Wade vs. Powell. 4. A third error charged is, that James Edmondson was only a next friend, and had no sufficient right or authority to sign and agree to said submission and basis of reference. That he did sign it was not error, but strengthens the act of the Attorney and Solicitors. The joining of the two, we think, made the agreement perfect. We think it a little strange that the complainant should make the violation of his 'duty and her right, by the next friend, as a ground for setting aside the award; and, to do so, makes her appeal through the same person as next friend. If he committed such gross breach of faith and duty to her, she ought to have withdrawn her confidence. 5. A fourth ground of error is, that the arbitrators exceeded their powers under the rule of reference, by settling their own fees. If this was a good ground, it could only be to that extent-not to vacate the whole award. We do not think it is error. The Statute of the State, providing for these arbitrations, gives to the arbitrators power to settle their fees; and, although this reference was not made under that Statute, we think it a good rule, and ought to be adopted and enforced by the Courts in arbitrations like this, outside of that Statute, as the sense of the law on that subject. 6. The next grounds of error are, that the arbitrators transferred sixteen of her slaves to defendant to pay certain damages or accounts, pretended or real, which the arbitrators found to be due and owing by her husband, Jacob S. P. Powell, individually, to the said defendant, and the same was in violation of the terms in which said negroes, vested in her, that they should not be made subject to the debts of her husband. In making this charge, the complainant gives the names of the negroes and the title under which she holds them, referring to the agreements between the defendant and her husband, and herself, which I have heretofore stated, and making the exhibits a part of the charge. Take the whole charge together and it disproves itself. Not one of the negroes so transferred was the property of the complainant, nor subject to the trust or restrictions contained in the deed from James D. Erwin, her father, to her. On the contrary, the legal title to every one of these negroes was actually in the defendant, and was to continue in him until all the advances made by him for the negroes, of principal and interest. were fully paid off, and in case it was not, that he should Wade vs. Powell. make the money out of the negroes; so that the arbitrators, instead of taking her negroes, only transferred to and vested in the defendant his own negroes, and at prices that were never contemplated when these agreements were made. There was no error in this. Another ground of error is, that no account was taken by the arbitrators, in the award, of the hire and labor of the negroes of complainant when used by defendant. It would be a sufficient answer to this ground that the bill of review does not state that it was made to appear to the arbitrators that any thing was due to complainant on this account. But we do not choose to meet it in that way. The award shows on its face that credit was given for every dollar of hire due by the defendant, and in such a way that complainant got the benefit of it to her separate use. 7. The next ground is, that the arbitrators allowed to defendant compound interest; how, the bill does not show; but the award shows that the rule of computing interest, adopted by the arbitrators, was that prescribed by Statute—that is, to calculate interest on the principal up to the time a credit is allowed; and if the credit exceeds the interest due up to that time, to add principal and interest together, deduct the credit from the sum total, and add interest on the balance to the next credit, &c.; but when the interest exceeds the credit, the sums were not added, but the interest continued on the balance, until a credit was reached that did exceed all interest, and then addition and deduction were made. This we understand to be the rule of computing interest under the Statute, but this the complainant calls compounding. 8. The next ground of alleged error is, that no copy of the award was furnished to the complainant, or her next friend, as was required by the arbitration act of 1856. To this we reply, that the award was not made under or in accordance with that Act, and is not necessarily to be governed by its provisions, especially in immaterial matters like that. 9. Another ground of error is, that the children of complainant, who are remainder-men in said deed, were not made parties to said award. If they have any interest requiring representation in the matters in controversy, we have not been able to see it. 10. The next and last ground of alleged error is, that the arbitrators examined the defendant and her husband as wit Wade vs. Powell. Resses in said investigations. We see no error in this. Besides, complainant does not show that either of them testified to any fact that was untrue or prejudicial to her interest. 