miracles, and consequently could not answer the purpose for which they are intended. But notwithstanding this species of improbability, they carry with them all the elements of absolute credibility; namely, the highest species of testimony, supported by a moral probability which bears directly upon every element of the statement. This may be briefly referred to the following heads:

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1. The human mind had wandered far from truth respecting God; and on the great question of his character and will, a future state, and the mode of acceptance in his sight, the light furnished by reason among the wisest of men was faint and feeble. points of such importance there was the highest moral probability that the Deity would not leave mankind in this state of darkness, but would communicate to them some distinct knowledge.

2. It is further probable, that if such a communication were made to man, it would be accompanied by prodigies or miraculous events, calculated to show beyond a doubt the immediate agency of God, and thus to establish the divine authority of the record.

3. There is no improbability that the power of the Deity should produce deviations from the usual course of nature capable of answering such a purpose. For what we call the course of nature is nothing more than an order of events which he has established; and there is no improbability that for an adequate end he might produce a deviation from this order.

4. An important branch of the moral probability of the whole statement of the sacred writings arises from the characters of the truths themselves, challenging the assent and approbation of every uncontaminated mind. This part of the subject resolves itself into three parts; namely, the truths relating to the character and perfections of the Deity; the high and refined morality of the gospel: and the

adaptation of the whole provisions of Christianity to the actual condition of man as a moral being. The former carry a conviction of their truth to the mind. of every candid inquirer; the two latter fix themselves upon the conscience or moral feelings of all classes of men with an impression which is irresistible.

This mode of reasoning is not chargeable with that kind of fallacy which has sometimes been ascribed to it, that it professes first to prove the doctrine by the miracle, and then to try the miracle by the doctrine. The tendency of it is only to deduce from the various elements which really enter into the argument a kind of compound evidence, the strongest certainly which on such a subject the human mind is capable of receiving. It is composed of the character of the truths-the moral probability of a revelation of clear knowledge on subjects of such infinite importance—and the highest species of testimony for the miraculous evidence by which the revelation was accompanied. There are principles in our nature calculated to perceive the manner in which the different parts of such an argument harmonize with each other; and, upon every principle of the human mind, it is impossible to conceive any thing more highly calculated to challenge the serious attention and absolute conviction of every sound understanding.

This imperfect view of a deeply interesting subject will be sufficient to show the fallacy of the objection which has been urged against the credibility of miracles, that they are contrary to our unalterable experience of the established course of nature. There might have been some degree of plausibility in the argument if these events had been alleged to have taken place in ordinary circumstances; but the case is essentially altered, and this kind of improbability is altogether removed, when in the alleged deviation a new agent is introduced entirely capable

of producing it. Such, as we have seen, are the miracles of the sacred writings; and the question in regard to their probability is, not whether they are probable according to the usual course of nature, but whether they are probable in the circumstances in which they are alleged to have taken place; namely, in the case of a direct interposition of the Deity for certain great and adequate purposes. In such a case, our estimate of probability must be founded, according to the principles already stated, not upon our experience of similar events, but on the knowledge which we derive from other sources of the power of the agent to whom the event is ascribed. Now the agent to whom miracles are ascribed is the Supreme Being, the creator of all things, the stupendous monuments of whose omnipo tent power are before us, and within us, and around What we call the established course of nature is merely an order of events which he has appointed; and the question of probability is, whether it is probable that for certain adequate purposes he should produce a deviation from this order. For such a statement, indeed, we require strong, numerous, credible, and concurring testimonies; but it comes to be simply a question of evidence; and there is no real improbability that in these circumstances such events should take place.

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In this manner, then, there is entirely removed from the statement the improbability which is founded upon the uniformity of the ordinary course of nature; because it is not in the ordinary course of nature that the events are alleged to have taken place, but in circumstances altogether new and peculiar. The subsequent inquiry becomes, therefore, simply a question of evidence; this evidence is derived from testimony; and we are thus led to take a slight view of the grounds on which we estimate the credibility of testimony.

Testimony, we are told, is fallacious, and is liable

to deceive us. But so are our senses;-they also may deceive, and perhaps have deceived us, as in the case of ocular spectra; but we do not, on that account discredit the evidence of our eyes; we only take means, in certain cases, for correcting their indications by other senses, as by touching the object, or by a comparison with the visual impressions of other men; and, whatever probability there is that the eyes of one man may be deceived in any one instance, the probability is as nothing that both his sight and touch should be deceived at once; or that the senses of ten men should be deceived in the same manner at the same time. It is the same with regard to testimony. It may have deceived us in particular instances; but this applies to one species of testimony only; there is another species which never deceived us. We learn by experience to separate distinctly the one from the other, and fix upon a species of testimony on which we rely with the same confidence as on the uniformity of the course of nature. Thus, if we find a man who in other respects shows every indication of a sound mind, relating an event which happened under his own inspection, and in such circumstances that he could not possibly be deceived; if his statement be such as contributes in no respect to his credit or advan tage, but, on the contrary, exposes him to ridicule, contempt, and persecution; if, notwithstanding, he steadily perseveres in it, under every species of persecution, and even to the suffering of death; to suppose such a testimony intended to deceive would be to assume a deviation from the established course of human character, as remarkable as any event which it could possibly convey to us. This might be main tained in regard to one such testimony; but if we find numerous witnesses agreeing in the same testimony, all equally informed of the facts, all showing the same characters of credibility, and without the possibility of concert or connivance, the evi

dence becomes, not convincing only, but incontrovertible.

The grounds on which we receive with confidence the evidence of testimony, may, therefore, be briefly stated in the following manner :

1. That the statement refers to a matter of fact, -that the fact was such as could be easily ascertained by the person who relates it, and that he had sufficient opportunity of ascertaining it. When the statement includes a point of opinion, the case comes under another principle; and we require, in the first instance, to separate what is opinion from what is fact.

2. That we have no reason to suspect the witness to be influenced by interest or passion in his evidence; or that he has any purpose to answer by it calculated to promote his own advantage.

3. That various individuals, without suspicion of connivance, have concurred in the same statement. This is a point of the utmost importance; and in cases in which we are satisfied that there could be no connivance, a degree of evidence is derived from the concurrence of testimonies which may be often independent even of the credibility of the individual witnesses. For, though it were probable that each of them singly might lie, the chances that they should all happen to agree in the same lie may be found to amount to an impossibility. On this subject there is also a further principle of the greatest interest, which has been well illustrated by Laplace, namely, that the more improbable a statement is in which such witnesses agree, the greater is the probability of its truth. Thus we may have two men whom we know to be so addicted to lying that we would not attach the smallest credit to their single testimony on any subject. If we find these concurring in a statement respecting an event which was highly probable, or very likely to have occurred at