multiplicity and complexity of function. And, if from the individual we pass to the social organism, we find that the same truth holds. The state, or organised body of individuals, has many functions to perform; but it can only perform them in the most efficient way through the functions of its individual members being specialised. From the social point of view, therefore, the greatest possible division of labour is a mark of the most evolved and perfect community. And this division of labour implies that each individual, instead of performing every function of which he is capable, should be made to restrict himself to that at which he is best, so that the community may be the gainer from the time and exertion that are saved, and the skill that is produced, by the most economic expenditure of indi1 Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 75 f.

(B) its psychological aspect

vidual talent.

Thus social perfection appears to imply a condition of things inconsistent with that development of one's whole nature which, from the biological point of view, has just been defined as a characteristic of the ideally moral man. It seems, indeed, inevitable that any such abstract preliminary notion of development as that which would test it by increase of complexity must fail in such a case as this where there is no question between the competing claims of two phenomena on the same level, but where harmony is wanted between the different aspects the same phenomena present when looked at from the point of view of the individual and from the point of view of the whole.

There is still greater difficulty in applying this criterion, when we come to the psychological aspect of morality the aspect most prominent in modern philosophy from the revival of independent ethical speculation till the time of Kant. According to Mr Spencer, "the acts characterised by the more complex motives and the more involved thoughts, have all along been of higher authority for guidance." 1 But the later or more advanced in mental evolution is not always more complex in structure; for it is a characteristic of mental development that the processes by which a result has been arrived at gradually disappear on account of the diminished attention they receive, so that there remains 1 Data of Ethics, p. 106.

complexity of structure with indirectness of

what is, so far as psychical structure is concerned, a simple mental state. Complexity of structure and confounds indirectness of origin are thus really two different characteristics of states of mind, which frequently go together, but frequently part company.1 When origin, Mr Spencer, accordingly, goes on to say 2 that "for the better preservation of life the primitive simple presentative feelings must be controlled by the later-evolved compound and representative feelings," he is really passing to a different standard without giving up the former. The sympathy with injured Zulus or Afghans which would be approved by Mr Spencer3 may be a more indirect, representative, or re-representative feeling, than the sentiments which led to British invasion, and, as such, may be more to be commended. But it would be rash to say that sympathy with the "British interests" supposed to be at stake-interests of commerce, and of the balance of political power, as well as those arising from the subtle effect of national prestige-is less complex than the feeling of sympathy with a people dispossessed of its territory. The latter feeling may be more indirect or representative, as implying an imaginative appro

1 Although Mr Spencer holds that representativeness varies as definiteness, and measures complexity, including that complexity implied by increasing heterogeneity.-Principles of Psychology, ii. 516 f.

2 Data of Ethics, p. 113.

3 Cf. Principles of Sociology, ii. 725.

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