which the thing was formed. The best bow is best serves that which shoots truest and farthest with a its purpose or as the normal, or purpose which is not rooted in the nature of his organism. How, then, shall we now determine the type in conformity to which perfection consists ? 1 The first answer to this seems to be, that the type is what is normal,-" what we have learned to regard as the normal development of objects belonging to" the class. But the normal may have either of two meanings-it may, in the first place, mean the usual or customary. This, however, would make the typical man mean the ordinary or average man; and the ideal of conformity to the type would be reduced to doing the customary thing, and not trying to be better than one's neighbours. But it is evident that this stationary morality does not represent properly what is fundamental in the theory of evolution: "whatever other duties men may acknowledge, they do not look upon it as a duty to preserve the species in statu quo." 3 If natural science teaches one thing more clearly than another, it is that the type, like the individual, is not permanent, but the subject of gradual modifications. If the type is what is normal, we must mean by "normal" something 1 Even were we to succeed in getting a satisfactory view of the type, we should still have to leave room for the individuality of each person, which is such that his function must differ in a manner corresponding to his peculiar nature and surroundings (cf. Lotze, Grundzüge der praktischen Phil., p. 13 f.) 3 Ibid., p. 100. 2 Simcox, Natural Law, p. 88. else than customary. But the only other meaning is or as what has strongest vitality velopment, of the word seems to imply a reference to a rule -either a rule imposed from without, or an inner or aids deconstitution or order. If the former alternative is that is, adopted, then we may use another definition of Mr Stephen's, and say that "the typical organism that organism which is best fitted for all the conditions of life, or, in other words, which has the strongest vitality;" and thus have to fall back either on the notion of "adaptation to environment," or on that of "strongest vitality "the notion we are seeking to interpret. If the other meaning, which the reference to a rule may convey, be adopted, then we are met by the fact that the inner order or constitution which is to be our guide, can (from our present empirical point of view) mean nothing different from the line. of development. And as we have already seen that it is unsatisfactory to interpret this as equivalent to adaptation to environment, or to increase of definiteness, coherence, and heterogeneity, this principle of conformity to the type is reduced to the general principle which we have been attempting to define more exactly-increase of life. dance and Thus the first determination of natural good (8) Abunas "perfection of the type" is seen to reduce variety of itself to the second, "absolute abundance and vital power, variety of vital power." For the additional state ment, which makes the highest excellence consist in "conformity to the type as it is going to be, but as, except in a few chosen specimens, it is not yet discernible to be," is unsatisfactory. For to those "few chosen specimens " the end would seem to be simply to remain as they are-a conclusion which is hardly consistent for a writer who regards morality as a continual progress towards a higher life, a process of "climbing." 2 And, for the generality of men, there must be some standard for determining what is "going to be," and for certifying that the "few chosen specimens" have realised this state in its perfect form. Thus "conformity to the type as it is going to be," equally with "perfection of [conformity to] the type as it is," seems to be but another way of saying " abundance and variety of vital power," or, more fully stated, "the possession of abundant faculties, active and passive, fully developed, and in regular and equal exercise." 3 The question thus comes to be how we are to determine this "abundance of faculties." We cannot do so by reference to such characteristics as increase in the number and complexity of these faculties; for a criterion of this kind, as we have seen, is of no 1 Simcox, Natural Law, p. 104. 2 Ibid., p. 103. 3 Ibid., p. 89; cf. J. T. Punnet, Mind, x. 91: "What the progress-principle makes its aim and end is not complexity, but the highest and choicest fruits of complexity—the harmonious unfolding of all the latent capacities of man." assistance in deciding the most fundamental ethical questions. To say that these faculties must be regular and equal" in their exercise, is to give a merely formal canon. For how the equality and regularity are to be brought about,-which faculties are to be supreme and which subordinate-what meaning equality can have in view of the admitted diversity in a man's nature,- are questions left altogether undetermined. And to describe the ideal or perfect universe as one in which there is no conflict or collision,1 is to give a description which is negative as well as merely formal. We are thus obliged to fall back on which falls a subjective criterion, and say that the abundant life which it is the end of conduct to promote is a man's strongest tendencies, or the greatest number of these. Natural good is determined by "preferring out of all the rudimentary possibilities existing in nature, the combination that harmonises the greatest number of the strongest tendencies." "2 We set out, be it remembered, to obtain a characterisation of those acts to which the most persistent tendencies of human nature lead us; and the conclusion we have arrived at is, that they are the acts which harmonise the greatest number of the strongest tendencies. The objective stand 1 "Of real tendencies" tendencies are not real? 2 Natural Law, p. 98. - Natural Law, p. 98. But what back on the subjective standard. |