11. We have thus gone over the whole of the alleged errors, and find that the arbitrators, even judging all their acts by the rules of law, as we would that of a Court, and there has been no error committed that could authorize this Court to review and reverse that judgment. But, looking at the case outside of the strict rules of law, and outside of the necessity and importance of avoiding the mass of litigations that this award effects, and solely with reference to the interests of the complainant, ought this settlement of the controversy to be disturbed? When the defendant accepted the trust, complainant had nothing but the thirty negroes; he has received nothing from her, or her separate property, from that time until the present, except the use of a few of the negroes included in her father's deed, during the years 1849 and 1850, and nothing from any other source, except some $304 from her husband, which was passed at once to his credit. The defendant, in the meantime, advanced, out of his own means, largely for the support of the family of the complainant; bought and furnished in the same way, with his own means, and when the said Powell owed him largely, for a settlement of land for which he paid some $2,500; furnished them with every thing in the way of supplies for stocking and carrying on a farm-all of which complainant has now to her separate use; and, in addition to all this, she gets by the settlement some seven or eight negroes added to her separate estate, all growing out of the advances made by defendant, and which he lay out of year after year, paying hire on the negroes for which he held the title, and which he had bought and paid for. And all the defendant gets in the return is simple interest on the advancement. The complainant's separate estate has been largely benefitted, and the defendant gets nothing. Take another view. Suppose we should vacate the award and send the parties back to settle their rights in the Courts, what would be the result? The title of defendant to the eleven negroes, that he took absolutely from Powell in January, 1851, would be obliged to be sustained: there cannot be a shadow of pretence for setting it aside. Mrs. Powell had not the slightest interest in them nor never had, and as to Powell, Lee vs. Lee. there could be no excuse for setting it aside by him. Then the charge of the $3,200, which was admitted to be due by complainant on 1st January, 1852, on the other thirteen negroes. with interest, would necessarily have to be paid out of them, together with the $1,012, paid by defendant since for this trust. When these charges should be paid out of the thirteen, how many of them would be left? Instead of getting seven or eight, as she has, in all probability she would have fallen in debt. Instead of being injured by this award, the complainant has been largely benefitted. She is the last person to apply to the Court to set it aside. There was no error, and the Judgment of the Court below, overruling the demurrer, must be reversed and the bill dismissed. JUDGMENT. Whereupon, it is considered and adjudged by the Court. that the Judgment of the Court below be reversed, upon the ground that the Court erred in overruling the demurrer to the plaintiff's bill. The Court should have sustained the demurrer, and dismissed the bill. I. A demand once barred by the statute of limitations, and afterwards revived by a new promise, cannot be pleaded, at Law, as a set-off to an-action com menced during the existence of the statutory bas 2. The defendant, in an action at Law, cannot plead, as a set-off to plaintiff's demand, a judgment existing against plaintiff, unless defendant had a legal title to that judgment when the action was commenced, even though he may then have had an equitable interest in it. 3. In either case (above specified,) where there are peculiar equities between the parties, such as. that the indebtedness of the defendant at Law was created with reference to his demand against the plaintiff, and with the understanding that they should be included in a future settlement; and tha plaintiff at Law is insolvent. Equity will relieve the defendant by enjoining the action, at Law. and taking cognizance of the matters in controversy. Lee vs. Lee. In Equity, in Troup Superior Court. Decision by Judge BULL, at chambers, on the second day of February, 1860. Charles S. Lee filed his Bill in Equity, in the Superior Court of Troup county, against Moses Lee, alleging: That in the years 1833 and 1834, and after that time, he paid off for his brother, the said Moses Lee, divers judgments, obtained in the Superior Court, and in the Justice's Court of Greene county, Georgia; that some of the judgments so paid off were obtained against the said Moses Lee alone, and some were obtained against the said Moses Lee, as principal, and the complainant, as security. That the complainant also, at the special instance and request of the said Moses Lee, paid off divers notes, accounts, debts, bank drafts, &c., against the said Moses Lee, on some of which the complainant was security for the said Moses Lee; that these debts, notes, accounts, bank drafts, &c., amounted in the aggregate to the sum of five thousand eight hundred dollars, or about that sum; that, before that time, the said Moses Lee had been largely indebted to the complainant, but the same was discharged in property, delivered by the said Moses Lee to the complainant. That, afterwards, Francis H. Cone and others obtained judgments against the said Moses Lee, amounting to a large sum of money, and caused the executions issued therefrom to be levied on the property so delivered by the said Moses Lee to the complainant, whereby the complainant was compelled to, and did, pay off the judgments to save his property; that said Moses Lee resisted the payment of some of these debts, on the ground that they were gambling debts, but, failing to sustain his defence by proof, judgments were obtained upon them; that, being about to remove from the county of Greene, complainant engaged the Hon. Thomas Stocks to act as his agent in taking up these debts and judgments, and having them transferred to the complainant; that said Moses Lee, being insolvent and unable to discharge the said liabilities, the complainant knew full well that he would have to grant to his brother long indulgence, which he was willing to do. That the said Thomas Stocks paid off and took up, as the agent of complainant, divers judgments and debts against the said Moses Lee, as principal, and the complainant and others, as security, but failed to have the entry of payment by the complainant, as security, made on said |