domestic privacy with our wives and children, and relieve our burthened hearts by fighing with them over the forrows of our country, we fhall find fome ruffian familiars of the police on a domiciliary vifit; or fome infolent young officers, who have ftepped in unasked to relieve their tedium while on guard, by the converfation of our wives and daughters. It would be dangerous, however, to offend fuch unwelcome guefts, or even not to treat them with all the respect due to brave warriors who have served under Napoleon the Great. 'But, fhould we escape such intruders for the evening, still we muft lye down, uncertain whether our dwellings will be left unviolated till the morning. A tremendous noise will often at midnight rouse the father of a family from his fleep, and he will hear a harsh voice commanding to open the gate, through which its hapless master will foon pafs to return no more. p. 20, 21. The most disastrous consequence of conquest, would be the annihilation of national and individual opulence. The mere destruction of the funds would beggar an incredible multitude; but the trade and the riches of England would infallibly perish with its security for property-its equal laws-its colonies and commanding navy. It is only necessary indeed to consider, how much greater and more powerful we are at this moment than our population or extent of territory should naturally have made us, to see how much more we should lose, in losing our independ ence, than any other people. We should fall like Tyre or Carthage, if the foundations of our commercial greatness were once withdrawn. The quantity of domestic misery which would be produced, in such a population as ours, by this vast and general impoverishment, surpasses all calculation. The author is very long upon it; and gives a number of pictures and details, which we recommend to the consideration of all those who think that industry is secure of its reward in every civilized society, and that it is mere romance for people in the middling conditions of life to fight for political privileges, or for the choice of their rulers. The rigours of a suspicious provincial military government, would be displayed in full force over the politicians of conquered England. Our mobs and our clubs, and even our coffee-house conversations, would be effectually broken up by the sabre and the bayonet. Sanguinary punishments would repress the new invented crimes of suspected disaffection and sedition; and the happy invention of military conscription, would take off the turbulent part of our youth, to recruit the legions of their master, and to extend his conquests in another quarter of the globe. The author next foresees the destruction of our religious liberty, and the compulsory restitution of Popery, among the immediate consequences of our subjugation. We hesitate more A 2 about about this, than any of his preceding anticipations; though it is no doubt true, that the universality of that faith would be very convenient for an Emperor who keeps the Pope at his disposal, and that there is something in the constitution and doctrine of many. of the Protestant churches which would be likely enough to give offence to an absolute sovereign. The last evil to which the author directs the attention of his countrymen, is the general dissoluteness of manners which would result, partly from the debasement uniformly produced by loss of liberty, but chiefly from the contagion of that profligate and licentious soldiery which would be quartered over all the land, and would naturally take the lead in every thing in which their example could be seducing or pernicious. Such are the obvious and tremendous evils which this author very fairly and clearly deduces from the supposition of our yielding to the fate which has already fallen on the greater part of Europe, and being subjugated by the arms of France. There is no fancy, unfortunately, and no exaggeration in the statement; every article of it is supported by precedents; every tint is coloured from the life. It is even a softened delineation ; for no allowance is made for the peculiar rancour and hostility with which the enemy has always avowed himself to be actuated towards us, more than any other of his opponents. In the second part of his work, the author proposes to point out a remedy for these evils. But, in this more comfortable and pleasing task, we are concerned to say that he is by no means equally successful. His prescription for averting the present crisis, consists of three ingredients. 