neither of

which can

serve as an

ethical standard.

priation of the circumstances of another community; but, so far as structure is concerned, it is composed of far fewer and simpler component elements than the feeling for British interests.

Nor, on the other hand, can we allow ourselves to take refuge in the conclusion that, if the more complex emotion cannot be held to be better morally, then that which is later in evolution may at least be regarded as of higher authority than the earlier evolved feeling. According to Mr Spencer, the man who obtains by fraud the money to support his family is to be condemned, because, although we admit the claim his family have upon him, "we regard as of superior authority the feelings which respond to men's proprietary claims-feelings which are re-representative in a higher degree and refer to more remote diffused consequences."1 But were this the ground of distinction, we ought also to regard the feelings prompting a man to distribute his fortune in any foolish enterprise " as of superior authority" to those which prompt him to support his family, if only the former are " re-representative in a higher degree," and their consequences more "remote" and "diffused." Many of the greatest evils which infect social life and warp the moral feelings of men, are evils which are only possible as the result of a highly advanced civilisation and a refined and delicate organisation of the mind. 1 Data of Ethics, p. 123.

The factitious sentiments raised by a subtle casuistry with the effect of confusing the ordinary distinctions of right and wrong are, in almost all cases, more indirect and re-representative than the feelings in harmony with the moral consciousness of the community which they set aside in the individual conscience. So obvious, indeed, are objections of this kind-objections, that is to say, taken from the impossibility of so applying the criterion as to construct a workable system of morals-that Mr Spencer virtually relinquishes his own theory, talking of it as true only "on the average," and even allowing that it is in some cases suicidal.2

"1

As it cannot be held that the more complex in evolution is of greater authority than the less complex, nor that the later in evolution has such authority over the earlier, we must admit that the so-called "fundamental characteristics" of evolution, which find a place in its definition or "formula," are unable to determine its value in an ethical regard. The richness of life, physical, intellectual, and social, has indeed been produced only as the result of a long course of development, and by the assimilation of many various elements into a complex organisation; but its value cannot be measured either by the test of mechanical complexity, or by the length of time it has taken to evolve. We must therefore seek some other 1 Data of Ethics, pp. 107, 129. 2 Ibid., p. 110.

3. Further attempt to

method of giving a meaning to evolution in the region of moral values; and we find Mr Spencer himself really falling back in his discussion on the more general answer to our question, that the end of evolution is life: "evolution becomes the highest possible when the conduct simultaneously achieves the greatest totality of life in self, offspring, and fellow-men." Since it appears, then, that the characteristic of complexity or variety is as unsatisfactory a criterion of morality, as the notion of "adaptation to environment" was found to be, we must ask for some further interpretation of the notion of "development" or "increase of life" when regarded as the end of conduct.

3. The ethics of evolution-in whatever form we define devel- have as yet found it has always proceeded on the increase of assumption that life is desirable, and that it has a value which makes its pursuit and promotion

opment or

life as the end.

a reasonable moral end. How this fundamental ethical assumption2 is to be justified, I do not at present inquire. But the question must now be faced-What is meant by "life" when we say

1 Data of Ethics, p. 25; cf. Lange, Ges. d. Mat., ii. 247. Lange's statement is noteworthy: "Die menschliche Vernunft kennt kein anderes Ideal, als die möglichste Erhaltung und Vervollkommnung des Lebens, welches einmal begonnen hat, verbunden mit der Einschränkung von Geburt und Tod."

2 The "endeavour to further evolution, especially that of the human race," is put forward as a new duty" by Mr F. Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (1883), p. 337.

definition of

cient.

that its "increase" or " development" is the moral end, and speak of its "greatest totality" in a way that implies that it admits of quantitative measurement? The biological definition of life is Biological itself matter of dispute. But, even were such a de- life insuffifinition as that proposed by Mr Spencer agreed to, it would be insufficient to provide a standard for human conduct. The very generality which may make it fit to stand as a definition, or at least abstract description, of life, renders it at the same time incapable of serving as a criterion by which the various modes of the manifestation of life may be judged. One point, however, generally emphasised by the theory of evolution, may be admitted. The life which human conduct "ought" to increase is not merely that of one individual man, but the whole life of the community-" self, offspring, and fellow-men"-with which the individual life is bound up. Evolution has shown how the growth of the individual has been so dependent upon that of the whole body of society that it is impossible to separate their interests. At the same time, no complete identity has been brought about, and it remains one of the greatest difficulties of any empirical theory to harmonise their competing claims. For argument's sake, however, and to admit of the quality of the end being investigated apart from considerations as to the method of distribution, the question may be discussed as if natural selection

Health as

the end

to interpret

pleasure,

had produced complete solidarity between the life of the individual and that of the race.

What criterion have we, then, of the development of human nature or life? The answer at once suggests itself that the higher evolution of life can be accurately measured by the amount of pleasure got by living beings. But this view has been examined in the preceding chapter, and found to be unsupported by sufficient evidence; so that we are driven to seek for some non-hedonistic criterion that will give meaning to the phrase "development" or "increase of life," when prescribed as the ethical end.

Nor is the matter made any clearer by saying that either used the "health" of society is the end we ought to promote. This has been put forward as an interpretation of the hedonistic principle, which brings that principle into accord with the theory of evolution. As such, however, it seems open to fatal objections. Given as an explanation of "pleasure," it falls back upon the notion of "life"; for health can only be

1 Darwin, Descent of Man, p. 121; Stephen, Science of Ethics, p. 366. Earlier than either of these writers, Dr Hutchison Stirling suggested Health as a practical principle to be set against the anarchy of individualism. But with him, it is not an empirical generalisation of the tendency of evolution. It is as "the outward sign of freedom, the realisation of the universal will,” that "health may be set at once as sign and as goal of the harmonious operation of the whole system—as sign and as goal of a realisation of life."-Secret of Hegel, ii. 554.