The process of willing, or rather the process out of which willing emerges, is thus to be conceived as of gradual growth. We cannot assume that in its history there is anything corresponding to the meaning of the term 'will' until it is possible to connect the initiating circumstances-the feeling and sense-presentation-as subjective with the change produced this change being regarded either as one which may be brought about by objective conditions, or as itself belonging to the objective world. The latter is undoubtedly the simpler case; for the objective world is at first defined in close relation to and dependence on our experience of movement. It is therefore in the process where the sense-impulse is followed by movement that the distinction between the impulse as subjective and the movement as an objective result becomes apparent: and this is the simplest type of willing. The total consciousness, the total state of mind which corresponds to the term 'willing,' is itself a complex: it is the representation of this objective change as following from a subjective motive. In the more subtle case the change produced lies completely within the inner life; but, within that inner life itself, there can be no doubt that we draw the same distinction between what is objective and what is subjective. A new sense-presentation, for example, is undoubtedly part of the inner life; but its occurrence there is at once accounted for by reference to objective conditions. The series of ideas in consciousness is part of the inner life; but, when the case is one of suggestion or association only, we always explain the sequence in thoroughly objective fashion: the psychical mechanism is in one way objective.

Inner process of will is that in which a subjective motive brings about a change in the flow of consciousness identical in kind with that which is produced by the psychical mechanism, that is, by independent or objective conditions.

What Wundt calls the feeling of activity' in such a case is not, I take it, a feeling at all, but the complex consciousness which embraces the terms of the process-the subjective motive and the effect of an objective kind produced; and it may be that, in the inner life, there is something strictly corresponding to the overcoming of resistance which intensifies the muscular sensations in outer movement.

B.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING.

CHAPTER I.

THINKING AS A MENTAL FACULTY.

I PURPOSE first clearing the ground by considering the view of the nature of thought which seems to follow naturally from the logical treatment of its characteristic forms-the notion, judgment, and reasoning. And here there are two varieties of interpretation which it is worth while following out separately: (1) that which commonly takes expression in the doctrine of faculties, familiar in the Scottish philosophy, and (2) a more refined expression of the same view, of which Lotze's doctrine may be taken as representative.

According to the former of these two interpretations, thought coexists with other activities of mind, having a separate function and a certain independence of action. No doubt this psychological proposition is connected with, and perhaps determined by, the obvious difference that distinguishes the products of thought, such as the notion and judgment, from the simpler materials of our knowledgeperceptions, ideas, and the combinations of these in what are called associations. The percept and the general notion

are broadly contrasted: they are the concrete exemplifications of the important difference between the particular and the universal. An association of ideas and a judgment are no less distinct from one another, and seem to represent the equally important difference between casual concomitance and objective connexion.

But, while contrasted, thought and these other activities. or processes of mind are in a special relation to one another. The concept appears as a higher product resting on percepts, which constitute the material for its formation; the judgment, though obviously distinct from an association of ideas, is yet, as a natural occurrence, in some way dependent on associations: for, unless the ideas connected in a special way in the judgment rose into consciousness together, the act of judgment would be impossible.

It is easy to proceed from this point to the perfectly definite view which receives official expression in the doctrine of Faculties, but which in fact seems to run through all our customary modes of reference to the structure of knowledge. 'Thinking' or 'thought' is used as a comprehensive term for a special activity of mind, which operates upon the materials furnished in isolated perceptions and ideas, and whose several products are the results of the several ways in which it thus operates on the matter submitted to it.

Some such view finds representation in most of the pyschological doctrine of the Scottish school of philosophy, though in its latest exponent, Sir William Hamilton, it is curiously crossed by a view altogether incompatible with it. In his Logic, and in his definite classification of what he calls the intellectual powers, Hamilton is to be found adopting the familiar position that, perceptions being given, thought operates on them in the way of comparison, evolving in a graduated series (1) concepts, (2) judgments, (3) reasonings. Taken as a whole, moreover, his special doctrines in logic

rest on and imply this familiar psychological position. The same is true with respect to the best exposition of logic from. Hamilton's point of view, that of Mansel.

In Mansel, however, as in Hamilton, though with somewhat different phraseology, we find a recognition of a certain function of mind so closely connected with thought as to require inclusion under the general term 'thinking,' although its nature is not identical with the procedure assigned expressly to thought. In dealing with the judgment Mansel proceeds on the ground that the terms of the judgment are concepts, and therefore general. But this statement is immediately confronted with the fact that there are thereby excluded certain types of predication which must be recognised as judgments, but in which, nevertheless, one of the elements at least is not a concept. The assertion, for example, of my own existence, an assertion which, for other reasons, both Mansel and Hamilton were inclined to regard as primitive or fundamental in the life of mind, cannot be resolved into a relation between two concepts. Mansel, therefore, was driven to distinguish between what he called the logical and the psychological judgment.1

In a similar fashion Hamilton, who, in his Lectures on Logic and in his classification of the powers of mind, expounds thought as a process of elaboration operative on materials supplied to it, is to be found asserting in his Lectures on Metaphysics that, "so far from comparison or

1["Every operation of thought is a judgment in the psychological sense of the term but the psychological judgment must not be confounded with the logical. The former is the judgment of a relation between the conscious subject and the immediate object of consciousness: the latter is the judgment of a relation which two objects of thought bear to each other. The logical judgment necessarily

contains two concepts, and hence must be regarded as logically and chronologically posterior to the conception, which requires one only. The psychological judgment is coeval with the first act of consciousness, and is implied in every mental process, whether of intuition or of thought." -Mansel, Prolegomena Logica (1851), pp. 54, 55.]