1. We are not to make peace till matters look better on the Continent; 2. We are to improve our military system, chiefly by filling our ranks with very young men; 3. and finally, We are to deserve the favour of Heaven by reforming our lives, and by forthwith abolishing the slavetrade. Upwards of seventy pages are devoted to pious declamations against this abominable traffic, and reasonings and citations from the Revelations, to show that the successes of Bonaparte have been permitted as a chastisement and admonition to its supporters. All this may be very well meant; but the reasoning, we suspect, would scarcely go down in a sermon. The subject, however, requires a more deliberate consideration. We cannot bring ourselves to enlarge upon the actual hazard in which we stand, of invasion and possible defeat, though it is. here that the prejudices which tie up our hands from exertion are most fatally prevalent. After all we have seen of the unalterable hostility, the daringness and perseverance of our enemy, it is not a little alarming to think how general the persuasion still is, is, that nothing in the shape of a formidable invasion will be attempted. Even on the supposition of such an attempt, the greater part of our countrymen have never allowed themselves to imagine any thing beyond a battle at sea. A few of the more resolute have perhaps looked forward to a momentary and unambiguous conflict on the beach with those who had escaped from our maritime vengeance: but we cannot discover that the idea of a protracted contest in the interior has ever been admitted, or that any preparations have been made in contemplation of such a possibility. What the consequences may be of such neglect, we have just been attempting to point out. For some of the facts which imperiously call upon us to take security against them, we refer our readers to the following passages of the work now before us. Though his threats of invasion have been suspended, not so his naval preparations. He has not difcontinued the building of that great number of fhips of the line, the keels of which were long fince laid at Antwerp, at Breft, and in various other ports of his dominions; and the dock-yards of Venice, are now fully employed, as well as thofe of Spain and Holland, in preparing for him a regular marine. Meantime, the Boulogne flotilla has been carefully maintained upon that extenfive scale, and in that fitnefs for immediate fervice, to which he had raised it before his march for the Rhine. It is, if public and general report may be credited, capable of transporting, by a fingle embarkation, 150,000 men to our fhores. Nor is that flotilla to be defpifed, as an inftrument of invafion, when in the hands of a man prodigal of the lives of his troops, and inexorably bent on the accomplishment of his, purpose: more especially now, when he has gained renown enough, and ftrength enough, both at home and abroad, to be in no danger, from the difcontent that might be excited by the lofs of an army. • We had fome fecurity perhaps, till now, from the dilemma in which Napoleon was placed, by the neceffity of either risking his own perfon in the paffage, or refigning to another commander the glory of the expedition, in the event of its fuccefs. But now, he cau afford to fpare, to Murat, to Maffena, Davouft, or fome other diftinguished general, the renown of conquering Great Britain; nor feel any apprehenfion that fuch a delegate will ufe the large force to be committed to him, either at Boulogne, or on this fide the channel, fo as to triumph with fafety, and avoid the fate of Moreau. The Ufurper will therefore moft probably not expofe himself to the inconvenience of leading the army of England, nor rafhly re-engage himfelf to do fo; but will yield to the prayers of his anxiously affectionate fubjects, and devolve on fome favourite chief, that hazardous command. But the Boulogne flotilla will not be relied upon, as the only mean of invafion. In other ports of the channel, in the German Ocean, the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Adriatic, regular and powerful armaments will be prepared, fo as to diftract our attention, and divide our naval force; nor would it be poffible for us to blockade them all, A 3 through through every feafon, and with fleets and fquadrons fufficiently ftrong, if our navy were three times as large and potent as it actually is. It would be prepofterous therefore to fuppofe, that from no part of his immense maritime regions, will the enemy be able to fend expeditions to fea; and not lefs fo, to rely that his fleets and transports will all be met with by British fquadrons, before they can land troops on our fhores. Even the vigilance and energy of Nelfon, could not prevent the powerful invafion of Egypt; and if, prior to 1805, any man believed that it is impoffible for the hoftile fleets to fteal from their harbours, to perform voyages, and to land forces in diftant parts, without being arrefted by British fleets in their way, he must now be quite cured of that mistake. We have learnt, by reiterated experience within the last two years, that all this may be done, without the discovery even of the point of deftination, till it is too late to fruftrate the plan. It would not be quite so easy, I admit, to collect and fend to fea, with equal fecrecy, a fleet large enough to waft over an army adequate to the invafion of England; but fuppofing fuch Heets to be collected at more ports than one, even this might very probably be effected. It muft