If men could be generally perfuaded of the neceffity of the case, and of the efficiency of the propofed remedy, we fhould by no means defpair of seeing it adopted, at least to fuch an extent as to ensure its ultimate fuccefs. Of the neceffity, we think, no man that looks at the present state of Europe, and recollects by what it has been produced, will long entertain a doubt. The fame review will fatisfy him of the efficacy of the remedy fuggefted. France has triumphed by the free and unlimited use the has made of the talents of her people; but the people of England are at this moment much more enlightened and ingenious, and capable of affording more efficient fervice to their government, than those of France, or of any other country. If a fimilar field was opened for competition,-if the fame high rewards were held out for excellence, and the fame facilities afforded for its publication and display, we are perfectly fatisfied that England would in a very fhort time exhibit more splendid inftances of fuccessful genius, in every department of the public fervice, than have yet been produced among thofe who have rifen to fuch a height by their multiplication. Unless fome fuch measures be adopted, it is not easy to fee how they are to be refifted.

We have dwelt too long, we are afraid, on these general confiderations; but they are too important, we conceive, to be fuppreffed upon fuch an occafion; and we have been induced to give. fome latitude to the expreffion of our opinions, both because the topic has been altogether overlooked by the author of the work before us, and has not been fufficiently unfolded in any recent work that has fallen under our obfervation. The effential difference between a new and an old government, is the key, we are firmly perfuaded, to the whole recent and difaftrous history of Europe, and fhould be our guide and point of direction in all the efforts which we are yet to make for its restoration.

The only other topic in the work before us, to which we have now leisure to attend, is that which treats of the policy of feeking peace with France, in her prefent triumphant pofition. The opinion of the author, we have already intimated, is decidedly against fuch a pacification. Ours, we will confefs, rather leans the other way; though the question appears to us to be one of the moft difficult and delicate, as well as the most important, to which the public attention can poffibly be directed.

The war was undertaken, we fhall admit, for the purpose of repressing the ufurpations of France, or of ameliorating its government. The refult has been, that France has fubjugated the whole Continent, from the Baltic to the Straits of Meffina; and that its government has paffed from a tumultuous democracy, into a regular, enlightened, and well-disciplined military defpotism.

Such

Such is the state of things with regard to France and her continental enemies. With regard to ourselves, we have hitherto fuffered nothing but in our tranquillity and our finances. Our navy has been uniformly triumphant, our trade has increased, and we have conquered a great number of the foreign fettlements of the enemy, without lofing any of our own; at the fame time, we are threatened with invafion, and our taxes are becoming every day more intolerably burdenfome. The problem is, whether, in these circumstances, it be wifer to make peace, or to continue the war. The folution, we have already faid, appears to us to be extremely difficult; but it will be easier if we can ascertain for what objects the war muft now be carried on.

There are only four ends, we think, that can poffibly be in the view of those who are for perfifting in hoftility. The firft is, to restore the Bourbons, to reduce the power of France, and to reprefs her within her ancient limits. The fecond is, to retrieve, at least to a certain extent, the loffes of our faithful allies. The third is, to maintain the conquefts which we have made during the war; and the laft is, to defend ourselves with greater fecurity from the dangers with which we are menaced from the enormous power and rooted hoftility of our enemy. Of thefe four objects of war, the two first, we are afraid, may now fairly be given up as defperate and unattainable. The third, we conceive, is unjustifiable and infufficient; and it is with regard to the last only, that we are inclined to entertain any doubt or hesitation.

Évery attack that has been made upon France has ended in adding to her power. The wars which her neighbours have waged against her have been the fole caufes of her greatnefs. She baffled the greatest armies, and the most extenfive leagues, while the strength of her enemies was unbroken, and her own immature. Is it to be expected, then, that the iffue of the conteft fhould be different, when their refources are wafted, and hers improved,when their armies have been broken and dispersed, and hers confolidated, multiplied, and elated? The game, we fear, is decidedly loft, as to the continent of Europe; and for our allies to perfift in it, will only be to push their bad fortune. They had better take up the remaining stakes, if they can; and endeavour to acquire a little more fkill and contrivance, before they chufe partners for a new party. Every new league that has been formed against France, has added a new country to her conquefts. The first gave her the Low Countries and Holland; the fecond gave her Italy and part of Germany; the third laid Auftria at her feet; the fourth has annihilated Pruffia. Is it for her enemies to perfift in this fyftem? Or does any one remain fo fanguine as to think the continuance of the war more hazardous to France, than

to what yet remains unconquered on the Continent? In fo far as Europe or our allies are concerned, there feems no reason for doubting that peace will give them a better chance of falvation than war.

With regard to ourselves, it will probably be pretty generally admitted, that the conquefts we have made are of little value, except as the means of difarming or embarraffing the enemy; and that, if a fecure peace could be purchased by their restoration, it would be madness to think of continuing the war, merely for the fake of retaining them. We have more foreign fettlements already than we have any good ufe for; and it would be the height of imprudence to think of keeping all that are now in our hands, even if their original owners were quite willing to relinquish them.

The only rational ground, then, upon which the continuance of the war, as it feems to us, can be juftified, is, that in point of fact, we are fafer from the power of France by war, than we fhould be by peace; that war is truly a defenfive measure with us; and that, to relinquifh the advantages which its continuance gives us over the enemy, would be to fall into a fnare which a very little forefight might enable us to efcape. It is effential to inquire, therefore, how far this is a well-founded opinion.

