pressly who did. For after saying that Lord Digby pretended to Lord Kimbolton that he did not know from whom that counsel proceeded, Lord Clarendon adds, Whereas he (Lord Digby) was the only person who gave the counsel, named the persons, and particularly the Lord Kimbolton,' &c.*

Although both Mr. Hallam and Mr. Forster distrust Lord Clarendon's account, it is very difficult to get rid of this explicit testimony. If true, which I cannot but believe, it shows Charles to have been utterly incapable of acting as the King of a constitutional monarchy; it shows that, after inducing Lord Falkland, Sir John Culpepper, and Mr. Hyde to be his advisers, he accused of high treason a peer and five members of the House of Commons without their previous knowledge. There can be no doubt, I think, that if by violence he had been able to procure the condemnation of Pym and Hampden, he would have beheaded them, as his son afterwards executed Russell and Sydney. Thenceforward the question could be decided by arms alone; and while we may find it difficult to pronounce that the cause of the Commons was the cause of liberty, it is clear, I think, that the cause of Charles was the cause of tyranny. Charles was, in fact, incapable of keeping faith with those who resisted his will.

When the civil war was at an end, and the King was defeated by his subjects, a new party had arisen, who went a step beyond the Presbyterians, both in religion and politics. The toleration which the Presbyterians had originally asked, in matters of dress and ceremonial, the Independents wished to extend to faith and doctrine, and were thus the earliest advocates of religious liberty. The political freedom which the Presbyterians hoped to enjoy under the ancient kingly government of England, the

* Hist. vol. ii. p. 129.

Independents thought would best be secured by a republican constitution. Their views with respect to the King were tinged by the most erroneous notions, drawn from Scripture. They imagined the Sovereign ought to die, that the sins of_the_war might be expiated by him, and not by them. Ludlow, in vindication of the King's execution, quotes, with self-applause, a passage from the Book of Numbers: That blood defileth the land, and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it.' He continues, And, therefore, I could not consent to the counsels of those who were contented to leave the guilt of so much blood upon the nation, and thereby to draw down the just vengeance of God upon all; when it was most evident that the war had been occasioned by the invasion of our rights, and open breach of our laws and constitution on the King's part.'* This reason, if good for any thing, makes it not only the right but the duty of a party victorious in civil war, to put to death their adversaries in cold blood. Strange infatuation!

6

Charles fell a sacrifice at last, because Cromwell had lost his popularity by negotiating with him, and wished to regain his credit with the army. He had found reason to suspect, in the course of the negotiation, that Charles, always insincere, had no real intention of being reconciled with him, and that the democratic troops whom he commanded were ready to break out into mutiny in consequence of his supposed apostasy. In his anger he said, 'I will cut off his head, with the crown upon it.' Cromwell's reconciliation was written in the King's blood. The deed, unjust and unwise as it must be esteemed, was, as Mr. Fox has said, not done in a corner. Elizabeth had not brought Mary to a public

* Ludlow's Memoirs, i. 267.

trial. Machiavel, in a chapter in which he shows, 'that a people accustomed to live under a prince, if by any accident it becomes free, with difficulty preserves its liberty,' says that, for the difficulties and evils which must be encountered, there is no more powerful, or more effectual, or more salutary, or more necessary remedy than to put to death the sons of Brutus,' that is to say, to give a striking example of severity against those who would be the chiefs of a counter-revolution.* Such, no doubt, was the manner in which Cromwell viewed the death of Charles. It put an end to all hesitation, broke the spirit of the Royalists, and pledged him for ever to the enemies of the Stuarts.

By the nation at large the capital punishment of the King was not demanded, and was very soon lamented. When living, he was a baffled tyrant; when dead, a royal martyr.

In fact, Charles was an obstinate, prejudiced, and foolish man, possessed of considerable talents, exempt from most vices, and possessing but few virtues.

The fate of the Parliament was much more important to the State than that of the King. From the moment they were obliged to raise an army, their independence was in danger. The exclusion of the eleven members was an act of force, destructive of legal government. The diminution of their numbers, till at last they consisted of not more than one hundred members, and often less; their subordination to military members, and their taking refuge with the army, were the preludes to their final exclusion and dissolution. The minds of men, which had been led into the war by reverence and attachment to legal forms and established precedents, were now left without star or compass to guide them. Many, no doubt, had supposed that a war against Charles I. was, like

* See Note (D) at the end of the volume.

C

a war against Henry III., a proper method of seeking a redress of grievances. They imagined that, after some contest, the King would yield to his subjects in arms, and consent to resettle the nation. But when they found all established authority subverted, all government made a matter of question and conjecture, they knew not where to look for liberty or for law. In their utter inability to remedy this confusion, they turned their eyes to the strongest, and sought protection for their property and their lives.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAUSES OF THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ENGLISH FORM OF GOVERNMENT UNDER CHARLES THE FIRST.

'Cunctas nationes et urbes, populus, aut primores, aut singuli regunt; delecta ex his et constituta reipublicæ forma laudari facilius quàm evenire, vel, si evenit, haud diuturna esse potest.'—Tacitus.

SUCH was the deliberate judgment of Tacitus; a judgment, indeed, contradicted by the event, but which nevertheless is marked with the utmost perfection of thought, to which speculative reasoning could reach. Indeed, the history of the English Government, whilst it finally disproves, affords, in its course, ample justification for the opinion of Tacitus. Let us first consider what, in his profound mind, must have struck him as an obstacle to the success of a constitution made up of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Was it the difficulty of forming a balance between the three powers? Surely not. Any schemer may lay out the plan of a constitution, in which the three powers shall each possess the authority, which in theory it ought to have. Indeed, there is scarcely any constitution which a man of sense can draw up that will not appear more plausible in this respect than the English. What more absurd, à priori, than that the King should have the sole power of making peace and war, whilst the Commons have the sole power of granting money?

It is not then the difficulty of balancing powers which has been overcome by the successful refutation which our history affords to the dictum of Tacitus. The grand problem which has been solved is, how the three powers shall come into action without dis