dispose himself to pursue the course most conducive to his own happiness.' The consequences to the third theory of action of the third alternative (c) are (c) in its similar: it only states the law with more appear- meaning. ance of psychological accuracy. If a man always follows that course of action which will give him at the time the greatest (real and imaginative) satisfaction, it is impossible for us to infer from his nature an ethical law prescribing some other end, without admitting a fundamental contradiction in human nature; while to say that he ought to seek the end he always does and cannot help seeking, is unnecessary and even unmeaning. Modification of character may of course be still brought about, since the kinds of action in which an individual takes pleasure may be varied almost indefinitely. But the motive made use of in this educative process must be personal pleasure; and the end the legislator has in view in his work must be the same, though it is often quietly assumed that for him personal pleasure has become identified with the wider interests of the community. guity, The different significations of which it admits Result of show that the psychological law that action follows this ambithe greatest pleasure is by no means so clear as it may at first sight appear. Probably it is the very 1 Bentham, op. cit., chap. xix. (xvii. in the reprint of 1879), § 20; Works, i. 148. 2 Cf. Bentham, Works, ix. 5. ethical hedonism. ambiguity of the law that has made it appear to provide a basis for an ethical system. When it is said that greatest pleasure is the moral end of action, this "greatest pleasure" is looked upon as the greatest possible balance of pleasurable over painful states for the probable duration of life: on the egoistic theory, of the life of the individual; on the utilitarian theory, of the aggregate lives of all men or even of all sentient beings. But when it is said that greatest pleasure is, as a matter of fact, always the motive of action, it is obvious that "greatest pleasure" has changed its signification. For if the same meaning were kept to, not only would the psychological law as thus stated be openly at variance with facts, but its validity would render the moral precept unnecessary. It is even unmeaning to say that a man "ought" to do that which he always does and cannot help doing. On the other hand, if the double meaning of the phrase had been clearly stated, we should at once have seen the hiatus in the proof of egoistic hedonism the gap between the present (or apparent) pleasure for which one does act, and the greatest pleasure of a lifetime for which one ought to act as well as the additional difficulty of passing 1 Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, I. iv. 1, 3d ed., p. 41; cf. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 9: "To a being who is simply a result of natural forces, an injunction to conform to their laws is unmeaning." from egoism to utilitarianism. If greatest apparent pleasure or greatest present pleasure-is by an inexorable law of human nature always sought, how can it be shown that we ought to sacrifice the apparent to the real-the present pleasure that is small to the greater future pleasure? If the individual necessarily pursues his own pleasure, how can we show that he ought to subordinate it to the pleasures of the "greatest number"? from psycho ethical will imply It is a matter of fact, however, that the psychol- 3. Transition ogists who maintain that action follows the great- logical to est pleasure-meaning by that, greatest apparent hedonism. or greatest present pleasure-have in their ethics Right action made the transition to an enlightened Egoism, or even to Utilitarianism. The nature of the transition thus requires to be more clearly pointed out, If the former interpretation of the law of psychological hedonism could be accepted, and a man's motive for action were always what seemed to him likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on the whole, ethics-what Bentham calls private ethics-could be reduced (as Bentham finally reduces it) to certain maxims of prudence. To be fully acquainted with the sources of pleasure and (a) correct pain, and to estimate them correctly, would imply possession of the highest (egoistic) morality. If action, men could be made to think rightly as to what their greatest pleasure consisted in, then right action on their part-that is to say, the pursuit of estimate of conse quences of their greatest pleasure—would (according to Bentham's psychology) follow as a matter of course. Right conduct, however, is not so purely an affair of the intellect as this would make it. Indeed, Bentham's psychological assumption requires only to be plainly stated for its inconsistency with the facts of human action to become apparent. The "video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor" expresses too common an experience to be so easily explained away. The impulses by which action is governed are not always in accordance with what the intellect decides to be best on a survey of the whole life and its varied chances. In judging the consequences of action, a future good is compared with a present, regardless of the mere difference of (b) and cor- time by which they are separated. But the springs which move the will are often at variance with the decisions of the understanding; and many men are unable to resist the strength of the impulse to act for the pleasure of the moment, though they foresee that a greater future satisfaction would follow from present self-denial. responding strength of feeling. It would seem, then, that the facts of experience are sufficient to show that a man's conduct does not always follow the course which he thinks likely to bring him the greatest pleasure on the whole. But the view that a man always acts for what is most pleasant—or least painful-at the time cannot be dismissed so easily. It is not enough simply to point to the facts of human action in order to show that this hypothesis is inconsistent with them. If we instanced the self-restraint in which so many pass their lives from day to day, it might perhaps be answered that there is a persistent idea of duty, or love of reputation, or fear of social stigma, the repression of which would be more painful than the restraint it puts upon other impulses. Even the martyr who deliberately parts with life itself for the sake of an ideal, may be said to choose death as the least painful course open to him at the time. It should be borne in mind, however, that Professor Bain, the most thorough psychologist of Bentham's school, refuses to admit this line of defence for psychological hedonism, and holds that, in actions such as those referred to, men are really carried out of the circle of their self-regarding desires.1 But my present purpose is not to discuss the merits of any such psychological theory, but rather to investigate its ethical consequences. And for this purpose the question requires to be put, how a passage is effected from psychological hedonism to an egoistic—and even to a utilitarian-theory of ethics. late that action can If a man always acts for his greatest present The postu pleasure, real and imaginary, it seems a far step to say that he "ought ought" to actor in any way to expect that he will act-at each moment for the 1 Cf. The Emotions and the Will, 3d ed., p. 293 ff. be rational ised |