It proceeds upon one general and fundamental suppofition, which we are not inclined to dispute, viz. that the enemy would like better to conquer, than to make peace with us; that he dislikes our free conftitution, our naval power, and commercial profperity; and deeply refents the deftruction of his marine, and the hoftility we have fo zealously endeavoured to excite against him. If he does make peace with us, therefore, we may depend upon it that it will be for his own convenience, and not for any love he bears to us, and that he will have every inclination to procure our destruction, whenever he can find an opportunity. In admitting all this, however, as to the difpofitions of the French government, we do not admit much more than may be fafely affumed as to the purpofes and difpofitions with which nations in general leave off an indecifive war. They do not in general love each other at such a moment at all better than they did during the subfiftence of hoftilities; nor do they care lefs for the objects, for the attainment of which they have been fhedding each other's blood in vain. They make peace merely because they defpair of obtaining those objects at any reasonable expense; but with a strong refolution to renew the pursuit of them, whenever they think they can be attained. As to making peace in the fpirit of peace, therefore, it is a profeffion in which we have no faith on any occafion. For the fame reason, we are but little moved with the common declamatory in

vectives

vectives against the perfidioufnefs of our enemy, and the impoffibility of trufting to any promises or engagements he may come under. We conceive that all nations are perfidious in this fenfe of the word; and that they neither do, nor can trust to the good faith of each other, when they enter into compacts and agreements. There are few pofitions in the science of politics fo generally and conftantly true as this, that a treaty will not bind any govern ment much longer than its intereft would have bound it at any rate; and that all treaties will be broken, foon after it ceases to be the interest of either of the parties to obferve them. If we were at peace with France to-morrow, it would ftill be very much for her intereft (we mean the intereft of her prefent government) to demolish our constitution and our marine, and very much for ours, to reduce her power, and diminish her territory. If either of the parties, therefore, faw a fair profpect of accomplishing their end, is there any one fo romantic as to fuppofe that pretexts would not be found to fet afide the pacific bonds of the treaty ?

It is no doubt true, at the fame time, that there are peculiarities in the prefent cafe which give an extraordinary weight to fome of the confiderations to which we have alluded. The object about which we are contending is nothing less than our existence; and the hoftility of the enemy approaches to the bitterness of perfonal hatred and animofity: we have nothing to receive back, befides, at a peace, and have a great deal to give up. All thofe things certainly require deliberation. The most important of them, however, is the peculiar hoftility of the enemy; and we will confefs, that our conclufion upon the general question would be very much influenced by the opinion we fhould form as to the extent of this hoftility, and the degree to which it is felt by the French nation in general.

If we could perfuade ourselves that the French emperor had fworn in his heart to accomplish our deftruction, or perish in the attempt, and offered to make peace with no other purpofe than to take profit by the temporary advantages it might give him by the restoration of his colonies, and the opportunity of bringing home his stores and treasure;-if we could believe, in fhort, that he was refolved only to give us one year of peace, and that he would find it safe and practicable to renew the war again after fo fhort a respite, then we would entirely agree with those who think that such a peace ought to be rejected, and that it could only be confidered as a ftratagem to cheat us out of the conquefts we have made, and to defeat the effect of our maritime fuperiority. But if, on the other hand, we fhould fee reason to believe that France ftands in need of a peace of longer duration, and that, with all the inward hoftility that can be imagined, its ruler looks

B 3

forward

forward to the formation of a navy, and the restoration of his commerce, as the only fure means of fubduing us,-then we would grant him fuch a peace, and take his word for it in a treaty; because we are decidedly of opinion, that we should profit more by the respite than he could do; and because the very time which would be requifite to mature his machinations, would render their execution impoffible.

We certainly incline decidedly to the latter of these opinions; though we have no longer room to state our reasons at length. They are founded chiefly upon the great difficulty the French government would find in engaging its people to enter upon a new and desperate contest, after so welcome a pacification; upon the unwillingness and hesitation of that government to grant us a peace at all; and upon the admitted fact, that no such use as is here supposed, was made of the peace of Amiens, though it subsisted much longer than was necessary to have indicated the purposes for which it was concluded. Believing, therefore, most cordially and sincerely, that France will make peace with an intention to renew the war whenever she has us at an advantage, we see no reason to think that she has in view such local and limited advantages as she could gain by a speedy renewal of hostilities, or that she will ultimately gain any advantage at all by a longer interval of repose.

The reasons of this opinion will be best explained by a short enumeration of the advantages and disadvantages of a peace to this country; or rather of the losses and dangers which we shall incur and avoid, by accepting, at this moment, of terms of pacification.

The dangers and disadvantages of peace in our peculiar situation are obvious, and have been often enumerated; but, for the most part, with so much exaggeration and vehemence, that a plain and candid statement of them may still have the merit of novelty. In the first place, we must lay our account with giving up the greater part of the conquests we have made, without receiving, ourselves, any thing in return. France has nothing to return to England in compensation for what England may restore to her or her allies. We may stipulate something indeed for our allies in return for what we give up; but though this may be very much for our honour, it will not be much for our immediate interest or emolument. We have already said, however, that the possession of these places is really of very little benefit to this country; and that the chief use of taking them, is rather to hamper and annoy the enemy, than to enrich ourselves. The chief disadvantage, therefore, which we shall fuffer by their restoration, will be, in the second place, that we shall thus enable the enemy to occupy variety of positions from which he may annoy us, on the re

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