and Georges, if he had preferved, by cultivating the arts of peace, the beft fruits of his victories, and had reftored the lawful princes to the throne of France-'alors Buonaparté eût été le plus grand homme que l'hiftoire passée, prefente et future, eût prefenté à l'admiration des fiècles.' This at once deftroys his whole doctrine of Buonaparte having only an ordinary genius; for furely, the addition of extraordinary moderation and virtue, to common· rate talents, cannot conftitute such greatness as the world never faw.' And if our author means to tell us, that true greatness of character depends as much upon worth as genius, he is only repeating a verbal criticism, as trite as it is trivial; which, if admitted to its utmoft extent, merely proves, that a character may be very great, without attaining the utmost conceivable pitch of greatness.

General Dumourier proposes to justify his disbelief of Buonaparte's military talents, by a particular analysis of his conduct and that of his enemies, during the three last campaigns;-the war with Austria in 1805; with Prussia in 1806; and the present war with Russia, down to the battle of Eylau. It is unnecessary, and might perhaps appear presumptuous, to follow this analysis minutely. Certain general considerations, which occur to persons not conversant with military affairs, are sufficient answers to the author's inferences, even were we to admit the whole of his details, through respect for so great an authority. But there are also defects in his reasoning, on points of military science, too obvious to have escaped him, had he not been warped by his theory, and set out predetermined to find every thing wrong which both Buonaparte and the allies have done, and every thing quite practicable which either party has omitted.

The campaign of 1805, according to our author, was a contest which party should commit most mistakes. England having done nothing to create alarm on the North coast of France, and Prussia shewing no symptoms of hostility, but, on the contrary, remaining firm in her neutrality, as Buonaparte well knew, from the venality of the cabinet of Berlin;-he was enabled to reinforce Massena, and to march with all his troops into Suabia. The blunders of Austria at the outset were obvious; they have never been denied. But the hostile seizure of the Elector of Bavaria's person, and the forcible incorporation of his army with the Emperor's, are surely not the omissions which we have most reason to regret. General Dumourier forgets, that the Elector accused the Emperor of having suddenly demanded the dismission and incorporation of his army; and of having, on a refusal, seized upon the electorate, The Emperor too admitted, that, what

ever were his demands, he had ordered his army to march, whether they should be complied with or not.* Here, then, was just as much violence as heart could wish; but the execution was not so prompt as such violent policy requires; and Austria had the full credit, without reaping the benefit, of those reprehensible councils. We take the liberty of suggesting, that the grand error, in so far as regarded Bavaria, was the omitting to ascertain, beforehand, whether the influence acquired by France over the court of Munich, from the affair of the indemnities, had been extinguished, or, indeed, expecting that it should be extinguished, or ever imagining that the Elector could hesitate which of the two dangers he should chiefly shun, a rupture with France, or a breach with Austria. Then, if the war could not safely be commenced without Bavaria, it should have been delayed; or, if it must be commenced, and in spite of Bavaria, it should only have been begun, when Austria was able, at one and the same time, to give France the alarm, and to march through that electorate. Such movements, indeed, require a certain time; and Buonaparte must necessarily have learnt that they were in preparation. Then, he could hurry his army through Flanders and cross the Rhine, as soon as he was assured of the dispositions of Austria. But in what does superiority of policy, aye, and of military address, consist? Is there no skill in moving exactly at the right time, and to the proper place,-and with the requisite degree of celerity? The plain truth is, that Austria went to war too soon;-and, having resolved on war, she delayed her operations too long. France committed no such mistakes; and beat her accordingly.

But, though the campaign in Suabia occasioned the loss of Vienna and the retreat from Italy, our author says, that, until the battle of Austerlitz, the affairs of the allies might easily have been retrieved. Buonaparte had advanced to a vast distance from home, both armies were in want of provisions,-a general engagement alone could have saved the French. The allies, therefore, should have left a garrison in Olmutz, and an army of observation in Teschen ;-they should have rapidly marched off towards the Upper Palatinate, by Prague and Egra. In that country they would have found abundant supplies, and might have fallen upon the camp at Schellenberg on the Danube without delay; thus forcing the enemy to retreat, in order to avoid being cut off from his communication with the Rhine. This retreat, our author conceives, would have proved fatal to him, pursued

as

*See Hiftorical Reprefentation, Sept. 29. 1805, and Auftrian Anfwer, Qctober 16,

as he must be by the Archduke and the Hungarian insurrection and so there would have been an end of Buonaparte, and the French revolution,

We fear, however, that our author is here taking it all his own way, and fighting both for the allies and their enemies. He cannot surely think, that Buonaparte would have been idle while this grand march was going on. If it was so greatly for his advantage to accept the battle which they gave at Austerlitz, he would have moved off to intercept them as soon as they point ed towards Prague, and would have brought them to an engagement, or stopped their manœuvre. The distance between Olmutz