not, however, be concluded, that the enemy will certainly be driven to the neceffity of embarking by ftealth. A much more likely, and feafible expedient would be, the bringing together, by combined and well concerted movements, a large part of his naval force, at the deftined point of embarkation, and then failing openly for our coaft, under the protection of a fleet fuch as we could not immediately colle& fhips enough to intercept and defeat. It has been computed by fea-officers of reputation and judgment, that 150,000 men might be embarked at Boulogne in a fingle day; for the veffels now collected there, are fo conftructed as to take the ground without damage; and when anchored at high-water mark, on a long fandy beach which is impregnably fortified for their protection, they are left dry for hours by the ebb tide; fo that the troops may march on board by means of planks, as quickly almoft as they could file off into their barracks; and at the return of high water, be ready to put to fea. If fo, the command of the channel for eight and forty hours, might fuffice for the most formidable invafion. ? P. 109-112. And afterwards After all, have we effective foldiers, regular or irregular, fufficient, in point of numbers, to make the country perfectly fafe against a powerful invafion? The volunteers, much more than the regulars, are difperfed in every part of the island; and no great proportion of them could be convened at any given point, foon enough to ftop the progrefs of an enemy, who might land on our eaftern or fouthern coaft, before he could become master of London. Befides, the defects which I have juft been ftating, would be found peculiarly fatal, if fuch troops were to be marched from diftant parts of the ifland, immediately prior to their being brought into action. Of the volunteers now enrolled throughout the kingdom, a great many many are certainly, in point of difcipline, as well as bodily qualificatione, unfit for actual fervice; and a large proportion even of those who are returned as effective, will not be found fo upon trial. It is too common, 1 fear, to keep every member on the effective lift, who has once exercised with the corps in battalion upon an inspection or general mufter; though, perhaps, he never was perfect even in his manual exercife, and has forgot the little he once learned of it. Thefe undisciplined effectives too, are, it is probable, increafing very rapidly, in almoft every corps not receiving pay, though their nominal force remains undiminished. • Without enlarging on this fubject, I will hazard an opinion that there are not 50,000 volunteers in the whole ifland, now ready to take the field, and fit to act against an enemy; yet, were there fix times as many, it might be difficult to draw together two armies of that amount, in time to make a first and second ftand, for the existence of their country. Suppofing a battle to be loft, and London in the hands of the invaders, the fubfequent junction of volunteers, who are fcattered over the whole face of the island, would be no eafy work. With a most active and energetic enemy in the centre, the communications between the eaft and the weft, the north and the south, of the island, would not be long open. The hope therefore of further refiftance, would depend, not merely on our having enough of effective volunteers, to form a powerful referve, but on their being fufficiently numerous, to make head in different parts of the country at the fame moment, and fight their way in large bodies to a general rendezvous, though oppofed by powerful detachments. • If it be objected, that these calculations are founded on an affumption that we should be taken by furprife; I anfwer, that our notice of an approaching invafion would probably be extremely short, and quite infufficient for the purpose of embodying our volunteers throughout the ifland, prior to the actual defcent. The means of fuddenly embarking a large army at Boulogne, are continually at the enemy's command. The only requifite for invafion, therefore, which, unless he trults to the flotilla alone, he must provide by new expedients, is a convoying fleet: and this, as has been already shown, he may very poffibly obtain by a preconcerted junction of different fquadrons off that or fome neighbouring port. But the only probable means of fo obtaining a temporary fuperiority in the channel, are fo far from being inconfiftent with fecrecy, that they neceffarily imply that quality; nor would the opportunity, when found, admit of any delay. It feems not unlikely, therefore, that the fame day would bring us advice that the blockade of Boulogne was raised by a ftrong hoftile feet, and that the troops were beginning to embark: nor is it impoffible, that the flotilla might be already on our coaft, before the danger could be announced by Government, at any great distance from London. • What then is to be done in order to prepare effectually against the danger of fuch a furprife, with our prefent means of interior defence? A 4 Are |