and Prague is nearly 150 English miles. Was Buonaparte to remain in his camp at Brunn, and starving too, while the allies were moving over this space, at the rate of ten miles a day? Or, if the execution of the movement depended on its celerity, are we to believe that the Russians and Austrians were certain of marching with greater expedition than the French? Our author admits, that both armies were in want of provisions;-they could not therefore remain stationary ;-and from every thing which has appeared in the different campaigns between the French and their enemies, we are entitled to conclude, that, if the chance of defeating them in a pitched battle was small, the chance of beating them by manoeuvres, and particularly by rapid marches, was infinitely smaller. What reason have we, from any of the late campaigns, to imagine that the Austrians and Russians could have marched away, and fought or not as they chose, during their whole movement? Is it not much more likely, that Buonaparte, seeing part of the army quietly in garrison at Olmutz, and part observing him in Teschen, (which was a diminution by no means inconsiderable, of the chief force), would have allowed the rest to advance until he could just get between them and their own country, and would then, by a rapid movement, have overtaken and brought them to a battle with his whole forces after his usual manner, leaving the forces in Olmutz to garrison that town, and the army in Teschen to observe him, until he had time to pick them up after destroying the main body? Fatal as the battle of Austerlitz was, such a catastrophe would have been much more so. It would indeed have laid open to him the whole frontier of Russia. The idea of his having been in such danger at Austerlitz, is, however, infinitely less chimerical, than the notion so fondly cherished by some persons in this country, that his chief danger was after the battle, and that the allies might have destroyed him without difficulty, if they had only delayed the negotiations a few weeks longer. The indecency, indeed, with which we upbraid those monarchs whom our councils have brought to the verge of

ruin, because they refuse to plunge deeper and lose all, is one of the most disgusting circumstances attendant upon the late continental policy of England. General Dumourier talks of, what he is pleased to term the pacifico-mania,' upon several occasions; but he is much too sensible a man to blame Austria for the by which she preserved her existence.

peace

The particulars of the campaign against Prussia, have not undergone so much discussion, and are less fully known, than those of the war in Suabia or Moravia. The mistakes which our au thor imputes to the cabinet of Berlin, and its generals, are nu merous, and cannot be vindicated. They gave the enemy time to assemble his army by marching separate and inconsiderable divi→ sions from the south of Germany upon the Mayne, instead of advancing into Franconia as soon as war had been resolved on, and thus carrying it on, as Frederic the Great had done, at the expence of a foreign and hostile territory. In the whole detail of the plan which they did adopt, the greatest want of generalship is observable; and the quick surrender of the strong places, one after another, can only be ascribed, our author thinks, to the cowardice or disaffection of their commanders. He also blames the King of Prussia, and with perfect justice no doubt, for taking possession of Hanover, and thus offending the best and most attached of his natural allies. He avoids saying one word, however, upon the policy of this country, in being offended at such conduct, in the peculiar circumstances of the Continent; nor does he blame the King of Prussia for the most fatal of all his errors, the rupture with France. It is scarcely possible that so acute a person as General Dumourier should have passed over those points; we must rather impute his silence on them to his dread of the pacifico-mania,' above hinted at. Like Mr Gentz, and a large body of reasoners (shall we call them ?) in this country, our author seems afraid of reprobating, under any circumstances, any thing that has the semblance of hostility, lest neutrality should gain ground; or of admitting that peace is ever politic, lest the doctrine should make its way, that war must never be resorted to. They all along forget, that they have not to argue with quaker statesmen, but with men who deprecate premature resistance to France, only because it is sure of being ineffectual;—who, far from wishing to see the Continent sunk in a state of apathy to French aggressions, only deplore partial and unavailing struggles, because these must indeed produce, from entire prostration of strength, the lethargy so much and so justly to be feared.

Having, in our author's view of the subject, by his rashness and audacity, destroyed the Prussian army, contrary to all the rules of military science, Buonaparte might have completed the

conquest

conquest of Europe, had he possessed the great qualities which enable a man of genius, to profit by his successes. The winter was already set in; he had only to occupy that season in consoli dating and arranging the dominions which he filled with his troops; in improving the pacific dispositions of Austria; in recruiting his army and clothing it at the expense of the conquered countries; in raising a subsidiary German force; in availing himself of intrigue to separate his adversaries-and the business was finished. Si sa tête fougueuse eût pu se plier à une pareille conduite, c'en était fait de la liberté du monde. Instead of this, however, he pushed on his exhausted army, and rashly dis-' closed his whole projects. The extent and boldness of these ter- . rified all Europe, but united none of the sovereigns more firmly against him. Indeed, so infatuated or intimidated were they, that not even his unparalleled folly, in betraying his own secret, would have worked his ruin, had he not happily been at length defeated by the Russians,-compelled to retreat after some vain boasting and parade, reduced to act upon the defensive, and to await what every man of sense now foresees must be his doom.

The project which Buonaparte so heedlessly disclosed, was, it seems, of this nature. He was to restore the Polish monarchy under one of his generals, obtaining the consent of Austria, in re turn for Silesia, and drawing from the new kingdom a numerous addition to his army. He was to procure two diversions, by making the Turks attack Russia in the Ukraine, and the Persians threaten her in Asia. He was to gain over the King of Sweden by giving him the Prussian part of Pomerania, and the Russian provinces on the Gulf of Finland, which would have reduced Russia to nearly the same situation from which Peter the Great raised her. Finally, but which might as well have been placed first, as it is the foundation of the scheme, he was to have overthrown the allies in a decisive battle, which would enable him to give the law at St Petersburgh.

The different branches of this vast plan General Dumourier examines separately. There was no chance, he contends, of Austria agreeing to the reestablishment of Poland, unless Buonaparte could suddenly threaten her with his whole army and that of his allies on the Rhine, having previously completed the conquest of Silesia to tempt her withal, and delaying the prosecution of the war beyond the Vistula until he obtained her acquiescence. The Poles themselves were not disposed to make any exertions. This part of the argument is, in our apprehension, perfectly just. Our author, however, reasons from the event, respecting the disposition of the country; and states merely as a fact, what might easily have been gathered

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